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What Makes a Thing What It Is? Aristotle and Hegel on Identity

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Abstract

The notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters (e.g., those raised by Max Black). Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a “weak individuator.” A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent, separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context.

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Notes

  1. Here, I left aside the discussion about referentially opaque contexts, which would make the logical identity much less obvious.

  2. Black himself hints at an objection of this sort at the end of his essay (cf. Black 1952, p. 163).

  3. The classic passages are Top. I 7; V 4; VII 1–2; Metaph. V 9; X 3.

  4. As remarked by Zadro (1974, p. 327).

  5. Aristotle, Top. I 7, 103a23–24; cf. also 103a9–10 (Engl. trans. by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge).

  6. Cf. Aristotle, Top. I 7, 103a10, 27. The same example is repeated in Metaph. IV 4, 1006b25–27: “For being one means this—being related as ‘raiment’ [lōpion] and ‘dress’ [himation] are, if their definition [logos] is one.” Cf. also Phys. I 2, 185b20.

  7. The concept of genus-matter is explained with great clarity by Stenzel (19593, pp. 131–140).

  8. As maintain Charlton (1994, p. 46) and Gill (1994, p. 57).

  9. We find it both in Metaph. VII 12 and in chapters thirteen and fourteen of the second book of the Posterior Analytics.

  10. Aristotle, Metaph. VII 12, 1038a19–20. For a detailed explanation of the matter cf. Cubeddu (2004, pp. 67 ff.); cf. also Balme (1987).

  11. As we have seen in chapter seven of the first book of the Topics, an analogous discourse can be made in reference to identity in genus.

  12. Ross (1949, p. 678). Cf. also the similar interpretation by Barnes (19942, p. 266), who observes, however, that Aristotle does not explain how we are to apprehend a universal. An answer ante litteram has been given by Wieland (1962, pp. 88 ff.): in his view, the individual “by its very nature stays always already in the light of a universality”; from the point of view of the single man, however, the error is always possible, that is why the research “then verifies whether it is in this case a genuine universality” (Wieland 1962, p. 95; cf. also pp. 98–99).

  13. Cf. Aristotle, De part. anim. I 4, 644a12 ff. (Engl. trans. by W. Ogle).

  14. Regarding this topic cf. Balme (1987, p. 72), Lennox (1987, pp. 340 ff., 346 ff., 358), and Carbone (2002, pp. 558–560).

  15. This eventuality is examined by Black (1952, p. 160) himself, who goes from here to postulate “a plane running clear through space, with everything that happens on one side of it always exactly duplicated at an equal distance in the other side,” like in a mirror, but he immediately abandons this hypothesis.

  16. Cf. Gill (1994, pp. 61–63). This interpretation, which refers to the passage of Metaph. VII 8 mentioned above, is supported also by Charlton (1994, p. 45).

  17. Cf. Gill (1994, pp. 65–66), who argues examining Phys. V 4.

  18. Cf. Gill (1994, p. 59); particular forms too may be considered as weak individuators (Gill 1994, pp. 69–70).

  19. “[…] those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something” (Engl. trans. by J. L. Ackrill).

  20. The centrality of the relations with the other in Hegel has been emphasized by Theunissen (1978, p. 29): “Die gesamte Logik gründet Hegel auf die Hypothese, daß alles, was ist, nur in der Beziehung und letztlich nur als die Beziehung auf ›sein Anderes‹ es selbst sein könne.”

  21. Hegel, WdL, GW 21, p. 107; 2010a, p. 92. The English translation has been slightly modified.

  22. Cf. Hegel, WdL, GW 21, p. 115; 2010a, p. 99: “something has existence only in limit.”

  23. Hegel, Enz., § 92, Zus., p. 197; 2010b, p. 147; cf. also WdL, GW 21, p. 115; 2010a, p. 100: “something is what it is only in its limit.”

  24. The negative relation is the “puncticity” (Punctualität) of the thing, that is, the interpenetration, or intersection, of the matters with one another (cf. Carlson 2007, p. 358).

  25. Referring to these pages of the logic of reflection, Theunissen (1978, pp. 27 ff.) speaks about “Kritik der Verselbständigung.”

  26. I have dealt with this issue in Raspa (2008 and 2013, pp. 124 ff.).

  27. I assume here the definition of social objects given by Ferraris (2009, pp. 176, 183–184 and passim); cf. also Ferraris (2005, pp. 154 ff.). For more details on the idea outlined here in relation to social objects, cf. Raspa (2012).

  28. “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence, men are indirectly producing their actual material life” (Marx & Engels [1845–1846]/1958, p. 21; 1998, p. 37). “The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first historical act” (Marx & Engels [1845–1846]/1958, p. 28; 1998, p. 48).

  29. This is a revised and enlarged version of my essay “Che cosa fa di una cosa quella cosa. Aristotele e Hegel sull’identità,” published in Azzarà, S. G., Ercolani, P. & Susca, E. (Eds.). Dialettica, storia, conflitto: il proprio tempo appreso nel pensiero (pp. 73–93). Napoli: La scuola di Pitagora, 2011. Versions of this essay have been presented at the International Congress Identity: Ontological Perspectives (Amsterdam, 25th–27th May 2005), in a seminar held at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Turin on December 13, 2005, at the International Congress Metaphysics Today between a priori and a posteriori (Alghero, 8th–9th October 2010) and at the International Congress Dialectic, History and Conflict. The own Time grasped in Thought (Urbino, 18th–20th November 2011). Many thanks to those who intervened with questions and critical comments; a special thanks to Italo Cubeddu and Silvio Bozzi, who read and discussed with me this paper, and to Angus Dawson, for his help with translations.

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    Venanzio Raspa

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Raspa, V. What Makes a Thing What It Is? Aristotle and Hegel on Identity. Acta Anal 31, 345–361 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-016-0287-y

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