Introduction

Globally, persecution, violence, and human rights violations have contributed to an increase in the number of people forcibly displaced from their home countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2023). In 2022, 108.4 million individuals were displaced, including 5.4 million people who sought asylum in a host country (UNHCR, 2023). In high-income host countries, ‘deterrence’ policies and practices, such as complex visa processing and legal requirements, are becoming increasingly common (McAdam, 2017), and Australia leads the international community in the stringency of its deterrence policies for asylum seekers who arrive without a visa (Dastyari et al., 2022).

Deterrence measures employed by various Australian governments over the past three decades include border excision (removal of Australia’s islands from the ‘border’ at which asylum seekers may claim protection), interdiction (boat interception and turn-backs), and mandatory detention, along with restricting access to social welfare, employment options, language classes, and medical assistance (McAdam & Chong, 2019). These deterrence measures regularly change and have significant day-to-day implications for people seeking asylum in Australia. Restrictions on social welfare and employment opportunities mean that most people are forced to rely on a range of non-government organisations (NGOs) to meet their basic needs (Australian Human Rights Commission [AHRC], 2019). Internationally and in Australia, NGOs navigate a range of policy directives that disadvantage people seeking asylum, whilst at the same time, staff and volunteers attempt to assist asylum seekers to both meet their basic needs and to make their protection claim (Field et al., 2020).

This research focuses on Australian service providers who worked with people seeking asylum within the ‘legacy caseload’: individuals who arrived in Australia by sea seeking asylum between 13 August 2012 and 1 January 2014.

Policy Context Before 2013

The securitisation of people seeking asylum by sea has long been a feature of the Australian political agenda. Securitisation refers to the way in which issues are thought about and framed as existential threats to particular political communities through speech acts and audience acceptance (McDonald, 2011). This has occurred through linking people seeking asylum to broader questions of border security. Whilst Australia’s policies regarding people seeking asylum have oscillated between a deterrence- and humanitarian-based system, key enduring features include mandatory detention, introduced in 1992; border excision, introduced in 2001; and indefinite detention, introduced in 2004 (Phillips & Spinks, 2013a). For people seeking asylum by sea, offshore processing and the provision of temporary (rather than permanent) protection have also been characteristic, apart from a brief period under the centrist-left Labor-led government between 2008 and 2012 (Crock & Berg, 2011). The 2008 to 2012 period saw an increase in people seeking asylum by sea, resulting in bipartisan support for deterrence mechanisms since 2012 (Phillips, 2017; Phillips & Spinks, 2013b).

Bipartisan support for these mechanisms has relied on the political framing of asylum seekers as either the ‘bad refugee’ (who jumps the queue by coming by boat) or the ‘good refugee’ (who awaits overseas for a resettlement place) (McAdam, 2013, p. 437). This rhetoric has designated people seeking asylum by sea ‘illegal’ and ‘queue jumpers’ (Every & Augoustinos, 2008; Klocker & Dunn, 2003; Pickering & Weber, 2014) and criminal, through links to people smugglers (Cameron, 2013; Lippi et al., 2020; McKay et al., 2011).

Policy Context 2013–2022

The 2013 election centred on anti-asylum seeker rhetoric. The election campaign slogan for the Abbott-led conservative opposition was ‘stop the boats’ (Rourke, 2013). Election promises included reducing the overall numbers of refugee places through the humanitarian intake program, reintroducing temporary protection, continuing the ‘no advantage’ policy of the government, creating a regional deterrence framework (including interdiction), and establishing a refugee determination process based on the UK’s ‘detained fast-track system’ (AHRC, 2013). In September 2013, the Abbott-led government was elected, resulting in a huge shift in Australian asylum policy. Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) was established in September 2013, militarising the border to address the ‘threat’ of people seeking asylum by sea by deterring and preventing their arrival (Department of Home Affairs [DHA], 2021).

A wide range of deterrence-based legislative amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) occurred throughout the 2013 to 2015 period (Parliament of Australia, 2021). In December 2014, the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 was passed, designating 31,908 people part of the ‘legacy caseload’ cohort (DHA, 2023b; Refugee Council of Australia [RCOA], 2018). Between 2014 and 2022, consecutive conservative coalition governments incrementally decreased supports for people seeking asylum within the community (RCOA, 2019).

Policy Context After 2022

In May 2022, the Labor government was elected. Two key changes to asylum policy have occurred since. First, in February 2023, the Labor government introduced the ‘Resolution of Status’ visa for people in the legacy caseload, enabling access to permanent protection (DHA, 2023a). Second, in November 2023, the High Court of Australia found ‘it is unlawful to hold a person in immigration detention when there is no real prospect of them being removed from Australia in the foreseeable future’ (AHRC, 2023, para 2). Whilst this ruling may not impact the legacy caseload directly, the change marked the end of Australia’s policy of indefinite detention and signalled a shift towards a human rights–based approach to asylum policy.

Nevertheless, the RCOA (2024) notes that since 2014–2015, the number of people seeking asylum by plane has increased, but the number of those granted protection visas has declined during the same period, despite the number of refugees and people needing protection worldwide increasing. It is also important to recognise that the last accepted asylum seekers to arrive by sea were in July 2014. The enduring policies of OSB, regional deterrence, and the fast-track refugee determination process remain.

The Legacy Caseload

Legacy caseload asylum seekers face significant barriers to protection in Australia within this policy context and have been increasingly restricted from government support, whilst they undertake the refugee determination process (DHA, 2023b; RCOA, 2018). Australia continues to determine refugee resettlement, protection, and support based on a hierarchy determined by mode of arrival. People who have been pre-determined refugees through UNHCR’s offshore program are afforded the most rights, followed by people seeking asylum onshore with a valid visa (student, working, or tourist visa), and finally people seeking asylum onshore without a valid visa, who have typically arrived by boat, including the legacy caseload (Phillips, 2015). Until recently, a key difference between these groups is their access to protection once they have been determined to be a refugee under Australian law. UNHCR and valid visa entrants can obtain a permanent protection visa, considered a proxy for resettlement, allowing people to fully participate in the Australian community. At the time of this research, legacy caseload asylum seekers were not able to access permanent protection, regardless of their recognition as a refugee (Phillips, 2015).

As of October 2023, almost two-thirds of legacy caseload asylum seekers have been recognised as refugees by the Australian government and are living in Australia with a temporary protection visa (DHA, 2023b). Many in this group waited over a decade for their visa to be finalised. During this time, they experienced marginalisation and harm, through changes to the protection available, oscillating legality of employment, and decreasing accessibility of government welfare support (the status resolution support services (SRSS)) (AHRC, 2019). Policy has also dictated where and how people live during the refugee determination process; the location of a person in the legacy caseload may include onshore detention, community detention, or living within the community on a bridging visa (DHA, 2017). Many of the people in the legacy caseload living in the community with a bridging visa rely on support from NGO services.

Service Provision for People Seeking Asylum

Service providers often act as an intermediary between policy and people seeking asylum (Briskman & Doe, 2016; Posselt et al., 2019). Despite their important role, there is limited literature examining their experiences in Australia. The small number of studies includes research conducted across multiple segments of the asylum system, including offshore and onshore detention, community detention, and life in the community post-migration. The work that does exist has focused on the day-to-day provision of assistance (Jewson et al., 2015), impact of the broader policy environment (Apostolidou, 2018), and the competing objectives service providers face between fulfilling organisational contracts and supporting people seeking asylum (Gerard & Weber, 2019).

Service providers previously researched included frontline workers such as caseworkers, psychologists, and lawyers or those working indirectly with people seeking asylum, such as the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) employees (Gerard & Weber, 2019; Robinson, 2014). These service providers worked across segments of the asylum system, including in offshore and onshore detention and community detention (Briskman & Doe, 2016; Crawford et al., 2016) and providing assistance for community members post-migration (Apostolidou, 2018; Robinson, 2014). This research suggested that service providers feared for their clients. These fears were related to clients not gaining access to the services they needed or slipping through the gaps due to strict eligibility criteria (Jewson et al., 2015), being re-detained or deported (Gerard & Weber, 2019), or facing danger if returned (Robinson, 2013).

In addition, service providers have reported the Australian policy environment as constraining their ability to support people seeking asylum, thereby eliciting feelings of frustration, powerlessness, and guilt (Apostolidou, 2018; Posselt et al., 2019). The policy context has also been found to negatively impact the wellbeing of service providers (Gerard & Weber, 2019; Jewson et al., 2015). Further work in this area has explored the response of workers to the policy environment, describing their use of self-care and professional supervision (Posselt et al., 2019; Robinson, 2014) and advocacy (Stoddart et al., 2020) as ways to continue to work in the asylum sector.

Therefore, the experiences of Australian service providers have been characterised by competing objectives as they operate within a policy system that is detrimental to their clients, their ability to perform their job, and their own wellbeing (Gerard & Weber, 2019) and places them at risk of being complicit in restrictive government policy and practice (Field et al., 2021).

The current policy environment in Australia includes administrative SRSS restrictions, limited funding for NGOs in both the statutory and community sectors, and a broader anti-asylum seeker sentiment within public and political spheres (Briskman & Doe, 2016; Robinson, 2014). The research literature has not yet examined the role of service providers in supporting the legacy caseload nor the implications of this for future Australian policy. Given the critical role of service providers in the lives of people seeking asylum, this study aims to provide insight into how policy impacts workers in both statutory and community sectors.

Method

This research used a constructivist grounded theory (CGT) (Charmaz, 2014) approach. CGT allowed for the exploration of the subjective experience of individual service providers alongside consideration of the larger social structures, power, and equity and their relationship to individual and collective action (Charmaz, 2014). The application of CGT is discussed further in the analysis section below. This research was granted ethical approval by the University Human Research Ethics Committee (2018–339).

Sample and Recruitment

Participants who worked in, or volunteered for, organisations supporting people seeking asylum (particularly the legacy caseload) in Victoria, Australia, were recruited. Organisations were identified via a desktop search and discussions with key informants. Recruitment materials were distributed via an asylum seeker sector mailing list and via community events. NGOs were contacted through their publicly available contact details, and two statutory sector NGOs and two community sector NGOs invited the researcher to present the project to prospective participants. Participants were also encouraged to distribute the study information to their networks to assist with snowball sampling. All potential participants were provided with the research flyer, plain language statement, and consent form. Individuals who were interested in participating contacted the researchers directly to arrange an interview ensuring confidentiality.

Data Collection

Data were collected between December 2018 and February 2020. Nineteen semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted in person and one via phone, consistent with CGT (Charmaz, 2014). No difference was noted between interview modes. Interviews focused on understanding participants’ perspectives, meanings, and experiences in relation to changes to asylum policy. The topic guide included questions about the impacts of policy change on the individual’s role as a service provider, their organisation, and their relationship with their clients (people seeking asylum). Questions also explored service providers’ perceptions of the impact of policy changes on the legacy caseload asylum seekers in relation to social connection, housing, access to services (healthcare, legal), and employment. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Whilst data saturation was reached with those participants from community sector NGOs, recruiting further statutory sector participants was more challenging. This may be reflective of the employment and policy environment at a ‘crisis’ point and the significant time constraints on these participants, as discussed in the results.

Participants

Twenty people (17 female, 3 male) who worked or volunteered in eight Victorian organisations participated in interviews. Six participants worked in statutory sector organisations, two previously worked in statutory sector organisations, two worked in culturally and linguistically diverse population-specific services, and six worked and four volunteered in other asylum seeker-specific community organisations. Participants worked in roles providing health services and specific mental health services, legal advice and representation, housing support, general material aid support, and casework. Participants had been in these roles for between 6 months and 15 years (average 5 years). Nine participants had worked across multiple organisations in the asylum seeker sector in the past (included in their years of experience).

Data Analysis

Data analysis was informed by the CGT method (Charmaz, 2014) and utilizing NVivo 12 (2018). Analysis began with initial coding for actions, allowing the relations and interactions between and within service providers’ individual experiences to emerge (Charmaz, 2014). Initial codes were analysed for significance and frequency. Codes which were uncommon or related to non-pertinent policy themes (such as resettled refugees) were excluded. Focused codes were generated through synthesis of initial codes, generating analytic categories (Charmaz, 2014).

Constant comparison between codes and theoretical categories and memo-writing occurred concurrently to coding, consistent with the CGT process outlined by Charmaz (2014) and informed by Glaser (1978). This method enabled the establishment and identification of distinctions within and between individual data and initial codes, initial codes and focused codes, and focused codes and categories or themes (Charmaz, 2014). Memo-writing enabled idea development and critical reflexivity and informed theoretical sampling choices (Charmaz, 2014). For example, identification of a lack of information on statutory sector NGOs led to a more targeted recruitment of this group. Data saturation was sought to ensure that the experiences of service providers were captured through this comparative process and impacted upon the decision to cease the data collection (Glaser, 1978). For community sector NGO participants, saturation was achieved when the categories sufficiently described their experiences and no new codes emerged from the analysis of the interviews.

The concurrent coding and memo-writing processes recorded context, meaning, and connections within and between codes and categories and analytical choices (Charmaz, 2014). For example, the initial code of ‘battling the department on behalf of people seeking asylum’ reflected service providers’ resisting the policies governing asylum seekers. This code became a category reflecting how service providers managed working within the asylum system. Diagrammatic memos were generated to prompt focused coding, creating categories from codes and their relational codes. Relational codes included the in vivo codes: ‘little wins’, ‘we work around it’, and ‘do the best you can’. These relational codes were reflected on in memo-writing. In this example, the ways in which service providers not only managed their own expectations and perceptions of working in the asylum system, but also how they resisted the Australian government’s characterisation of people seeking asylum, were tested conceptually. NVivo was used to identify broader themes, such as producing a theme centred on resistance in ‘service providers’ commitment to supporting people seeking asylum, across the data set, enabling an explanation of how service providers experience and respond to asylum policy.

Results

Two key themes resulted from analysis of the interviews, highlighting the experiences of service providers who work with people seeking asylum who are living in Australia. These themes were (1) the impact of policy constraints and (2) the strategies employed by service providers to support of people seeking asylum.

Theme 1: Impact of Policy Constraints on Service Providers

Policy constraints left service providers feeling powerless in their roles. They experienced difficulties in navigating the system when trying to support people seeking asylum and frustration with a system that was inconsistently applied, as well as being challenged by bureaucratic complexities. The impact of policy constraints was found through service providers’ (i) perceptions of exclusionary policy and (ii) navigation of the uncertain policy environment.

Perceptions of Exclusionary Policy

Service providers described how government policies lead to the exclusion of people seeking asylum, resulting in rights being neglected and unfulfilled. Government exclusion was perceived by service providers to be most apparent in the SRSS changes, which ensured that many asylum seekers were deemed ineligible for support, and created another policy of deterrence. The aim of this deterrence policy was considered multifaceted: dissuading people from seeking asylum, punishing asylum seekers in Australia, and encouraging people seeking asylum to withdraw their protection claim and return home. These government actions were viewed by service providers as the antithesis of a human rights–based treatment of people seeking asylum, purposefully punitive and to make ‘an example’ of the group.

I mean everyone’s fairly familiar with the broad government, you know, policy about people seeking asylum. It’s ‘turn back the boats’ and it’s ‘save the people from drowning at sea’ as opposed to the people… who’ve come by boat previously. So, they make an example of people. It’s a pretty punitive program… their [the government’s] policy is – has always been to make an example of the people here so that they will tell people that, ‘It’s really not that great. Don’t bother coming to Australia. You can’t sponsor your family.’ (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 2 years)

Service providers often advocated directly to government departments. Participants reported that the DIBP workers often refused to consider individual experiences of hardship when deciding whether to assist people seeking asylum. Instead, participants relayed that DIBP workers maintained the government policy that they were there to provide administrative support, and not to meet ‘other’ needs of people seeking asylum, and as a result re-directed all individual needs to the community sector.

That’s a line that comes up a lot from Immigration, ‘We’re not a welfare service, we’re not a charity’, therefore we refuse to provide anything outside of the absolute bare minimum to clients. (Case manager, statutory sector, female, 7 years)

Singling out the legacy caseload was considered by service providers as the government treating people seeking asylum as ‘lesser human beings’ (Team leader, community sector, male, 15 years) with fewer rights. The impact of the changes to SRSS eligibility, in particular the cessation of income support, was highlighted to result in exclusion from society: forcing asylum seekers into destitution.

I do phrase it as forced destitution now, I think that the policies are intended to result in destitution. I don’t think there’s any other way of reading them, I don’t think that say something like excluding people from work rights has no economic advantage, it only results in people being excluded from financial independence. So, the policies… were creating forced destitution. (Program coordinator, community sector, female, 4 years)

Many service providers interpreted forced destitution as the government punishing asylum seekers based on their mode of arrival by sea. Service providers perceived these actions by the government as an additional way to encourage asylum seekers to repatriate, with some participants reporting such a response from the department.

I will go straight to them [the DIBP] and say, ‘Look, what I do?’ but then there’s always the… there are certain things they’ll [the DIBP worker will] always say, ‘Tell them they can go home’. (Caseworker, community sector, female, 1 year)

Responding to an Uncertain Policy Environment

Participants’ accounts highlighted the impact of a complex and uncertain policy environment on their work. Policy directives around visa status, legal stage, access to healthcare or work rights, and SRSS eligibility changed frequently and varied from client to client. Service providers found specific policy directives difficult to navigate. This was heightened by the perception that DIBP workers lacked or withheld knowledge.

It's trying to traverse all the different policies across the lines. For caseworker, you’ve got to know so much. And it changes. The caseworkers at the department of immigration [DIBP] can’t keep up, or the case managers, they can’t keep up with the changes either. Our guys will ring up and ask for advice for an interpretation of the policy, and they can’t even tell you what it is. They don’t know the answers. So, what do you do then? (Program coordinator, public sector, female, 10 years)

All participants worked with people in the legacy caseload, as well as other cohorts of people seeking asylum, which complicated service provision. However, interpreting legal status and legal decisions was especially confusing when assisting the legacy caseload asylum seekers.

[The visa system] is confusing. Even when you talk to the lawyers, I don’t think they really fully understand it either because it changes all the time and there’s different reasonings and policies. Certainly, [one organisation’s] lawyers have a very different take on it than, say, [another organisation’s lawyers], or other lawyers have different sort of views on how it is. I don’t think, even in the department [DIBP], how we stand politically as well on how we interpret things sort of thing but, yeah. (Program coordinator, public sector, female, 10 years)

Service providers emphasised how visa status determined a person’s access to support. This was made more challenging by inconsistencies in departmental decision-making. The lack of consistency in visa grants was a constant source of stress which impacted many service providers’ ability to perform their roles.

One of the challenges for us is trying to understand the department’s [DIBP’s] thinking. Now this has been a challenge for a long time, but there never seems to be a hard and fast rule about anything. So, you will find that one month we’ll get almost 50 clients that will be exited [no longer eligible for the SRSS program] because they’ve received [a temporary protection visa], which is great, but then the next month you might only get 10… like, there doesn’t seem to be any kind of consistency around why things happen. (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

This inconsistency impacted all cohorts of asylum seekers regardless of language or visa group. Participants described situations where family members would apply for protection visas at the same time, yet not all would be successful.

I had a family, a Tamil family, both father and son, exactly the same story, fled the same village, same thing. The son got granted refugee status and the father didn’t. Try and explain that to a person seeking asylum as to why there was a grant there and not there, when the stories are the same and they’re from the same village? They arrived on the same boat. They came together. They’re clearly father and son. It doesn’t make sense. (Program coordinator, public sector, female, 10 years)

The lack of transparency around decision-making was also a major stressor for service providers and impacted their ability to support clients. Participants described being confused by individual policies and were often unable to explain them to people seeking asylum.

So, the SRSS and bridging visas and Medicare [Australia's universal health insurance scheme], I put them under the same banner because I don’t really know the specific policy. It seems really complicated and really hard to get an answer through the government how all three are linked. They’re inexplicitly linked. (Casework coordinator, statutory sector, female, 1 year)

One of the main roles of service providers was to work with asylum seekers to prove they were deserving of support, and this often included providing evidence of their vulnerability. On many occasions, service providers faced questions about the legitimacy of the person seeking asylum.

Yeah, like in a very surface level it [providing documentation to prove service eligibility] definitely impacts because just logistically there’s a lot more to it to do like for example, the Medicare example of having to prove their pseudonym matches their actual given name, which is on their application for protection… constantly we are supporting our client to prove who they are, or prove their vulnerability, or prove their eligibility to a service. (Casework coordinator, statutory sector, female, 1 year)

Assessing clients’ vulnerability and eligibility for various programs was an on-going feature for organisations. Service providers commented on the need for correct documentation in the DIBP’s required format as an unnecessary bureaucratic need which created further barriers to providing on-going support to clients or intaking new clients.

One of the really annoying things – just while I am thinking about it – each bank statement page has to be stamped and if each page is not stamped, they reject the application… those little things – really kind of bureaucratic stuff that just kind of like, ‘Are you fricken’ kidding me?’…. They’ll just kind of reject it out of hand because every single page has not been stamped. (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

Participants reflected on how their role had changed over time. This included some providers changing from a general supportive role—such as monthly phone-based contact—to crisis management—trying to ensure continuity of SRSS and an appropriate standard of living. Ensuring continuity of SRSS was considered a more complex role, involving increasing documentation and requiring creative thinking to attempt to continue supporting those without employment.

So that’s one of the biggest issues – is that the caseloads haven’t changed but the job requirements changed quite a lot. So, in the old days it was very simple. You worked with someone. You were helping them. You were maintaining them until a decision was made about their visa. Now you’re desperately trying to keep them on the [SRSS] Program. So, your work is about, ‘What’s your problem? What’s the problem?’ (Team leader, statutory sector, male, 2 years)

Theme 2: Service Providers’ Strategies to Support People Seeking Asylum

Service providers employed different strategies when working in a challenging policy environment. Three clear strategies of resistance to enacting policy were identified via participants’ accounts: (i) subverting organisational policy, (ii) creating new networks, and (iii) cultivating hope for policy change.

Subverting Organisational Policy

Service providers working in the statutory sector were in a position where their professional ethics conflicted with the requirements of their employment. Whilst they acknowledged their inability as individuals to change the policy, by focusing on the ways they could work within the system, they felt they were able to improve the lives of people seeking asylum. For example, one participant described the experience of negotiating with the government to pay for palliative care, whereby they had to argue to ensure that their client continued to receive support.

A client I had about a year ago, he had a stage four brain tumour and so, had to be moved into palliative care… he was in his last months to weeks of life, he was dying… there’s nothing to be gained from being punitive towards him, and it was an absolute battle. It took me hours, and hours, and hours to prepare this application just to get funding to cover the bare minimum bed fee. For Immigration [DIBP] to pay that bare minimum bed fee because they wanted to end his payments completely… Basically, they took the line that, ‘If he’s dying, what does he need the payments for?’… so, it was a battle to get them to do the funding. (Case manager, statutory sector, female, 7 years)

Participants expressed anger and frustration at the government and often described how they were ‘battling’ the department. Seeing the department as an adversary, but trying to continue to support people seeking asylum, meant that many service providers described rebelling against their official role or organisation’s position.

But it’s gotten to the point now where I just, as a case manager, if a client comes in with a speeding fine, I will help them, but I just won’t case note it anywhere. Because I just think it’s ridiculous that we would have to report that to Immigration [DIBP]. So, I will help them, and I will just say, ‘We’ll pretend I never heard about this, and you go on your way and do what you need to do about it’. (Case manager, statutory sector, female, 7 years)

These actions were the manifestation of participants’ values conflicting with the rules or policies in the asylum system. Personal or professional ethics allowed participants to resist their organisational policy; however, their role as an employee required them to conduct surveillance and checks to determine the on-going eligibility of their clients. In practice, a client could lose their income payments and be unable to continue to live in their home if these checks were not conducted.

It’s this fine line between being the spokesperson for the government but still trying to provide the compassion and the understanding for the client and understanding what the client’s going through because as a contractor we’re required to deliver exactly what the policy is and we have to meet certain KPIs [key performance indicators] and we’ve got to do everything that the contract says… but how do we do that in a compassionate way when you do know that there is a client there that actually can’t afford to pay their rent and can’t afford to eat? (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

Participants reported that their organisation had faced funding changes and increased pressures to find resources. For example, changes to the SRSS program meant that statutory sector NGOs had expanded their ability to assist people to prove that they needed continued support. The process of providing evidence was often not remunerated and had significant resource implications for services. Service providers often undertook extra work to provide the evidence required by the government to keep people seeking asylum supported.

The client has no money to be able to afford a translation. We don’t have any money to be able to afford a translation because we only get paid for working with the clients and, in fact, we don’t even get paid for doing these applications. We only get paid once the applications approved… So, they first tried submitting the application with the documents in Farsi. And of course, [the DIBP] came back and said no… (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

Creating New Networks

The large numbers of people seeking asylum who were deemed ineligible for SRSS meant that services had to find creative ways to continue to support them. Participants working across sectors emphasised the need to co-operate to assist people seeking asylum.

We’ve learnt which organisations out there will support and won’t support and so you get to learn who to have a conversation with to say, ‘Look, this client's really not eligible but they need this, this, this... What can you do?’ (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

This need was due to the government’s exclusion of people seeking asylum from accessing mainstream or government-funded services in the community. Exclusion from these services was due to several factors in addition to the narrowing of eligibility for SRSS, including services being unaware of a person’s eligibility for assistance, the government not providing people with identity cards or evidence of low or no income, delays in issuing visas, and short visa lengths. Service providers described adapting to these bureaucratic barriers by advocating to mainstream services on behalf of people seeking asylum. Participants explained the importance of their advocacy role in the lives of people seeking asylum, for example assisting with medical or school bills. The already scarce finances meant that unexpected bills had a detrimental impact on the mental health of those seeking asylum.

For me as a case worker, there is a lot of advocacy around waiving bills... Perhaps an x-ray that happened months ago or the school sending out a letter that they send out to all families saying, ‘These are the school costs for 2020.’ That can create huge, huge stress. And rightly so, because they [people seeking asylum] think now they need to try and find money, which is impossible to find. (Casework coordinator, statutory sector, female, 1 year)

Service providers demonstrated the benefits of networking with other organisations in the asylum support sector and educating mainstream services. Participants described finding diverse ways to connect their clients to support.

There are things out there for people seeking asylum that people working in the mainstream areas don't know. Like even education, what funding can schools tap into for people. Often, it's us telling them. Or health care providers. Or having to argue with Medicare that this person is actually eligible, don't send them away again. (Casework coordinator, community sector, female, 1 year)

Participants accepted that they were unable to make the structural changes required to support their clients but were able to have ‘little wins’ against the system. This included linking in with other supportive networks of organisations that could step in to aid people seeking asylum if the government could not.

If you have partners or you have organisations that understand and work with you sometimes you do get those little wins. And it’s those little wins that you work towards. Because you don’t get any big wins. (Team leader, statutory sector, female, 4 years)

Cultivating Hope for Policy Change

To continue working in this environment, participants focused on the resilience of their clients and the positive aspects of their job and made short-term goals. These actions were a form of maintaining hope as well as a coping strategy implemented by participants.

The department [DIBP] makes me incredibly angry at times… but if I let that anger get to me, then it's going to eat me up, and it's only going to harm me. So, I turn that into, ‘I just do what I can one day at a time and what little…’ (Program coordinator, public sector, female, 10 years)

Service providers emphasised their clients’ resilience and the relationships they had formed with their clients. This was one of the reasons many service providers stated that they remained in the sector.

It amazes me how resilient human beings can be and how at the end of the day, clients can yell at you, they can, you know, hate your guts, but they will still respect you and they will still, you know, trust you enough to allow them… allow you into their lives, that's pretty amazing. So, it's hard but it's good. It's very good. (Casework coordinator, community sector, female, 1 year)

Many participants perceived their role as one of advocacy. In recognising their unique insight into the lives of people seeking asylum, they hoped to create future policy change.

So, I just feel that if I can still do something, I will, you know, even though policy does not allow me to do a lot of things a lot of the time. But if I can talk to the community members about it, hopefully one day it might change. (Team leader, statutory sector, male, 8 years)

Discussion

The role of the service provider in the lives of people seeking asylum is significant. Whilst service providers were administrators and mediators of policy, this research found that service providers also played a role as advocates, problem solvers, and fighters. As the Australian government has outsourced the wellbeing of asylum seekers to NGOs, service providers have had a significant impact on the ability of asylum seekers to live in Australia during the refugee determination process. The policy implications and issues in the sector are explored below.

Policy Implications for Service Providers

A key finding of this research was that service providers drew attention to the government’s mechanisms of exclusion: designating people seeking asylum as illegal, leaving people destitute, and obfuscating responsibility through bureaucratic barriers. Ultimately, these actions call into question the role of the Australian government in the encouragement of repatriation of people seeking asylum, regardless of their risk of persecution.

In designating people seeking asylum as illegal, service providers considered the government to be justifying the exclusion of the legacy caseload. This research confirmed the findings of past Australian studies where service providers perceived the Australian government to be contributing to the poor mental health of people seeking asylum (Apostolidou & Schweitzer, 2017) and viewed people seeking asylum as being targeted and systematically mistreated (Posselt et al., 2019). These findings arose from interviews conducted with nine Queensland-based practitioners across public organisations and community sector organisations (Apostolidou & Schweitzer, 2017) and through a national online survey between 2016 and 2017 with 50 people who worked with those from refugee and asylum seeker backgrounds (Posselt et al., 2019).

In creating destitution, service providers considered the government to be making an ‘example’ of the legacy caseload: deterring future asylum seekers. Service providers highlighted aspects of government policies, such as employment barriers for people seeking asylum and bureaucratic documentation requirements, as particularly cruel. Participants considered the government’s denial of support as purposefully creating destitution. Past Australian research with 29 people seeking asylum has found that even for those who were receiving SRSS, the experience was akin to living in ‘enforced poverty’ (Hartley & Fleay, 2017, p. 56). The uncertainty in policy directives, unhelpfulness, or at times incompetence of the immigration department and changing administrative requirements for documentation obscured service providers’ ability to assist people seeking asylum to navigate financial hardship. This supports the work of Hartley and Fleay (2017) who suggested that the inability to afford and access basic standards of living reduces an asylum seeker’s ability to participate in society. Service providers described aspects of powerlessness in the face of such policy restrictions, whereby the policy environment negatively impacted their ability to support people seeking asylum. This finding is consistent with previous studies, where powerlessness has been found to be a characteristic of asylum seeker service provision in Australia (Apostolidou, 2018; Gerard & Weber, 2019; Posselt et al., 2019; Robinson, 2014).

In Australia, exclusionary policies cause harm beyond destitution. This research has demonstrated that the asylum system in Australia encourages repatriation, regardless of risk of persecution. First, service providers reported that individual administrators within the DIBP viewed return as a valid response to asylum seekers’ need for support. The acceptance of return, regardless of risk of persecution, was an alarming finding of this research. Second, service providers considered destitution a factor in return. This is supported by European research which found that ‘voluntary’ return was ‘offered as a less painful alternative to continued destitution followed by (inevitable) compulsory return’ (Webber, 2011, p. 103). Whilst Webber (2011) focused on rejected refugee claimants, this research focused on service providers assisting those still undergoing the refugee determination process. Third, service providers considered that the harmful asylum system in Australia impeded the ability of people seeking asylum to effectively engage with the refugee determination process.

Issues in the Sector

Service providers highlight issues working in the sector, including negative impacts on their own health, personal ethical dilemmas, and service eligibility and resource distribution. Participants reported that the reduced support from the DIBP had increased their workloads and negatively impacted upon their health, as well as the health of the people seeking asylum they were supporting. This is consistent with past Australian and UK research, conducted between 2006 and 2011 with 30 frontline workers, where the demands of the work and the prolonged nature of the support negatively affected service providers’ mental health over time (Robinson, 2014).

This research found that service providers in the statutory sector expressed their personal ethical dilemma when faced with the dual commitment to supporting their clients and abiding by their organisations’ contractual obligations. Previous research has suggested that a paradox of care and control is present in service provision (Gerard & Weber, 2019), a paradox often called the ‘dual loyalty’ conflict (Briskman & Zion, 2014; Zion, 2019). Gerard and Weber’s (2019) case study of nine participants, in 2016 and 2017, drew attention to the tensions between humanitarian and security objectives present in the work of statutory NGOs, emphasising how the Australian governments’ exclusion agenda is present in both the policy and work of NGOs. Building on this finding, the current research found that statutory sector service providers were acutely aware of their positioning as an extension of the government. However, in contrast to the work of Gerard and Weber (2019), this research emphasises the agency of service providers and highlights their role in disrupting the asylum system. This finding demonstrates the power of individual service providers to intervene on behalf of people seeking asylum and supports Briskman and Zion’s (2014) assertion that subversion and advocacy occur in both the detention and community settings.

Across all sectors, service providers were presented with issues of eligibility and resource distribution. This is not a new dilemma in the provision of support. As originally surmised by Zetter (1991), the hostility towards people seeking asylum at the policy level can be viewed at the service provision level. The government’s categorisation of a person seeking asylum controlled the supports (financial or material) they were entitled or could gain access to. This categorisation led to NGOs triaging asylum seekers based on their visa status, stage of refugee determination process, and ability to prove their level of destitution. Service providers recognised asylum seeker status as a barrier to asylum seeker’s economic and social rights including non-discrimination, the right to work, and the right to health (UNHCR 1951; UNICESCR 1966). Therefore, service providers also created new categories for eligibility and used these categories to allocate resources on the basis of need: crisis, deservingness, and comparison. The possibility of gaining access to SRSS, or aid from NGOs, was based on the asylum seeker’s ability to prove that their experience of hardship was legitimate, which further normalises marginalised people’s dependence on charity. In this context, the narrowing of SRSS eligibility acted as an additional mechanism of exclusion and a ‘push’ factor for repatriation.

The operationalisation of exclusion in Australia is concerning not only for those seeking protection in Australia, but also across the world. In Europe and the UK, the ‘Australian model’ of deterrence and externalisation of refugees has been gaining traction (Geibel et al., 2023; Matera et al., 2023). In the UK, the Nationality and Borders Act in 2022 and the subsequent Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda closely follow Australia’s policy lead (Matera et al., 2023), whilst across Europe,the far-right have adopted the Australian slogan, ‘No Way. You will not make [insert country here] home’ (Geibel et al., 2023). The exportation of Australian-style externalisation policy and discourse should cause alarm. As this research demonstrates, the Australian system has been designed to harm—to encourage repatriation, regardless of risk of persecution.

Limitations and Future Directions

This research had limitations. First, a larger and more diverse sample (for example, a larger sample of statutory sector service providers and/or a further focus on mainstream and CALD sectors) from a larger geographic location would benefit future research. Second, the qualitative analysis reflects the research team’s interpretation of the data. Third, the voluntary nature of the recruitment means that participants may have self-selected. Whilst these factors impact on the transferability of the findings, this research provides important insight into the experiences of service providers working with asylum seekers in Australia. Future research would benefit from addressing these limitations. Further, examining how service providers perceive the quality of service they are able to provide in this context and the outsourcing of social supports for people seeking asylum would be beneficial. Given the exportation of the Australian model of governance, further research into the role of service providers in host countries across Europe and the UK also warrants further attention.

Conclusion

This research has examined service providers’ experiences of policy and changes to policy. The findings highlight service providers’ challenges working in a system that is opaque and unpredictable. Despite this, they challenge asylum policies through inclusive notions of citizenship, belonging, and human rights. Service providers considered the actions of the government to be cruel. However, the constraints faced by service providers elicited feelings of powerlessness, particularly to change the overarching exclusion of people seeking asylum.

The experiences of service providers in Australia demonstrate the impact of how the Australian government operationalises its exclusion of people seeking asylum. This exclusion conflicts with the Refugee Convention, with the government having created barriers to supporting people seeking asylum that NGOs are working hard to fill. To redress the harms caused by the Australian government’s policy, social supports need to be made available to all people seeking asylum. This research also recommends continuing and additional federal government funding for NGOs. Service providers need to be adequately supported within their organisations to provide effective and meaningful support to people seeking asylum. The increased number of people seeking asylum on valid visas indicates that service providers across all sectors will continue to be required. Without service providers, people seeking asylum cannot effectively engage in the refugee determination process.