Abstract
In several publications Graeme Forbes has developed and defended one of the strongest arguments for essentialism about biological origins. I attempt to show that there are deep, as yet unrecognized, problems with this argument. The problems with Forbes’s argument suggest that a range of other arguments for various forms of origin essentialism are also likely to be flawed, and that we should abandon the seemingly plausible general metaphysical thesis that concrete entities that share all intrinsic properties are identical.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Forbes did not actually take his original inspiration from Kripke’s proof-sketch [Forbes 2002: 337, n. 2], but his argument is of the same basic style as those who have followed Kripke
What follows is not identical to Forbes’s argument as presented in any one place, but the only differences between my presentation and his are in the order of presentation. For example, Forbes tends to argue that assuming (EBO) is false leads to violations of (SI), whereas my reconstruction uses (SI) and the denial of (EBO) to derive an absurdity
The parody is easy to construct. Simply use the above system of worlds, except with ‘green-leafed’ and ‘brown-leafed’ substituted for ‘growing from acorn a’ and ‘growing from acorn b’, and make the appropriate substitutions throughout Forbes’s original argument
In (2002) he focuses on objections to his argument relying on the possibility of ‘recycling’—the possibility of acorns growing into trees and then the original matter that composed the acorn being recycled to produce the same acorn again. Although recycling cases, if coherent, show that biological origins are not exclusive, Forbes’s more direct concern is with whether they would violate (SI). He discusses twins in a similar context in his (1980)
Helpful criticisms from a referee, including the following example, have greatly improved this paragraph
You might be tempted to appeal to an identity property, such as ‘being identical to tree 1’, but assuming that biological origins supervene on these identity properties (and so that there can be no change in origins without a change in identity) would beg the question
We don’t need to worry about the rest of the intrinsic properties, since by hypothesis none of them are exclusive, essentials.
While Forbes originally discussed the case of identical twins to motivate (SI), in his (2002: 338, n. 11 and 14]) he implies that he sees potential violations of (SI) as the reason for denying that organisms that aren’t twins could not have been
It might look like the property of being the nth entity to have a certain origin has a better chance of being an intrinsic, exclusive, essential property of material objects, since there are no ‘identical twins’ when it comes to material objects—material origins are the hunks of matter which exhaustively and exclusively constitute the object at the time of its construction. Thus, I cannot object, as I did in the case of biological entities, that the property of being the nth object to have certain material origins is not exclusive. However, it is still implausible to suppose that such a property is essential, and even more implausible to hold that it is intrinsic.
References
Forbes, G. (1980). Origin and Identity. Philosophical Studies, 37, 353–363.
Forbes, G. (1985). The metaphysics of modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Forbes, G. (2002). Origins and identities. In A. Bottani, D. Giaretta & M. Carrara (Eds.), Individuals, essence and identity, themes of analytic metaphysics (pp. 319–340). Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel.
Hawthorne, J., & Szabo-Gendler, T. (2000). Origin essentialism: the arguments reconsidered. Mind, 109, 285–298.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Mackie, P. (1987). Essence, origin, and bare identity. Mind, 96, 173–201.
Mackie, P. (2002). Forbes on origins and identities. In A. Bottani, D. Giaretta & M. Carrara (Eds.), Individuals, essence and identity: Themes of analytic metaphysics (pp. 341–352). Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel.
Noonan, H. (1983). The necessity of origin. Mind, 92, 1–20.
Robertson, T. (1998). Possibilities and the arguments for origin essentialism. Mind, 107, 729–749.
Rohrbaugh, G., & deRosset, L. (2004). A new route to the necessity of origin. Mind, 113, 705–725.
Rohrbaugh, G., & deRosset, L. (2006). Prevention, independence, and origin. Mind, 115, 375–385.
Salmon, N. (1978). How not to derive essentialism from the theory of reference. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 703–725.
Salmon, N. (1981). Reference and essence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to David Barnett for helpful conversations and comments on an earlier draft, to Louis deRosset for his comments, and to audiences at the University of Western Australia, the University of Melbourne and the Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference 2007. Thanks also to Graeme Forbes for sparking my interest with an informative presentation at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Damnjanovic, N. Sperm, Eggs and Hunks: Biological Origins and Identity. Acta Anal 24, 113–126 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0050-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0050-8