Abstract
This paper develops a version of the acquaintance theory of introspective justification. In the process, it rejects the view that acquaintance is sui generic in favor of a view that identifies acquaintance with availability for selection by attention mechanisms. Moreover, unlike many recent accounts of knowledge by acquaintance, it explains the epistemic significance of acquaintance in terms of the epistemic basing relation without any need to appeal to the structure or existence of phenomenal concepts. Lastly, while in ideal cases acquaintance will provide a kind of infallible justification, the paper shows how to extend these ideas to allow that acquaintance can provide fallible introspective justification.
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Notes
The object of acquaintance, however, might be an intentional state that represents something non-existent. Consider conscious judgments. If I’m acquainted with my judgment that p, the judgment must exist. However, the intentional object of my judgment needn’t exist. If it turns out that phenomenal properties are representational states with their own intentional objects, similar remarks will apply to acquaintance with phenomenal character.
It’s controversial whether acquaintance is best construed as non-representational or as a species of non-conceptual representation. I needn’t take a side on that issue here. What matters is that if acquaintance is representational, then it must be distinguished from the kind of representation involved in intentional thought.
See Gertler (2012) for an excellent discussion of acquaintance in these terms. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to discuss these further features of acquaintance more explicitly.
There has been a recent resurgence of naïve realist views of perception that reject this picture. These views hold that the perceptual object is a constituent of the perceptual experience. However, such views are best seen as arguing that perceptual experience involves acquaintance with a perceptual object. As such, the contrast is still helpful for illustrating the concept of acquaintance. See Brewer (2013), Campbell (2002), and Martin (2006) for some examples of these naïve realist views of perception.
There are several theories of attention within philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science more generally: spotlight theories, feature integration theories, capacity limitation theories, motor theories, and more. See Palmer (1999) and Mole (2021) for excellent overviews of the various theories. My own view is that something close to Wu (2014)’s account of attention as selection for action is correct and this will inform my presentation below. However, I am optimistic that my theory of acquaintance and my views on its epistemological significance could be reframed in a way that is consistent with most of the prevalent theories of attention.
Taylor (2015) briefly mentions the strategy of tying acquaintance to selective attention and quickly mentions some motivations without being able to elaborate. This paper can be seen as an attempt to explicitly develop and defend the kernel of an idea that was very briefly mentioned there.
You could choose to use the phrase “attend” as a success term. However, even if you use “attend” this way, the important point is that the same mental act is present when you successfully attend to the basketball and when you only seem to attend to the basketball. A disjunctivist about perception would likely reject this line of reasoning and insist that there is no mental act shared between successful and unsuccessful cases of attending vs. merely seeming to attend to a perceptual object. My reasons for rejecting disjunctivism are beyond the scope of this paper. See Logue and Byrne (2008) for an excellent collection discussing disjunctivism.
This point becomes obscured when we attend to our mental states themselves to form introspective judgments. In these cases, a mental state is both the psychological input to the attentional process and the intentional object of the judgments that result from this process. The mental states are both the object of acquaintance and the object of our attention. However, it is only because it can serve as the input to the attentional process that the mental state counts as an object of acquaintance. The fact that the same mental state (or features of a mental state) can serve as both the psychological input to the attentional process and the intentional object of the judgment resulting from that process is central to my explanation for the epistemic features of introspection.
Whether you prefer to say that the mental state of awareness is “constituted by” or “supervenes on” these capacities will depend on your views in the philosophy of mind. I remain neutral on these difficult issues. However, for stylistic reasons, I will often drop the qualifier “or, perhaps, supervenes on.”.
A later section of the paper will discuss the epistemic aspects of the problem of the speckled hen.
This is not to be construed as a higher-order intentional state representing our mental state as being accessible.
In this way, my account of acquaintance and knowledge by acquaintance is more like Russell (1910, 1912)’s view than more recent developments of the acquaintance approach to introspective justification such as Gertler’s (see especially her 2012). Russell described acquaintance as a knowledge of things as opposed to any knowledge of truths. Russell used the term “knowledge by description” to refer to any knowledge that a proposition about something is true. Similarly, I want to distinguish between acquaintance and knowledge by acquaintance. Acquaintance with our mental states or their features is not constituted by any knowledge of truths about those states. Acquaintance is a cognitive and metaphysical relation between us and the things themselves. However, when we stand in this relation to our mental states under an appropriate mode of presentation—the possibility of modes of presentation for acquaintance is discussed later—provides subjects with propositional justification for forming beliefs about those mental states; however, we shouldn’t confuse the relation of acquaintance with the justification or knowledge (of truths) we gain by acquaintance.
This would be to adopt a perceptual model of introspection rather than an acquaintance-based theory.
It’s critical to appreciate the difference between the cause-effect relationship and the constitution (or, perhaps, supervenience) relationship. It might help to think of this as analogous to how naïve realists understand perceptual experience of a physical object O as a form of perceptual acquaintance despite the causal processes involved. On their view, the perceptual experience of O is not merely the effect of a long causal chain. Instead, the mental state we refer to as a perceptual experience of O is constituted by (or supervenes on) this entire causal process. Thus, the physical object is literally a metaphysical constituent of the perceptual experience. On their view, a hallucination of O does not (and cannot) involve the person having a perceptual experience of O. Even though both situations involve similar causal processes in the brain, there is no conscious mental state common to the perceptual and hallucinatory cases. I reject naïve realism. However, I think the proposed account of perceptual acquaintance is perfectly intelligible and consistent with the traditional features ascribed to acquaintance (even if it rejects traditional views about the “objects” of acquaintance). My reasons for rejecting these naïve realist proposals are (i) I think they fail to explain the phenomenology of perceptual experience and (ii) I think that the sciences provide good reason to adopt a representationalist theory of perception. I don’t have the space to discuss these issues in detail. Nonetheless, the comparison between my view of introspective acquaintance and the naïve realist view of perceptual acquaintance is helpful for understanding why my view accommodates these traditional features ascribed to the acquaintance relation.
I am most tempted to think of this as what Chalmers (2003) refers to as a standing phenomenal concept. This is a concept whose content is exhausted by the phenomenal character it picks out rather than any relational features of an experience (e.g., a standing phenomenal concept of pain does not include any content claiming that getting kicked in the shin often causes the relevant kind of experience). However, a standing phenomenal concept does not involve a token experience being embedded within the concept. As such, these concepts can persist beyond the time when you have an experience that instantiates the relevant quality. Standing phenomenal concepts are thereby capable of being reapplied at different times. However, I don’t need to commit myself to the view that this is the best way to understand the nature of the concept involved in this example.
One could give an account of acquaintance in terms of availability for selection by attention mechanisms for any actions, where it makes no difference which actions. However, as I make clear later, distinguishing modes of presentation is helpful for the acquaintance theorist. A referee asked if AAM’s vindication of modes of presentation only holds if we assume an account of attention like Wu (2014)’s that analyzes attention in terms of action. AAM’s distinction between modes of presentation of acquaintance is most natural on this kind of account. My preference for an account of attention along these lines—as mentioned in a previous footnote—has likely influenced my thinking on these matters. Whether this can be applied within other frameworks of attention is worthy of more discussion than I can give it here. However, I am optimistic that AAM could still allow distinctions between modes of presentation on any prominent model of attention. A central idea that all theories of attention must account for is the idea that attentional resources are limited and there is competition for our attentional resources. As such, whether we can attend to something will often depend on context. Our attentional mechanisms may be able to select a mental state or feature in one context but be unable to select that same mental state or feature in a context where we are focused on forming certain kinds of beliefs. This is all that is necessary to allow distinctions between modes of presentation.
We could make further distinctions between modes of acquaintance. For instance, a dog might be able to attentively select the feeling of hunger to form a belief or thought about where food may be. As becomes clear later, we can distinguish among different varieties of epistemic modes of presentation. So, technically, I would say that the dog might be acquainted with its hunger under one epistemic mode of presentation (the one relative to guiding beliefs/thoughts about the location of food) but not under another epistemic mode of presentation (the one relative to guiding beliefs/thoughts about the character of that conscious episode.) I will not, however, try to provide an exhaustive list for individuating modes of presentation.
See Feldman (2004) for an example. As mentioned previously, McGrew (1995), Gertler (2001, 2010, 2012), Chalmers (2003), and Balog (2012) have all defended versions of knowledge by acquaintance that appeal to the structure of phenomenal concepts. On these views, you can express the content of knowledge by acquaintance with a demonstrative such as “I’m experiencing thusly.” The demonstrative concept picks out and embeds a token experiential quality within the concept we are applying to our experience. In one sense, these theories are incredibly demanding since knowledge by acquaintance is limited to the application of phenomenal concepts to our experience—in fact, they are limited to the application of what Chalmers refers to as direct phenomenal concepts as opposed to the standing phenomenal concepts that could exist beyond the duration of a token phenomenal quality to which they refer. However, I think these ‘containment’ views are best described as versions of the modest theory since they do not demand an awareness of a relation of correspondence or fit.
See Fumerton (1995), Bonjour (2003), Hasan (2011), and Taylor (2015) for defenses of more demanding theories. Taylor’s central focus is on inferential justification and only briefly mentions introspective justification. Moreover, while Taylor suggests we must be aware of an epistemic relation between our evidence and belief, he suggests that an awareness of probability relations is sufficient for introspective justification.
See Fumerton (1995 and 2006) for discussion of the relationship between internalist justification and the search for philosophical assurance.
Bergmann (2006) seems to suggest that the only way one could treat their experience as a reason for a belief is if one actively conceives of it as relevant to the truth of their belief. He notes, however, that this would initiate a vicious regress that leads to a disturbing form of skepticism. I do not assume that the ability to treat something as a reason requires actively applying a concept that describes my experience as supporting my belief, but I agree that merely being aware of something that is a reason is insufficient for being able to treat it as a reason.
Modest theories can avoid the problematic implication while maintaining that a subject is acquainted with a conscious experience of a 48-speckled hen, they need only deny that the subject is acquainted with the experience’s feature of depicting exactly 48 speckles. There is truth in this idea that we are often acquainted with our conscious experiences without being acquainted with all its features. However, modest theories still run into the problem that they seem stuck giving ad hoc or circular explanations of what we are and are not acquainted with in these kinds of cases.
It’s unclear how Bonjour understands the nature of our awareness of the correspondence or fitting relation itself. Sometimes he makes it sound as if the awareness of fit is non-conceptual, but he often seems to suggest that this awareness involves the subject making a judgment that there is a match between the content of our belief and the content of our awareness of an experience.
Pollock (2000) expresses this same worry.
I formulated this principal as providing sufficient conditions for introspective justification. Later I suggest a weaker principle that allows fallible introspective justification within an acquaintance theory.
To say that we must be acquainted with the experiential features in virtue of which this experience makes the belief true isn’t to require acquaintance with the truthmaking relation itself. There is a difference between being acquainted with an experience that has feature f and being acquainted with feature f itself. If f is the truthmaker for a belief about that experience, then it is acquaintance with f that is relevant to this principle of introspective justification.
I define acquaintance in terms of availability, and condition (iii) in my epistemic principle contains the modal “can.” Nonetheless, an introspective judgment will not be doxastically justified by acquaintance if it is not formed because attention selected the relevant features. This is critical to how I explain the special epistemic features of introspective beliefs in the next section.
This is a subtle point, but acquaintance isn’t itself the epistemic basis of our belief when we form a doxastically justified introspective judgement. On my view, it is the object of our acquaintance that serves as the epistemic basis for our introspective beliefs. Acquaintance (in terms of an ability to attend) is what explains why something is a part of the evidence we possess. Our introspective belief is then formed based on that available evidence when the formation of our introspective belief manifests or exercises the abilities constitutive of the acquaintance relation.
One might worry about cases of passive attention where an experience, such as a flash of light, pulls our attention to it. Even here there seems to be a goal-oriented aspect to attention insofar as our psychological mechanisms select that experience for the purpose of determining “what is that?” See Wu (2014) for a compelling defense of this idea.
See Pylyshyn and Storm (1988).
Later I propose a weaker principle where our experience can provide some small degree of fallible introspective justification for attributing 48 speckles. However, this justification is extremely minimal and is insufficient to meet any threshold for describing the belief as justified (when using a binary notion where a belief is either justified or unjustified).
A reader may be tempted to frame my theory of an epistemic mode of acquaintance as an attempt to give a more substantive account of what it is to be acquainted with the correspondence or fitting relation. Mere acquaintance with an experience would simply be the capacity to attend to the experience for some purposes. Acquaintance with correspondence would involve the capacity to attend to an experience or its features that make p true for the purpose of forming a judgment about p’s truth. I don’t have any objection to this way of framing my view.
We might go even further and analyze our capacity to attend to an experience in terms of a reliable propensity to select the experience and its features when attempting to consider whether p. I believe this reliability in attending to something is included in the concept of having the relevant ability. However, this does not turn my theory into a form of reliabilism. The ability to reliably attend to an experience or its features is part of my account of what it is for a person to possess or have this experience among their evidence or reasons. However, this reliability is not what accounts for why the experience is a reason or evidence for the belief that it justifies. The explanation for why the experience is a reason for its corresponding belief is the existence of a necessary evidential relation that holds between the experience and belief. That evidential relation holds regardless of whether I meet the conditions for possessing that reason (and so independently of my ability to reliably attend to the experience and its features).
I am not claiming that the propositional content of our belief is constituted by the experiential quality picked out. I merely claim that the propositional content of our belief refers to the experiential basis of that belief—note that I’m using “basis” here in an epistemic and not a merely causal sense. This distinguishes my view from acquaintance theories defended in McGrew (1995), Gertler (2001, 2010, 2012), and (Chalmers, 2003) that appeal to controversial ideas surrounding the structure of phenomenal concepts. It also means that my theory can allow for introspective beliefs that involve more substantive concepts than “I’m experiencing thusly” to be justified by acquaintance. My theory can explain how acquaintance provides justification for introspective beliefs that apply what Sosa (2003) refers to as simple geometric and arithmetic concepts to our experiences. I don’t deny that we can apply phenomenal concepts in the way these other theories suggest. I am cautiously optimistic that we can. However, I do deny that the structure of phenomenal concepts is what explains the epistemic uniqueness and privilege of introspection.
I am not claiming that perceptual and memorial beliefs are inferentially justified. It’s possible that a perceptual experience or a memory experience will provide non-inferential justification for believing their contents. However, that justification is indirect in the sense that the experiential basis that provides justification is a distinct state from the supposed state-of-affairs picked out by the resulting perceptual or memorial belief.
My explanation of the uniqueness and privileged status of introspection is similar to the explanation Declan Smithies gives using his simple theory of introspection (2019). However, my epistemic attention theory is not a version of the simple theory Smithies defends. According to his simple theory, “when you have an introspective reason to believe that you’re in a certain kind of mental state, you have that reason just by virtue of being in that mental state” (Smithies, 2019, p. 154). I reject this claim. When a subject has an introspective reason to believe that they are in a certain mental state, on my view, it is not sufficient that the subject merely be in that mental state. Having that introspective reason requires that you be acquainted with the mental state and its features; that mental state and its features must be appropriately situated within your cognitive economy so that you can select that state for various epistemic goals.
See Lyons (2009) for an excellent discussion distinguishing evidential and non-evidential justifiers.
See my previous fn. 29 about my view on the role of acquaintance at the level of propositional vs. doxastic introspective justification.
The point here is that there is nothing intrinsic to my belief that accounts for its infallibility. Rather, the infallibility is fully explained by the relationship between the belief and its epistemic basis. Things would be slightly different if one were to form a belief deploying a phenomenal concept constituted by a demonstrative act picking out a token instance of a phenomenal quality—i.e., in the cases where my belief uses Chalmers (2003) direct phenomenal concepts. While I’m sympathetic to the possibility of direct phenomenal concepts, I’m uncertain about their existence—see Ball (2009) and Tye (2008) for attempts to argue against the existence of phenomenal concepts. So, I’m still uncertain whether there are beliefs that are content-relative infallible in the sense that McGrew (1995), Gertler (2001, 2010, 2012), and Chalmers (2003) defend. Nonetheless, assuming that direct phenomenal concepts are possible, the epistemically significant fact in these cases would be that the resulting beliefs are infallible relative to their epistemic bases and not that they are infallible relative to their content. The fact that the belief with a direct phenomenal concept has a content that couldn’t be false has no epistemic relevance. Arithmetical beliefs (i.e., that 5+7=12) are also infallible relative to their content but this does not thereby mean that a person has any justification for these beliefs.
Tucker (2016) presses this same concern.
There is much disagreement on the metaphysics of determinables and their determinates. There are views that eliminate determinables entirely, views that reduce determinables to the instances of their determinates, and views that take determinables as both real and fundamental. Engaging in this debate would take us too far afield. I note my commitment to the existence of fundamental determinable properties. See Fales (1990) and Wilson (2012) for arguments supporting the existence of determinable properties.
On my view, the determinable feature would also be a truthmaker for the disjunctive truth that the experience is either a red or orange experience. As such, acquaintance with the determinable could provide me with a conclusive introspective reason for believing that I’m having either a red or orange color experience even if I fail to be acquainted with a truthmaker for either side of the disjunction.
I’m not suggesting that fallible introspective justification requires inference from beliefs about determinables. This would be phenomenologically and psychologically implausible. It seems as if it’s the character of my experience that provides my minimal degree of justification for the claim that there are 48 speckles. No conscious process of inference is required. Moreover, it seems psychologically implausible that I have concepts to describe all the determinable features of my experience that I could attentively select to guide my introspective judgments. When I have a color experience at the edge between red and orange I can attend to various features of my experience. I might try to describe the determinable features that I am aware of as “reddish-orangish,” but this falls short of adequately capturing the character of that determinable feature. This phrase is the best I can do because I am at a loss for words and concepts that fully capture the content of the features I attend to. It’s useful to have concepts at several levels of generality. At a very specific level, we have the concept of crimson red. At a more general level, we have the concept of red. At an even more general level, we have the concept of “warm” colors. However, it would be inefficient to develop concepts that describe colors at every possible level of generality. If we don’t have the concepts to describe the determinables at the relevant level of generality, then obviously we cannot make an inference from any belief fully describing that determinable. It is our ability to attend to a determinable (to guide our introspective beliefs) that explains why it is among our introspective reasons; we needn’t be capable of forming any beliefs attributing that specific determinable feature to our experience. Notice that this idea is only available if you adopt my explanation of the epistemic significance of acquaintance in terms of the relationship it enables between a judgment and its epistemic basis. If the epistemic significance of acquaintance were explained in terms of its ability to embed an experiential quality directly within the content of a belief, then acquaintance would only be able to provide introspective justification to infallible beliefs about the determinable features. False or fallible beliefs about our conscious experience would then have to be justified by an inference from these introspective beliefs. That my account of acquaintance and its significance allows for these false and fallible beliefs to be foundationally justified directly by the character of conscious experience (via our acquaintance with it) is a significant advantage.
As I mentioned, there has been some recent skepticism expressed about the existence of phenomenal concepts. See Ball (2009) and Tye (2008).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to the audience at a Pacific APA symposium where I presented a much older version of this paper. I remember the Q&A being incredibly helpful, but I don't remember who was in the audience. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to more explicitly discuss some of the features traditionally ascribed to acquaintance. Lastly, thanks to Brett Coppenger, Ali Hasan, Richard Fumerton, and Gregory Stoutenburg for various helpful conversations we have had about acquaintance over the years.
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Taylor, S.A. Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification. Acta Anal (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x