Two-level games, issue politicization and the disarray of Taiwan’s cross-strait policy after the 2000 presidential election

Abstract

This study aims to illuminate the interactive relationship between domestic politics and external policy in Taiwan’s mainland China policy after the 2000 presidential election. Following the logic of Putnam's two-level games, this paper demonstrates how the newly elected President Chen Shui-bian adopted an ambiguous and evasive approach as well as frequently shifted positions in his dealings with the mainland China issue due to the constraints of his pro-independence constituents and a vigilant, anti-independence Beijing. Employing Knopf's three-to-three games as well as Puchala’s issue politicization, it further shows how Taiwan's opposition parties—the KMT, the PFP, and the NP—as well as Chen's political rivals, took advantage of Chen’s inability to break the Strait impasse by initiating active engagement with Beijing in order to gain political advantages.