Introduction

Each of the fifty states in the USA can be viewed or categorized as either red (republican) or blue (democrat) states based on electoral or voting patterns, majority political ideology, and the dominance of either the Republican or Democratic party in the state (Levendusky & Pope, 2011; Miller & Conover, 2015; Nivola & Brady, 2007; Rodden, 2005). Some studies refer to this phenomenon as geopolitics—the intersection of politics and geography (Davisson, 2011; May & McGarvey, 2017).

Although some previous studies have examined the association between geopolitics and public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA, the results are inconsistent and inconclusive (Bessett et al., 2015; May & McGarvey, 2017; Stanhope et al., 2019). Thus, it leads to calls for further investigation to bring nuance and augment the existing findings (Stanhope et al., 2019).

Studies examining the relationship between geopolitics and public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA can be broadly summarized into three categories. First, studies that focus on examining the association between an individual state and public attitude towards immigration policy (Lee et al., 2001). Second, studies that focus on examining the association between a group or bloc of states—Midwest, Northeast, and Southern states—and public attitude towards immigration policy (Sanders & Heineman, 2020). Third, studies that focus on examining the effect of electoral or voting pattern, and the dominance of either the Republican or Democratic party in the state—geopolitics—on public attitude towards immigration policy (Bessett et al., 2015; May & McGarvey, 2017).

The first two studies are commonplace in the extant literature compared to the third group of studies which are not because of the lack of scientific enquiry using this approach. Thus, it creates a gap in the existing literature that requires further investigation and the attention of researchers. Additionally, findings from geopolitics studies are mixed and require further investigation not only to augment the extant literature but also to add nuance to the findings.

Therefore, against this background, the present study seeks to add to the existing literature on the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA while addressing some of the existing gaps in the literature. To accomplish this goal, we analyzed 1018 responses obtained from the Public Religion Research InstituteFootnote 1 guided by six research questions, namely:

  • Research Question 1: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border?

  • Research Question 2: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards accepting refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries in the USA?

  • Research Question 3: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards making conditions difficult for undocumented immigrants, so they return to their home country?

  • Research Question 4: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards building a wall against immigrants in the USA?

  • Research Question 5: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards laws preventing immigrants from entering the USA?

  • Research Question 6: What is the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants with criminal background?

Overall, assessing the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards six different immigration policies has several theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, it augments previous studies seeking to understand the effect of geopolitics on immigration while adding nuance to the existing knowledge. Thus, the present study addresses a void in the present literature. Policy-wise, the present study sheds light on not just the effect of geopolitics on immigration but also on how citizens formulate their views and opinions that might apply to other policy issues and areas. Finally, the present study also reveals the effect of other factors on public attitude towards immigration policies in the USA.

We analyzed individual-level data of 1018 respondents (407 interviewed by landline and 611 interviewed by cellphones) obtained from the June 2018 national representative survey of adults 18 + years in the USA on immigration by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). Using empirical evidence from the extant literature, the variables that influence public attitude towards immigration policies in the USA were categorized into the following variables: geopolitics, group conflict/instrumental group conflict, demographic contact/intergroup, political, sociodemographic characteristics of the public, and others.

Literature Review

Geopolitics, Public Attitude, Immigration Policies/Laws

Public attitude towards immigrants and immigration policy in the USA is influenced by several factors (Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins, 2022; McCann & Boateng, 2020). One of such factors is geopolitics–red or blue states (Davisson, 2011; May & McGarvey, 2017). Red or blue states are often identified based on the electoral or voting pattern of each of the states, the dominance of either the Republican or Democratic party within the state over a period of time or during a specific electoral cycle, and the presidential candidate that wins the electoral college vote of the state among other factors (Levendusky & Pope, 2011; Miller & Conover, 2015; Nivola & Brady, 2007; Rodden, 2005).

Empirical evidence from some geopolitics studies suggest that blue states turn to be pro-immigration while red states turn to be anti-immigration (Levendusky & Pope, 2011; Miller & Conover, 2015). Elections in the USA are not just means for voters to participate in democracy, but also they are means for voters to express their policy preferences by choosing one candidate over the other (Major et al., 2018; Mayda et al., 2018). For instance, some studies contend that the election of Trump in 2016 was an indication of public support for some of his anti-immigrant sentiments and other policies espoused by the candidate (Bessett et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2001; May & McGarvey, 2017; McKanders, 2018; Sanders & Heineman, 2020). It was widely suggested that red states voted for the Trump because of the anti-immigration policies he sought to implement while blue states voted for Clinton because of her pro-immigration policies (Braaten & Braaten, 2021; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Glass & Levchak, 2014; Goodman, 2017). If geopolitics–red or blue states influence voters’ choice for presidential candidates, does it influence public attitude towards immigration policies in any way?

Conflict Theories, Public Attitude, and Immigration Policies/Laws

Furthermore, besides the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards immigration policy, the extant literature identifies other factors that influence public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016; Pryce, 2018). Conflict between immigrants and the public over resources, such as job opportunities, welfare programs, and others, continues to influence public attitude towards immigrants in the USA (Florack et al., 2003; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016; McLaren, 2017; Pryce, 2018).

These groups of studies focusing on the conflict between immigrants and the public—group conflict—and instrumental group conflict theories contend that high levels of immigrant population create the perception of competition for existing resources with the public which leads to anti-immigration attitudes towards immigrants (McLaren, 2017; Pryce, 2018). These studies have been criticized for the failure to address internal conflicts within each of the groups and their overemphasis on external conflicts between immigrants and the public (Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins, 2022; Meuleman et al., 2009).

Additionally, some studies contend that conflicts between immigrants and the public that influence public attitude towards immigrants are the result of the lack of contact between both groups. Thus, these studies suggest that constant contact between immigrants and the public can help improve knowledge sharing and cultural assimilation, and reduce conflicts (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Stangor et al., 1996). Although the existing literature have found that contact between immigrants and the public reduces negative perceptions about immigrants caused by issues of racism, false knowledge, xenophobia, and others (Allen & Goetz, 2021; Kilty & Haymes, 2000).

Critics argue that the contact between immigrants and the public through contact is a short-term solution and can also lead to unintended negative consequences (Dixon et al., 2007; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Crisp and Turner 2013). For example, putting two or more diverse groups unwilling to work together can lead to more conflict and further reinforce negative perceptions held by the public about immigrants (Boateng et al., 2021).

Crime-Immigration, Public Attitude, and Immigration Policies/Laws

Moreover, previous studies argue that public attitude towards immigration policies in the USA is influenced by the perception of crime and the association of immigrants with crime (Chenane & Wright, 2021; Light & Miller, 2018). Immigration has been observed to lead to community heterogeneity, competition, conflict, and crime in some cases (Hébert et al., 2004; Light & Miller, 2018). In contrast to this view, immigration has been found to lead to innovation, strong family and friendship bonds, socio-economic opportunities, and the revitalization of dying communities and economies (Alba & Nee, 2003; Feldmeyer, 2009; Sampson, 2008; Sampson & Bean, 2006).

Other Explanations of Public Attitude Towards Immigration Policies/Laws

Finally, several studies have found diverse sociodemographic variables influence public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA. Specifically, some studies have found that population characteristics, such as age, political ideology, income, education, marital status, religion, region, rural–urban residency, and gender, continue to influence public attitude towards immigration policy in the USA (Bowling & Westenra, 2017; Brown & Brown, 2017; Davis & Deole, 2015; Docquier et al., 2012; Garcia & Davidson, 2013; Haaland & Roth, 2020; Knoll, 2009; Lichter, 2012; Provine & Sanchez, 2011). Similar to these findings, a recent study by Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins (2022) found that the international reputation and image of the USA based on the immigration policies espoused and implemented influence public attitude towards immigration (also see Kudrle, 2003; Rocha et al., 2015; Manley, 2017; Giuliano & Tabellini, 2020; Isaacs et al., 2020).

In conclusion, the review of literature informed the study variables utilized in this study. These variables can be grouped into the following: geopolitics, group conflict/instrumental group conflict, demographic contact/intergroup, political, sociodemographic characteristics of the public, and others. Table 1 provides a summary of the literature review and variables.

Table 1 Summary of literature review
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Methods

Data

We analyzed the individual-level data of 1018 respondents (407 interviewed by landline and 611 interviewed by cell phones) obtained from the June 2018 national representative survey of adults 18 + years in the USA on immigration by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). PRRIFootnote 2 is a nonpartisan, independent research organization that conducts public opinion polls on a variety of different topics, specializing in the quantitative and qualitative study of political issues as they relate to religious values. The survey was based on a probability sampling to ensure results are broadly representative of the entire US population. The surveys were administered to respondents in either English or Spanish. Overall, the survey includes Americans’ views related to several immigration issues, including building a wall along the border between the USA and Mexico, banning refugees from entering the USA, the belief that America sets a good moral example for the world today on issues of immigration, and among other useful questions about immigration and the population characteristics of the respondents. We consider geopolitics, group conflict/instrumental group conflict, demographic contact/intergroup, political, sociodemographic characteristics of the public, and others explanatory factors that influence public attitude towards immigration policies in the USA.

Study Variables

Outcome Variables

The outcome variable for the present study is public attitudes (support or opposition) towards immigrants and immigration policies in the USA. The outcome variable was measured utilizing six questions from the survey. Measure 1 gauges the public’s attitude towards a border wall against immigrants entering the USA.Footnote 3 The measure was coded as a dichotomous variable with 0 representing the public favor border walls and 1 representing the public oppose border walls. Additionally, measure 2 gauges the public’s attitude towards laws that prevent immigrants from entering the USA.Footnote 4 The measure was coded as a binary variable with 0 representing the public favor laws preventing refugees and immigrants entering the USA and 1 representing the public oppose laws preventing refugees and immigrants entering the USA. Likewise, measure 3 gauges the public’s attitude towards laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border,Footnote 5 and the measure was coded as 0 representing the public favor laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border and 1 representing the public oppose laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border.

Moreover, measure 4 gauges the public’s attitude towards the USA not accepting refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries in the USA,Footnote 6 and the measure was coded as 0 representing the public agree and 1 representing the public disagree. Furthermore, measure 5 gauges the public’s attitude towards the USA making conditions difficult for undocumented immigrants to force them to return to their home country.Footnote 7 The measure was coded as 0 representing the public agree and 1 representing the public disagree. Additionally, measure 6 gauges the public’s attitude towards police stop targeted at undocumented immigrants and immigrants with a criminal background.Footnote 8 The measure was coded as a binary variable with 0 representing the public favor police stop targeted at undocumented immigrants and immigrants with a criminal background and 1 representing the public oppose police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants and immigrants with a criminal background. In conclusion, the six outcome variables gauge the public’s attitude towards immigrants and immigration policies in the USA.

Predictor Variable

The predictor variable for the present study is geopolitics–red and blue states in the USA based on the 2016 presidential election results. We created a geopolitics variable using the presidential candidate that won the state electoral college votes for all the states in the USA in 2016. The geopolitics variable was coded as 0 representing blue states—states won by Clinton—and 1 representing red states—states won by Trump. We utilized only the 2016 presidential election results as opposed to historical election results because the majority of the outcome variables included in the present study happened under the Trump administration. Although we acknowledge that some of the outcome variables have historical bearing, analyzing the present data with a historical geopolitics measure was impossible and we contend it can significantly influence our findings. Overall, 29 states were coded as red states while 21 states were coded as blue states.Footnote 9

Control Variables

We also controlled for the effect of several variables that can influence our understanding of public attitude towards immigrants and immigration policies in the USA. Gender (0 = female and 1 = male), age (18–94 years), region (1 = Northeast, 2 = North Central, 3 = South, and 4 = West), home ownership (0 = owned and 1 = rented). Registered voter (0 = no and 1 = yes), marital status (1 = single/never married, 2 = divorced/separated, 3 = married, and 4 = widowed), education (1 = high school, 2 = college, and 3 = graduate school or more), race (1 = Black, 2 = White, 3 = Asian, 4 = Native American, Hawaiian, and Pacific Islanders, 5 = Hispanic, and 6 = mixed race/other races). Political party identification (1 = Democrat, 2 = independent, 3 = Republican, and 4 = others), sexual orientation (0 = heterosexual/straight and 1 = not heterosexual/ straight), rural–urban status (0 = rural and 1 = urban). Religious affiliation (1 = no religion, 2 = Christian, 3 = Muslim/Islamic, 4 = Buddhist/Hindu, 5 = Jewish/Judaism, 6 = other religions), employment status (0 = employed and 1 = unemployed), income (1 = up to $24,999, 2 = $25,000–$49,999, 3 = $50,000–$100,000, and 4 = $100,000 or more), trust in political institutions to handle immigration in the USA (1 = trust in congress, 2 = trust in Trump’s presidency, and 3 = no trust),Footnote 10 the USA as a good moral example for other countries in the world when it comes to immigration issues (0 = agree and 1 = disagree),Footnote 11 political ideology (1 = conservative, 2 = moderate, 3 = liberal).

Plan of Analysis

To answer the research question for the present study, we conducted several analyses. First, we conducted a descriptive analysis to assess the distribution of scores for the variables utilized in the present analysis. Second, we conducted a bivariate correlation analysis coupled with a collinearity test to check for the presence of multicollinearity between the study variables. Overall, results from both the bivariate and collinearity test showed no evidence of multicollinearity issues in the data. Third, we conducted a regression analysis to assess the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable. Specifically, we conducted a multivariate binary logistic regression.

Results

Descriptive Results

The descriptive results for the study variables are shown in Table 2. Public attitude towards laws and policies that separate parents from their children at the border (favor = 25%, opposed = 75%) had an average score of 0.75 and a standard deviation of 0.43. Public attitude towards the acceptance of refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries into the USA (agree = 76%, disagree = 24%) had an average score and standard deviation of 0.23 and 0.42, respectively. Public attitude towards policies that make conditions for undocumented immigrants so they return to their home countries (agree = 32%, disagree = 68%) had an average score of 0.67 and a standard deviation of 0.46. Public attitude towards building a wall against immigrants (favor = 37%, opposed = 63%) had an average score and a standard deviation of 0.63 and 0.48 respectively. Public attitude towards laws preventing immigrants from entering the USA (favor = 36%, oppose = 64%) had an average score of 0.64 and a standard deviation of 0.47. Public attitude towards police stop targeted at undocumented immigrants and immigrants with a criminal background (favor = 53%, oppose = 47%) had an average score and standard deviation of 0.47 and 0.49 respectively. The geopolitics variable–red or blue state (red states = 60% and blue states = 40%) had an average score of 0.60 and a standard deviation of 0.49 (Table 2).

Table 2 Description of study variables (N = 1018)
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The USA as a good moral example on immigration to other countries globally (agree = 43%, disagree = 57%). Trust in political institutions (Trump’s presidency = 24.7%, Congress = 56.5%, none = 18.6%). The average age for the respondents was 53 years with a standard deviation of 19.1 for respondents aged 18–94 years surveyed. Rural–urban residency (rural = 25%, urban = 75%). Home ownership (rent = 29%, own home = 71%). Marital status (single = 27%, divorced/separated = 14%, widowed = 11%, married = 48%). Employment status (employed = 55%, unemployed = 45%). Education (high school = 32%, college = 50%, graduate school = 18%). Income ($24,999 and below = 21.8%, $25,000–$49,999 = 24.5%, $50,000–$99,000 = 29.9%, $100,000 +  = 23.6%). Party affiliation (republican = 26.6%, democrat = 33.7%, independent = 38.4%, others = 1.34%). Race (White = 71.6%, Black = 12.5%, Hispanic = 6.6%, Native American = 2.8%, Asian = 2.1%, Mixed race/Others = 4.2%). Gender (female = 51%, male = 49%). Religion (Christian = 73.6%, Muslim = 0.6%, Buddhist = 1.4%, Judaism = 1.9%, others = 2.2%, no religion = 17.3%). Registered voter (no = 18%, yes = 82%). Sexual orientation (not heterosexual = 9%, heterosexual = 91%). Region (Northeast = 18%, North Central = 22%, South = 37%, West = 23%) with an average score of 2.64 and a standard deviation of 1.02. Political ideology (conservative = 38.5%, liberal = 30.6%, moderate = 30.7%).

Predictors of Public Attitude Towards Immigrants and Immigration Policies in the USA

In the period between 2017 and 2021, the Trump administration introduced several laws, administrative restructuring, and policies to reshape US immigration. In this study, we examined six of these laws and policies. See Table 3 for a summary.

Table 3 Immigration policies and laws and their objectives
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About 25% of the respondents favor laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border compared to 75% who opposed this policy. After estimating the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border while controlling for other variables, the model was significant (F = 257.38, p < 0.001) and explained a significant (36%) portion of variance in the data (see model I). After controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, the USA as a good moral example on immigration globally (t = 3.53, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 2.54, trust in Trump’s presidency (t =  − 3.60, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.35, and political ideology, specifically, conservatives (t =  − 3.28, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 0.37 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards laws and policies that separate parents from children at the border in the USA. The present findings are consistent with previous findings about the factors that influence public attitude towards immigration policies and laws in the USA (see Pryce, 2018; McCann & Boateng, 2020).

Again, approximately 76% of the respondents agree to this policy while 24% disagree. After estimating the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards accepting refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries in the USA while controlling for other variables, the model was significant (F = 139.53; p < 0.001) and explained 20% of the variance in the data (see model II). After controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, trust in Trump’s presidency (t = 2.53, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio 1.92, trust in Congress (t =  − 2.08, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 0.48, and region–North Central (t =  − 2.26, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 0.43 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards accepting refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries in the USA.

Also, about 32% of the respondents agree to this policy while 68% disagree. After estimating the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards making conditions difficult for undocumented immigrants so they return to their home country while controlling for other variables, the model was significant (F = 184.30; p < 0.001) and explained approximately 23% of variance in the data (see model III). After controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, the USA as a moral example on immigrant policy globally (t = 4.42, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 2.62, and political ideology–conservative (t =  − 3.52; p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.41 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards making conditions difficult for undocumented immigrants, so they return to their home country (Table 4).

Table 4 Effect of geopolitics and other variables on public attitude towards immigration policy (separating parents from children at the border/accepting refugees and immigrants facing danger in their home countries in the USA/ making conditions difficult for undocumented immigrants, so they return to their home country) in the USA
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Furthermore, approximately, 37% of the respondents favor this policy while 63% disagree. After estimating the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards building a wall against immigrants in the USA while controlling for other variables, the model was significant (F = 441.92; p < 0.001) and had 51% of the variance in the data (see model IV). After controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, the USA as a moral example on immigrant policy globally (t = 3.35, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 2.44, trust in Trump’s presidency (t =  − 7.70, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.06, political ideology–conservative (t =  − 3.36, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.36, divorce (t = 3.67, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.17, republicans (t =  − 2.23, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 0.03, and North Central (t = 2.38, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 2.78 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards building a wall against immigrants in the USA.

Also, about 36% of the respondents favor laws preventing immigrants from entering and 64% oppose the policy. After estimating the effect of geopolitics on public attitude towards laws preventing immigrants from entering the USA while controlling for other variables, the model was significant (F = 172.00; p < 0.001) and explained about 21% of the variance in the data (see model V). After controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, the USA as a good moral example on immigration policy globally (t = 2.40, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 1.67, trust in Trump’s presidency (t =  − 2.69, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 0.50, political ideology–conservative (t =  − 3.18, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 0.45, and respondents with an income of $24,999 and below (t =  − 2.53, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 0.39 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards laws preventing immigrants from entering the USA.

Likewise, about 53% of the respondents’ favor police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants with criminal background while 47% of the respondents’ opposed police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants with criminal background. After estimating the effect of geopolitics and other variables on the outcome variable public attitude towards police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants with criminal background, the model was significant (F = 256.74; p < 0.001) and explained a significant portion (29%) of the variance in the data (see model VI). The model revealed that the USA as a moral example on immigration policy globally (t = 2.62, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 1.77, trust in Trump’s presidency (t =  − 4.13, p < 0.001) with an odds ratio of 0.29, political ideology–liberals (t = 2.59, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 1.89, and conservatives (t = -2.61, p < 0.01) with an odds ratio of 0.52, and region–South (t =  − 2.38, p < 0.05) with an odds ratio of 0.44 were found to be significant predictors of public attitude towards police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants with criminal background in the USA. The existing literature is replete with similar findings (Table 5; see Provine & Sanchez, 2011; Dzordzormenyoh, 2022; Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins, 2022).

Table 5 Effect of geopolitics and other variables on public attitude towards immigration policy (building a wall against immigrants/preventing immigrants from entering the USA/police stops targeted at undocumented immigrants and immigrants with a criminal background) in the USA
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Discussion and Conclusion

Everywhere in the world, the topic of immigration (especially undocumented) becomes a controversial issue and evinces serious and intense debates (Boateng et al., 2021; Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins, 2022). However, in the USA, the controversy is more prevalent, and most people hold strong anti-immigration sentiments. A significant number of Americans believe that immigration increases local crime rates or immigrants commit more crime (see McCann & Boateng, 2019, 2020; Passel & Rohal, 2015 for a review). This anti-immigration sentiment has led to the proliferation of immigration policies at both the federal and local levels to curtail the entrance of immigrants into the country. At the federal level, in recent times, the Trump administration issued a sweeping executive order to prevent citizens from certain countries from entering USA and also to reduce the number of legal immigrants. For instance, “executive order signed on January 27, 2017, prevented refugees from Syria from entering the U.S. indefinitely” (McCann & Boateng, 2020, p. 159). At the local level, several US cities have implemented or enacted policies and ordinances to address issues about immigration in their communities (Walker & Leitner, 2011). Whereas most of these policies are exclusionary in nature and aim to prevent or limit immigration, a few of such policies are largely inclusionary such as the sanctuary policies implemented by cities like San Francisco and others. The primary purpose of this paper is not to survey local or federal immigration policies in the USA but to examine, from the citizens’ perspective, what influences support for immigration policies.

Public support for immigration-related policies and laws—whether anti or pro—is a complex phenomenon to study and understand. The complexity is because immigration itself is a complex concept and has several dimensions. Also, understanding public support is difficult because of the multiplexity of variables that affect citizens’ support. However, the few available studies on this issue have observed the importance of geographical location in shaping attitudes toward immigration policies (Haubert & Fussell, 2006; Walker & Leitner, 2011; Winders, 2007). These studies have observed a statistically significant relationship between location and anti-immigration policy attitudes, arguing that such attitudes are more common in the South than in other regions of the USA. In our multivariate analysis, we observed a limited effect of geography on Americans’ support for immigration policies because, of the three geography-related variables included in the analysis, only one had some influence. Specifically, we did not find any effect for geopolitics on whether citizens will support or oppose any of the five immigration-related policies we examined. This observation implies that citizens in red and blue states do not differ in terms of their support. While this observation contradicts the notion that because blue states tend to have more positive views about immigration, people in that states may support pro-immigration policies than those in red states, it raises questions about the complexities and diversities that exist in the various states and the need to accommodate such uniqueness. There may be other factors that citizens may consider beyond simply living in a red or blue state or voting for a republican or democrat candidate. Factors such as the socio-economic conditions of the state and individuals may weigh heavily on people’s decision than just geopolitics.

Also, despite the literature observing the rural–urban effect, our analysis failed to make such observation. Prior studies suggest that rural folks in the USA tend to support restrictive immigration policies than their city folks, because they are likely to hold negative views about multiculturalism. The intergroup contact hypothesis, which argues that public interactions and contacts with immigrants have a positive effect on the citizens’ attitudes, may better explain why some scholars think rural folks tend to support restrictive immigration policies. Historically, immigrants are less likely to reside in rural areas due to the lack of or limited social and economic opportunities (McCann & Boateng, 2020). This reduces the number of immigrants in such areas and further limits native-born interactions with immigrants. Hence, according to this line of reasoning, rural residents will end up supporting anti-immigration policies than city residents who are likely to have increased contact with foreign-born citizens. Although this argument is impressive, we did not see any difference between the two groups with regard to the six immigration policies examined.

The only geographical variable that we found predicting support for immigration policies was the regional variable. That is, regional location is important in understanding people’s decision to support or oppose an immigration policy. Specifically, we observed that people in North Central tend to have favorable attitudes toward immigration policies compared to those in Northeast. These people are likely to oppose policies or laws that aim to ban immigration into USA as well as those that separate children from their parents. However, comparatively, Southern states tend to support policies that empower police officers to target undocumented immigrants in the communities than the Northeastern states. This observation offers credence to the prior argument that Southerners were more likely to hold negative views about immigrants due to certain unique characteristics of the South, such as their past legacies of racism and segregation (Haubert & Fussell, 2006).

Politics, for long, has been considered as an important factor in shaping public opinion about immigration and immigration-related policies (MacDonald, 2021). For example, it has been widely argued that ideological preferences of political parties as well as party affiliation of people play a critical role in public support. Liberals tend to hold favorable attitudes toward pro-immigration policies than their conservative colleagues. In this study, while we did not compare liberals to conservatives, we still observed the significant role of politics in forming attitudes toward immigration policies. Compared to moderates, liberals are more likely to oppose policies that allow police officers to target undocumented immigrants in the communities. Apart from this specific policy, there was no difference in terms of other policies. However, conservatives are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies than the moderates. That is, policies such as those related to border wall, banning of immigrants, separation of children from parents, not accepting refugees into the USA, and policies that make conditions for undocumented immigrants difficult as well as those that allow the police to target undocumented immigrants are likely to receive conservatives’ support than moderates’ support. This conclusion supports the notion that conservatives are philosophically anti-immigration, hold negative feelings about immigrants, and do not want immigrants in the USA. In addition to political ideology, we found that party identification is also important, with self-identified republicans agreeing with or supporting policies that prevent refugees from coming to the USA. This finding is important because it validates the ideological effects discussed earlier and also gives sense of what policies republicans make or are likely to implement when they are in government.

Past research has found demographic effects on public opinion about immigration and support for immigration-related policies. These studies believe that support and attitudes vary across characteristics such as race, education, income, gender, age, class status, or unemployment (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Coenders et al., 2008; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Haubert & Fussell, 2006; Mayda, 2006; Neal & Bohon, 2003; O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). The observation is that individuals that are older, possess low socio-economic capital, are less educated, are in working class, and are unemployed tend to express strong anti-immigration sentiments and are less likely to support pro-immigration-related policies. While we did not observe effect for some of these variables, we found that age, marital status, and income strongly influence support for immigration policies. Specifically, older people are more likely to disagree with policies that aim to separate children from parents whereas married people are less likely to support policies that prevent refugees from entering into USA. The low-income earners (those earning $24,999 or less) tend to express favorable attitudes toward immigration policies than the high-income earners (those earning above $100 k). These low-income earners are more likely to oppose policies that aim to make the life of undocumented immigrants unbearable. This observation and behavior are surprising, given the position of prior studies on this relationship. Proponents of the instrumental group conflict theory suggest that fear of economic competition from immigrants enhances anti-immigration sentiments among the natives, especially the poor and uneducated segments of the US population (Dzordzormenyoh & Perkins, 2022; McCann & Boateng, 2020).

The present study, like most empirical studies, have some limitations worth mentioning. First, the results presented above are based on analysis of survey data which sometimes have desirability bias—survey respondents adjusting their answers during interviews and surveys to appear credible which might not necessarily reflect their actual deposition. Desirability bias as a weakness of survey data can affect the current results; and therefore, we caution readers against further interpretation of the results presented in this study. Second, the geopolitics variable utilized in the present study examines only one election cycle—2106—which limits our ability to ascertain the actual influence of this variable on public support for immigration politics in the USA. We were also cautious in ensuring that the immigration issues considered correlated with the time of the geopolitics variable used in the present study. Future studies can examine the effect of geopolitics on immigration from a historical perspective and also adopt longer time frames to aid our understanding of the topic.

Despite the above study’s limitations, our findings have implications for both research and policy development. In terms of research, our findings extend the literature on immigration by exploring how citizens perceive immigration policies. This is a significant contribution to the literature since the majority of the attitudinal studies have focused exclusively on understanding anti-immigration sentiments and how citizens form their views about immigrants. Also, some of these studies have focused on understanding the immigration-crime relationship. By examining public support for immigration policies, we fill in gaps in the existing literature. Practically, our findings are useful for developing immigration policies that are based not on sentiments but on empirical evidence.