Abstract
In ontological debates, realists typically argue for their view via one of two approaches. The Quinean approach employs naturalistic arguments that say our scientific practices give us reason to affirm the existence of a kind of entity. The Fregean approach employs linguistic arguments that say we should affirm the existence of a kind of entity because our discourse contains reference to those entities. These two approaches are often seen as distinct, with indispensability arguments typically associated with the former, but not the latter, approach. This paper argues for a connection between the two approaches on the grounds that the typical arguments of the Fregean approach can be reformulated as indispensability arguments. This connection is significant in at least two ways. First, it implies that indispensability arguments provide a common framework within which to compare the Quinean and Fregean approaches, which allows for a more precise delineation of the two approaches. Second, it implies the possibility of analogical relations that allow proponents and opponents of each approach to draw upon the ideas that have been developed regarding the other.
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Notes
There is some disagreement over what indispensability consists in and, in particular, which theoretical virtues are key for determining indispensability—see Burgess (1983), Field (1980, p. 8), Colyvan (1999, p. 5; 2001, p. 77), and Panza and Sereni (2013). For the purposes of this paper, a rough characterisation of indispensability will suffice.
The characterisations of the two approaches so far has been only rough, depending on the somewhat vague descriptions of arguments are ‘naturalistic’ or ‘linguistic’. This seems to be in line with the way the approaches are characterised in the literature. Section 4 will consider this imprecision and suggest a clearer delineation of the arguments that fall under each approach.
Frege in Grundgesetze §91 might have argued for a realist attitude to mathematics on grounds of the applicability of mathematics to science, and this argument is sometimes taken to be a rudimentary predecessor of the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument (Balaguer, 1998, pp. 95–112; Colyvan, 2001, pp. 8–9; Sereni, 2014), though this connection has been disputed (Garavaso, 2005). The connection to be argued in this paper will differ from this. ‘Fregean-style arguments’ here refers to arguments premised on observations about a domain of discourse, independent of whether that domain is applicable to science. Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting this similar idea in the literature.
Also see Molinini, Pataut, and Sereni (2016).
Indeed, §3 will argue that some indispensability arguments do not fall under the Quinean approach, and §4 will consider cases where it is unclear whether an indispensability argument falls under the Quinean approach. §4 will also suggest a restriction on indispensability arguments that might define a subclass containing just Quinean-style arguments.
It is not being claimed that premise (1) is true just in case the corresponding instance of premise (I) is, nor is the same being claimed about premises (2) and (II). See below for a case in which one might deny premise (1) while affirming premise (I).
For instance, fictionalists deny (i) by denying the truth of all sentences in which singular terms purport reference to the target entities (Field, 1989; Leng, 2005; Mackie, 1977). Some other opponents deny (ii) by affirming some of those sentences while denying that we can infer anything about the reference of terms therein (Azzouni, 2004; Yablo, 2009). Still others affirm the reference of the relevant terms but deny that they refer to the entities under dispute (Hellman, 1989; Moltmann, 2013, 2016), thereby denying (iii). If these opponents hold that their account of the relevant discourse is at least as good as the realists, they fall under the present category of opponents; otherwise, they choose to adopt a sub-optimal interpretation of the relevant discourse (see below).
There have been doubts regarding whether some indispensability arguments can make a case for metaphysical realism (under which a kind of disputed entity exists) and not merely for semantic realism (under which a disputed kind of sentence is true)—see Liggins (2008), Pincock (2012), and Putnam (2006). However, these doubts are separate from the line of objection considered here, according to which some apparent arguments for realism can establish the existence of a kind of entity, but only in a deflationary sense. Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting this similar argument.
See Balaguer (1998) for an attempt at deflating indispensability arguments, though Balaguer does not argue that indispensability arguments are deflationary because they yield realism in a merely verbal sense.
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Gan, N. A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments. Acta Anal 38, 481–494 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y