Abstract
When we disagree with each other at the beginning of a debate, we are confident that we are right and the other side is just wrong (More discussions on moral disagreement can be seen at Rowland in Philosophy Compass 12(2), 2017). But at the end of the debate, we could be persuaded that we are wrong and the other side is right. This happens a lot when we disagree on empirical or factual claims. However, when we disagree with each other on moral issues, it is quite rare that either side is persuaded. We could be frustrated by the other’s stubbornness. But sometimes we come to see that the other side has a point. Their view seems reasonable. We might even feel that we could have taken their moral perspective and values. This phenomenon of moral ambivalence is discussed extensively by David Wong as part of his argument for moral relativism that there is no single true morality (Wong 2006). Recently, Agustín Vicente and Agustín Arrieta write to refute Wong’s argument (Vicente and Arrieta in Acta Analytica: International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition 31:207–223, 2016). They argue that moral ambivalence is a phenomenon of moral pluralism, the position that there are different acceptable courses of actions, rather than moral relativism (For many readers, moral pluralism is similar to moral relativism. I will specify the difference later). In this paper, I argue that moral ambivalence does not support the kind of moral pluralism that Vicente and Arrieta argue for. Furthermore, I point out that moral ambivalence does not support Wong’s naturalism, the position that morality has human nature constraints, but it does support the kind of relativism that he endorses.
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Notes
This is a moral dilemma case according to the second view. The young man cannot fulfill the responsibility to the nation and to his family at the same time. However, this moral dilemma view has an underlying assumption of universalism: in any case, there is a best choice that is universally applicable to all. Since this paper focuses on moral relativism, it will set aside the moral dilemma view and the third view. More discussions on moral dilemmas can be seen from Michael Cholbi, “The Denial of Moral Dilemmas as a Regulative Ideal”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2016, Vol. 46, No. 2, 268–289.
Alternatively we can also judge based on which kind of order of values that we ourselves accept. Without discussing the complication about speaker evaluation and agent evaluation, this paper only focuses on agent evaluation. Cf. Berit Brogaard, “Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2008, Vol. 58, No. 232, 385–409.
One may deny that there is any tendency here. Also one may point out that this psychological tendency has no normative implications. I will discuss these two objections at the last section of this paper.
Wong 2006, p. 20.
Wong 2006, pp. 24–28.
Wong interchangeably uses these three terms, moral relativism, moral value pluralism, or pluralistic relativism, which seem to refer to the same idea for him.
Wong 2006, p. 6.
Wong does not hold realism of those values, which are beliefs of goods.
I believe that Gilbert Harman seems to hold this view. Cf. Gilbert Harman, Explaining Values and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Wong 2006, p. 37.
Wong 2006, pp. 64–75.
More explanations are provided later with regard to the idea of “evidence” here.
Their use of “moral pluralism” is different from Wong’s. I will explain this in detail later.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 208.
One may be confused by the first type of moral disagreements. I believe that Vicente and Arrieta are claiming that there are different moral beliefs within one moral perspective, which explains different courses of actions.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 208.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 209.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 209. The term “moral pluralism” here is not that different from Wong’s pluralistic relativism. However, their further clarification later will reveal the differences.
One may find that the following table is not clear about the distinction between moral pluralism and moral relativism. More clarifications will be made later.
For example, in the Sartre case, we single out two moral values, responsibility to one’s family and responsibility to one’s nation, and we compare these two values. I believe that principle-based moral theories, such as utilitarianism or deontology, seem to endorse this approach.
Since we are merely talking about our “perception” of moral conflicts, we suspend the discussion on the tension between moral objectivity and moral relativity. Cf. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publisher Inc., 1996.
It is the same case with regard to recognizing a different order of values in another moral agent. It is much easier to recognize the different order of values in another moral community by coming across different moral agents.
I am aware of the complications here. I will set aside the dispute with regard to the connection between belief and justification.
Many people in epistemology claim that there are only three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief, and withholding. This is called Triad view. Cf. John Turri, “A Puzzle About Withholding”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 62, Issue 247, 2012, 355–364. I am not arguing against this traditional view here. The whole point of my discussion is to show the complications of how one moral agent comes across a different set of values.
Wong 2006, p. 24.
One alternative explanation is that the parents can switch moral codes for different contexts even if these moral codes belong to different sets of moral values. I believe that switching moral codes in general does not generate moral ambivalence.
One may argue that if two options have the same maximal utilities, then there are at least two moral choices from a particular moral perspective. I agree that in principle if it did happen that two options have the same maximal utilities, either option is ok. However, I do not think that in real life, there are two options that have the same maximal utilities. There are always relevant variables that would make differences.
They believe that moral ambivalence can only be generated by acceptable moralities, which are objectively correct. Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 217.
Vicente and Arrieta did claim that people who share “objective moralities” tend to experience moral ambivalence more. Due to my discussion on perspective pluralism, I will set aside the discussion about the above empirical claim.
Even if the phenomenon of moral ambivalence cannot be explained by objective pluralism, Vicente and Arrieta could have argued that there could be conceptual or causal connections between moral ambivalence and objective pluralism (or objective moralities). I will set this discussion aside due to the complications.
They quote David Hume as an example to illustrate the objective order of values. For them, Hume seems to believe that religious moral codes include artificial moral codes, which are not objective.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 217–8.
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 219.
An anonymous referee believes that Vicente and Arrieta could have taken the second reading that any two moralities, natural or not, can generate ambivalence if they share general features.
I only need this weak claim to refute their idea that moral ambivalence supports objective pluralism.
The discussion of “objectivity” of (order) of moral values would be another complicated matter that would derail my focus here. I will set that aside again. I only commit to the idea that any distinction between objective and non-objective order of moral values might not be relevant to moral ambivalence.
We might share many values with others. Different communities have different orders of values. One can give up his previous order of values and endorse a new one.
There is a subtle difference between discussing orders of values and values. I believe that the key is the order of moral values. What differentiates moral communities is how to rank different values.
Religious moral codes refer to moral codes that are endorsed by religious communities. They are not by definition non-natural. If they correspond to human nature, then they are natural.
I will set aside the complications with regard to the possible connection between “function” and “human nature.”
Vicente and Arrieta 2016, 219.
Here is an alternative reading of Vicente and Arrieta. They would accept that there could be ambivalence between similar moralities, regardless whether they are natural or not. In other words, for Vicente and Arrieta, one who embraces a natural morality could feel morally ambivalent when one comes across a non-natural morality. Thanks for an anonymous referee to point out this different reading of Vicente and Arrieta.
References
Brogaard, B. (2008). Moral contextualism and moral relativism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(232), 385–409.
Cholbi, M. (2016). The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), 268–289.
Harman, G. (2000). Explaining values and other essays in moral philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Harman, G., & Thomson, J. J. (1996). Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher Inc.
Rowland, R. (2017). The epistemology of moral disagreement. Philosophy Compass, 12(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12398.
Turri, J. (2012). A puzzle about withholding. The Philosophical Quarterly, 62(247), 355–364.
Vicente, A., & Arrieta, A. (2016). Moral ambivalence, relativism, and pluralism. Acta Analitica: International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition, 31, 207–223.
Wong, D. B. (2006). Natural moralities: a defense of pluralistic relativism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Bradley Monton, Timothy Perrine, Matt Lutz and Ru Ye, who provided helpful comments to earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also to an anonymous referee provided by Acta Analytica, as well as to the editor of the journal, Danilo Suster. Funding for this paper was provided by MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Project of Humanities and Social Sciences (Project No. 18YJC720009) and “the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities” of Wuhan University.
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Li, Y. Moral Ambivalence: Relativism or Pluralism?. Acta Anal 34, 473–491 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00393-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00393-1