Abstract
Stocks and flows are the foundations of dynamic systems. Understanding these mechanisms is essential in the lives of individuals. However, individuals often lack a good understanding of such systems. Previous studies have found that rational thinking as measured by cognitive reflection test (CRT) can positively influence stock-flow performance. CRT is an objective, 3-item scale for testing the level of rational thinking. However, it is unidimensional and does not assess rational and intuitive thinking styles, separately. Based on dual process theories, rational and intuitive styles are independent and separate with low correlations. To examine their separate effects, we designed a survey using Rational-Experiential thinking style test (REI-40). In addition, we examined the effect of ability and favorability as their sub-dimensions on stock-flow performance both directly and indirectly1through CRT. In total, 254 individuals participated in the study. The results provided support for the positive effect of rational thinking and negative effect of experiential (i.e., intuitive) thinking on stock-flow performance. Interestingly, the significant effects were related to the favorability sub-dimensions. Ability sub-dimensions had no significant effect on stock-flow performance. CRT partially mediated the effect of rationality dimension and its sub-dimension of rational favorability. It had no mediating effect on experientiality and its sub-dimensions. These results indicate that interest in rational thinking plays an important role in stock-flow performance. Furthermore, experiential ability has no negative effect on either CRT score or stock-flow performance. Rational favorability part of ERI-40 and CRT are most suitable for predicting performance in jobs related to stock-flow systems.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Survey Questions
Department Store Task
The graph below shows the number of people entering and leaving a department store over a 30-min period.
Please answer the following questions.
Check the box if the answer cannot be determined from the information provided.
Cognitive Reflection Test
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost in cents?
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If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
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3.
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake in days?
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40)
Instructions: Using the following scale, please rate the extent to which each item applies to you.
1 (Definitely Not True of me) 2 3 4 5 (Definitely True of me)
Experientiality Scale
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1.
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. (ef)
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2.
Using my “gut feelings” usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ea)
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3.
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. (ea–)
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4.
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. (ef)
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5.
I believe in trusting my hunches. (ea)
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6.
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. (ef)
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7.
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. (ef–)
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8.
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. (ef–)
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9.
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. (ef)
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10.
I trust my initial feelings about people. (ea)
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11.
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition. (ef)
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12.
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. (ea)
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13.
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (ef–)
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14.
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. (ea–)
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15.
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. (ef–)
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16.
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest “gut feelings” to find an answer. (ea)
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17.
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. (ef–)
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18.
I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. (ea–)
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19.
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know. (ea)
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20.
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s. (ea–)
Rationality scale
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1.
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. (ra–)
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2.
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (rf–)
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3.
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. (rf)
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4.
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (rf–)
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5.
I have a logical mind. (ra)
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6.
I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (ra–)
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7.
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. (ra)
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8.
I enjoy intellectual challenges. (rf)
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9.
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. (ra–)
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10.
I am not a very analytical thinker. (ra
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11.
I prefer complex to simple problems. (rf)
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12.
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (rf–)
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13.
I don’t reason well under pressure. (ra–) −0.03 0.46 0.36 0.35
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14.
I have no problem in thinking things through clearly. (ra) 0.04 0.42 0.39 0.46
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15.
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. (rf) 0.10 0.40 0.31 0.33
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16.
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me. (rf–)
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17.
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (rf–)
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18.
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. (ra)
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19.
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ra)
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20.
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. (rf)
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Hendijani, R., Ghafourian, F. & Attari, I. The effect of rational-experiential thinking style on stock-flow performance: The mediating role of cognitive reflection. Curr Psychol 42, 867–881 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-01459-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-01459-3