Abstract
In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.
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Fingarette, H. Free Choice. Curr Psychol 27, 1–5 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-008-9019-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-008-9019-9