Abstract
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For the Necessary Thesis see (e.g.) Ahlstrom-Vij (2013), David (2013), Pritchard (2014); for the Sufficiency Thesis see Goldman (1999); Swinburne (2001); Kvanvig (2008); Pritchard (2014). Instead of speaking of epistemic value, some authors speak of truth as being an “epistemic goal” or “epistemic aim” (see, e.g., Foley (1993), Alston (2005)). I would argue that their views are probably best explicated as endorsements of one or both of these theses.
I am using “bring about” in a wide way so that following a norm brings about something, namely, that one followed a norm. And, in keeping with an earlier point, I’ll understand “something of final epistemic value” to mean having at least some final epistemic value, whether or not that value is ultimately outweighed.
Strictly speaking, this argument is invalid. All that follows from the Stronger Requirement Principle is that Unlucky Inquirer has brought something of value about, not necessarily that the thing of value is Unlucky Inquirer’s doxastic attitude. I’ll set this aside here.
There might be other usages of the English word ‘ought’ or ‘should’ that do not refer to obligations or requirements or duties. Perhaps they refer to what would be ideal. Neither Feldman nor I are concerned with such usages here.
Just because there are more than one epistemic obligations it does not follow that they necessarily conflict—they might only apply to different situations. For instance, as Feldman himself realizes (2000: 178), A Evidence Principle can be seen as a conjunction of three statements about distinct obligations. Additionally, even if several duties or obligations conflict, these leaves open further philosophical analysis about how to think about such cases. Specifically, it is natural to say that when they conflict, the agent will have some overall obligation or duty which may (or may not) agree with one of those duties or obligations. Thus, the existence of conflicting duties does not require us to say that there are moral dilemmas in the sense that there are several incompatible actions each of which is absolutely, unconditionally required. For arguments against the existence of moral dilemmas, understood in that way, see Conee (1982, 1989). Feldman himself seems sympathetic to the idea that there might in principle be conflicts of the kind I describe here (cf. (2002: 374)).
Some additional refinements can be added to these principles to make them more plausible. (E.g., for any proposition one considers, one ought to believe it only if it is true.) Such refinements will not matter for generating conflicts with An Evidence Principle.
The criticism in this paragraph utilizes a point raised by DeRose (2000), though he uses it in a different way than me.
Further, doing so will presumably require him to say that the Evidence Principle is not only true but specifies an ultimate facie duty. However, as noted above, I think that principle is false and so if pressed would object to this line of reasoning.
References
Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013). In defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94, 19–40.
Aikin, S. (2006). Modest evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly, 46(3), 327–343.
Alston, W. (2005). “Beyond justification” Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Altschul, J. (2014). Epistemic deontologism and role-oughts. Logos and Episteme, 5(3), 245–263.
BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Conee, E. (1982). Against moral dilemmas. Philosophical Review, 91(1), 87–97.
Conee, E. (1989). Why moral dilemmas are impossible. American Philosophical Quarterly, 26(2), 133–141.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (Eds.). (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2008). Evidence. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: new essays (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
David, M. (2013). Truth as the primary epistemic goal: a working hypothesis. In M. Steup, J. Turri, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (2nd ed.). Blackwell Publishing.
DeRose, K. (2000). Ought we to follow our evidence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 697–706.
Feldman, R. (1988). Objective and subjective justification in ethics and epistemology. The Monist, 71(3), 405–419.
Feldman, R. (2000). The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 667–695.
Feldman, R. (2001). Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2002). Epistemological duties. In P. Moser (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology (pp. 362–384). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2008). Modest deontologism in epistemology. Synthese, 161(3), 339–355.
Fischer, J. M. (2006). My Way. New York: Oxford University Press.
Foley, R. (1993). Working without a net. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gibbard, A. (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues, 15(1), 338–350.
Goldman, A. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kornblith, H. (1993). Epistemic normativity. Synthese, 94(3), 357–376.
Kornblith, H. (2001). Epistemic obligation and the possibility of internalism. In A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kvanvig, J. (2008). Pointless truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32(1), 199–212.
Leite, A. (2004). On justifying and being justified. Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 219–253.
McCormick, M. (2015). Believing against the evidence. London: Routledge.
Oliveira, L. R. G. (2017). Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values. Philosophical Studies, 174, 485–506.
Oliveira, L. R. G. (2018). Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can. Philosophical Studies, 175(10), 2567–2582.
Peels, R. (2014). Against doxastic compatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3), 679–702.
Perrine, T. (Forthcoming). Strong Internalism, Doxastic Involuntarism, and the Costs of Compatibilism. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1879-4.
Perrine, T. (2017). Epistemic Value and Accurate Representation. Dissertation. Indiana University.
Perrine, T. (2018). Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession. Logos & Episteme, 9(4), 433–449.
Pritchard, D. (2014). Truth as the fundamental epistemic goal. In J. Matheson & R. Vitz (Eds.), The Ethics of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ryan, S. (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies, 114.1/2, 47–79.
Shaffer, M. (2013). Doxastic voluntarism, epistemic deontology, and belief-contravening commitments. American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(1), 73–81.
Smith, A. (2007). On being responsible and holding responsible. The Journal of Ethics, 11(4), 465–484.
Swinburne, R. (2001). Epistemic justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16(1), 267–297.
Zagzebski, L. (2017). Exemplarist moral theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, M. (2016). Moral responsibility and the moral community: is moral responsibility essentially interpersonal? The Journal of Ethics, 20, 247–263.
Acknowledgements
For helpful feedback, I thank Dave Fisher, Hao Hong, Mark Kaplan, Tufan Kiymaz, Adam Leite, Wade Monroe, Nick Montgomery, Tim O’Connor, Harrison Waldo, Phil Woodward, and an anonymous reviewer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest Statement
That author declares that there are no conflicts of interest.
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Perrine, T. Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth. Acta Anal 34, 515–529 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00382-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00382-4