Abstract
A number of arguments against moral relativism are based on the reality of intracultural conflict or the related possibility of sliding down a slippery slope and out the door of morality altogether. The first batch of arguments draws upon the evident fact that cultures are not unitary or homogenous but contain subgroups at odds with each other. The second batch is based on the claim that if moral truth is relativized to a culture, consistency demands that it eventually be relativized to the individual, and with that comes the end of morality. In this paper, (A) moral relativism is first defined, clarified, and defended—these preliminaries being necessary, given what follows—and (B) the common but infrequently discussed arguments mentioned above are distinguished, exposed, explained, evaluated, and ultimately rejected.
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Notes
Two important points about what follows. First, written as a stand-alone piece, this paper is intended to be comprehensible independently of acquaintance with the literature on moral relativism. To ensure such self-containment and accessibility, references to the literature are minimal, and a number of issues that could be critically explored at greater length are bypassed or no more than brushed upon. Space limitations, clarity, and coherence would dictate such limitations, even if the desire for ready accessibility did not.
Second, some meta-level remarks. The general view expressed in the preceding paragraph is unusual in philosophy, given that most journal literature is steeped in responses and counter-responses to numerous particular points, large, small, and in-between, in previous journal literature. But my sentiments are shared by some others (as well as being exemplified in other work of my own). John Kekes’ remarks about his work on well-being, for example, need only slight adjustment to describe this paper: “This… is about [moral relativism], not about what others have written about [it]. I have, of course, read and learned from the work of others, but I have decided, for better or worse, not to engage in detailed discussions of what is called ‘the literature.’… I wanted to make what I have to say accessible to the non-specialist readers who are likely to be interested in [relativism], rather than how I arrived at my views about it. This has led me to avoid detailed discussions of the works of others. I came to think of such discussions as the scaffolding without which no structure can be built, but which should be removed once the structure is completed. I hope that the end product will be judged on the basis of its merits, not on the basis of the scaffolding necessary for building it” (Kekes, 2010).
This and the next section overlap portions of Sects. 2, 4, and 5 (2018).
Defended elsewhere, in Wreen (2018).
“Absolute” operates as a qualifying adjective within normative ethics, indicating the force or weight of a principle, rule, or value. In essence, the term connotes infinite force or weight, and thus contrasts with “prima facie,” which connotes limited or finite force or weight. Relativism, on the other hand, is a view about normative ethics, and itself a part of meta-ethics. To say that relativism is compatible with absolutism is only to say that a plurality of valid or true moral codes is compatible with one or more of those codes containing absolute (that is, exceptionless) principles, rules, or values.
Similarly, universalism does not require objective moral truth. Universally shared desires, agreement, customs, needs, and so on could be held to ground moral truth. Stace (1975) (originally, 1937) seems to hold to a subjectively grounded universalism.
This argument is hinted at by a number of philosophers—for example, Pojman, 34—but never presented in complete form. Stace, however, in his seminal critique of relativism, a critique that many of the authors discussed in this paper seem to draw upon, does present the argument in much the same way that I have here. See Stace, chapters 1 and 2. His arguments are discussed in Wreen (2008).
To issue a perhaps needed reminder: there is a truth of the matter for the (subjectively based) relativist as much as for the universalist. The difference between the two lies in the nature of the ultimate grounds for moral truth. In my view, truth is easy to come by; determining the truth may be, at least in many cases, somewhat harder; and determining the nature of the ultimate grounds of truth may be harder still. But that is as true of mathematics as it is of ethics; and if we take metaphysics seriously, it is true of everything. (Clarity about the nature of grounding is absolutely essential to determining the truth or falsity of relativism, but is one of the issues that, as per fn. 1, must be bypassed here.)
My thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing the objection that follows to my attention.
And any of a number of more implausible views, such as that the relevant judgmental perspective is that of the person nearest the agent.
I borrow the distinction and the terminology used here from Lyons, 1982, 211.
This is argued elsewhere, in Wreen (2019).
In saying what I do here and in the rest of this paragraph, I am speaking somewhat loosely, and taking two individuals to hold the same moral code if the differences between their codes are few in number and unimportant. Just as no two individuals can be expected to hold exactly the same set of empirical beliefs, so no two individuals can be expected to hold exactly the same moral code.
My thanks to Cara So-hee Wreen, Hye-kyung Kim, and two referees for a number of useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Wreen, M. Relativism and Intracultural Conflict. Acta Anal 38, 537–549 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00539-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00539-8