Abstract
We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.
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Notes
Neither ‘proposition’ nor ‘is about’ are absolutely definite terms; however, we doubt very much the present discussion can be carried on without reference to propositions or other objects no better defined (e.g., truth-makers). In any case, we believe those terms are definite enough to make this discussion meaningful. Similarly, arithmetical truth is nowhere formally defined; however, it is definite enough for the claim to make sense that Gödel showed no formal system encapsulates it.
Surely, not all rigid designators are direct designators; consider ‘7 + 5’.
The assumption is plausible for S as defined but not for identity statements involving non-direct designators: the proposition contained in ‘7 + 5 = 12’ need not be either the trivial proposition that 12 = 12 or the linguistic proposition that ′7 + 5′=R′12′; identity statements involving non-direct designators seem to admit a non trivial de re reading which statements like S seem to lack (see below).
This derivation is Blum’s own puzzling argument: as he accepts that ‘T’ and ‘C’ refer rigidly, and he accepts (1) and (K) but finds the conclusion implausible, he expresses his puzzlement by bringing into question the possibility that ‘T’ and ‘C’ exist such that T = C.
Fitch 1976 argues from this plausible principle: “If S is a sentence containing a rigid designator α and S’ is a sentence obtained from S by substituting a rigid designator β for α in S, and α and β designate the same object, then S and S′ express the same proposition” (p. 244); as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is obtained in that way from ‘Venus is Venus,’ it would express the same proposition as the latter.
References
Blum, A. (2017). Can it be that Tully = Cicero? Symposium, 4(2), 149–150.
Fitch, G. W. (1976). Are there necessary a posteriori truths? Philosophical Studies, 30, 243–247.
Fitch, G. W. (2004). On Kripke and statements. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 28(1), 295–308.
Kripke, S. (1971). Identity and necessity. In M. Munitz, (Ed.), Identity and individuation (pp. 135–164). New York: New York University Press.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle., Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
Soames, S. (2002). Beyond rigidity: the unfinished semantic agenda of naming and necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Alex Blum for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Luna, L. Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements. Acta Anal 34, 9–14 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0346-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0346-7