Abstract
In this paper I will try to defend a quasi-naturalistic interpretation of J.L. Austin’s work. I will rely on P. Kitcher’s 1992 paper “The Naturalists Return” to compile four general criteria by which a philosopher can be called a naturalist. Then I will turn to Austin’s work and examine whether he meets these criteria. I will try to claim that versions of such naturalistic elements can be found in his work.
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Notes
See for example: Putnam 2001.
See Butler 1997.
Thereafter SS.
For the sake of economy of language I will thereafter call them analytics (just like Kitcher does).
Analytic philosophy has never been a uniform tradition. However, many identify it as a sui generis conceptual investigation of some short (Rorty 1967; Hacker 2008, 2009; Jackson 1982, 1998; Cohen 1986; Dummett 1993; Stroud 2000). Others, especially today, identify it with naturalism (Kim 2003; Leiter 2004). All endeavours to strictly define analytic philosophy however have serious flows, as Glock (2008) shows. Glock rather tries to analyse the term in terms of family resemblances (overlapping similarities in method, style and doctrines) and historical-genetic analyses (a sequence of individuals and schools).
B. Stroud argues the same (1984, pp. 38–82). Yet Stroud does not read Austin solely as a linguistic analyst. Austin rather provides practical (everyday life) reasons against scepticism.
See SS, pp. 33–43 (for an analysis of real), pp. 62–77 (appears/seems), pp. 125–127 (vague).
See “The Meaning of a Word” in Austin’s Philosophical Papers (thereafter PP), pp. 55–75.
See also J. Duran 2002. Duran derives an anti-foundationalist argument out of Austin’s comments in SS.
See for example his paper “The Meaning of a Word” in PP, pp. 55–74.
See for example Hacker 1996, pp. 193–195 and passim.
This is I think what Hanfling (2000, p. 204) implies, when he tries to justify this quote.
This is, for example, how Hacker (1996, pp. 212–213) goes around Quine’s criticism of the analytic–synthetic distinction.
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Gasparatou, R. Naturalising Austin. Acta Anal 28, 329–343 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0173-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0173-1