Abstract
Conventional economic wisdom views a Living Wage as costly in term of economic efficiency and competitiveness. I argue, based on x-efficiency theory, that higher wages need not cause any economic harm and can, on the contrary, generate higher levels of material wellbeing. Higher wages can be expected to induce x-efficiency and technological change cost offsets. In this context, an effective living wage, one that is above some subsistence minimum, can have a net efficiency effect on the economy. Therefore, a living wage greater than the wage rate generated by the free market cannot be predicted to generate economic harm. With the institutional parameters in place to realize a living wage, the economic pie can be expected to grow to accommodate the living wage.
Notes
The relationship between the minimum wage and the living wage can be a close one. In many instances they are both regarded as a legislated wage minimum where the living wage is above the minimum wage. But the living wage is not viewed a wage minimum that is legislated for the entire economy. It applies to particular sectors of the economy where decision-makers can agree that a living wage minimum is acceptable. From the perspective of Ryan, the minimum wage is the legislated sub-set of a living wage and falls below the minimum wage. To achieve a living wage requires, for example, enhanced bargaining power to workers plus investment in human capital and childhood development, which enhances the productivity of labor.
For a recent and elaborate discussion of Ryan’s articulation of the living wage narrative, its historical backdrop, and Ryan’s underlying ethical argument see Prasch (2010).
This is similar to the argument traditionally made with regards to a minimum wage, if it is set at too high a level. One should note that if a living wage is set at a level that generates unemployment and, for some of those employed, less income, this is not considered to be a sufficient condition to oppose such a living wage by some advocates of the living wage (Prasch 2004, 2010; Prasch and Sheth 1999). The benefits might still outweigh the costs. A key point of this article is that such costs need not materialize if one incorporates the efficiency effects of a living wage as well as the positive dynamic effects on technological change that a living wage might have. For more details on the political economy of minimum wage see Wilkinson (2004).
See Phelps (1997) for a modern and detailed economic analysis favoring wage subsidies, financed by taxes, to incentivize firm to employ workers at a wage exceeding their marginal product, thereby providing workers with a more livable wage. One side-benefit of such subsidies is the human capital formation experienced by the low productivity workers that could contribute to sustainable higher wages at some future date.
Ryan assumes that increasing wages generate higher product demand by implicitly assuming that these wages aren’t saved and that the increasing wages don’t reduce the income of non-wage earners by an equivalent amount. If wages generate increased productivity that neutralize the wage increase, higher wages won’t reduce the income of non-wage earners.
See Prasch (2010) for a detailed discussion of Ryan’s perspectives on the essence of a living wage.
The model presented here is different from the efficiency wage model developed by Akerlof (1982; 1986; 2002; Akerlof and Yellen 1986), for example. In the contemporary version of efficiency wage theory there is a unique wage rate that serves to minimize unit costs of product and maximize profits. Any wage lower or higher is not efficient. All ‘rational’ profit maximizing firms can be expected to pay the efficiency wage and only the efficiency wage. In the model presented here there is no unique efficiency wage. We have multiple equilibria with regards to the relationship between wage rates and minimum unit costs and wage rates and maximum profits. Which wage rate is paid becomes a discretionary variable that’s a function of bargaining power as well as the preferences of firm decision-makers.
See Adams and Neumark (2005) for an alternative perspective, but one subject to severe empirical critique.
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Appendix
Appendix
A Wal-Mart-Costco Vignette and the Living Wage Narrative
Some would argue that in a globalizing economic world it is increasingly difficult to avoid the Walmartization of the world without significant protection afforded to high wage and overall ‘good’ employers. This assumes that all firms have no choice but to behave like Wal-Mart and that Wal-Mart is in some sense a ‘bad’ corporation as a consequence of its relatively poor treatment of its labor forces and the communities in which its embedded.
First this argument assumes, without evidence, that mom and pop stores are more worker-friendly and community-friendly than Wal-Mart. In other words, one implicit counterfactual comparison to Wal-Mart is the small family owned and operated stores, some of which are driven into bankruptcy through competition with Wal-Mart. It also assumes that smaller stores can’t respond to Wal-Mart by developing competitive niche markets or producing more cost-competitively. This argument further assumes that worker-friendly firms can only produce at high unit cost (controlling for quality). With regards to the living wage narrative, an important question that must be asked is to what extent does Wal-Mart pay lower wages and provide fewer benefits than the traditional mom and pop type stores? Under which economic regime can workers earn an income that better approaches a living wage? (see Basker 2007, for an economic analysis of Wal-Mart).
On a larger note, the view that Wal-Mart’s organizational template is an economic imperative given by the forces of globalization fits nicely into the neoclassical worldview. The behavioral model presented here provides no such economic imperative. Also, the evidence contravenes the neoclassical worldview. In particular, the evidence from a Wal-Mart-Cosco comparison suggests that treating workers relatively well is competitive for the very reasons predicted by the behavioral model.
Costco pays employers much higher wages and greater benefits that does Wal-Mart. For example, on average, Costco, the fourth-largest U.S. retailer, paid fulltime employees an average hourly wage of $17, whereas Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, paid $9.68, in the recent past. But in Costco labor turnover was 50% lower than in Wal-Mart and productivity was higher. However, Costco shareholders have not lost out from the better treatment of its employees as Costco’s returns have been better than that of Standard and Poor’s 500 average returns and better than Wal-Mart’s (Bary 2007; Graef 2005).
Costco’s higher wage and labor benefits approach to human resource management coinciding with relatively high rates of return and corporate growth is consistent with the causal explanations suggested by the behavioral model presented here. This model suggests multiple paths of corporate governance with no economic (market driven) imperative to any of the possible paths. The Costco-type path appears to be viable and sustainable, providing workers a higher level of material wellbeing.
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Altman, M. The Living Wage, Economic Efficiency, and Socio-Economic Wellbeing in a Competitive Market Economy. For Soc Econ (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12143-011-9095-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12143-011-9095-8