Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements
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We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.
KeywordsIdentity statements Rigid designators Direct designators A posteriori de re Modal axiom schema (K)
I wish to thank Alex Blum for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Conflict of Interest
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
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