The perils of centralized research funding systems

Abstract

The distribution of research funds by key funding agencies in Canada and the U.S. is based on the idea of selectivity, i.e., the policy of NOT funding a significant fraction of the applicants. Despite the fact that this policy is superficially justified by the peer review-enforced goal of "excellence," in practice it tends to favor research along well-established lines and discourages novel approaches, innovation, and risk taking. Furthermore, the secretive nature of the funding system efficiently turns it into a self-serving network operating on the principle of an "old boys’ club." This even further undercuts the veneer of objectivity in the peer review assessment because funding panels can arbitrarily interpret reviews at their whim without oversight. Although the system calls itself "competition,", the idea of real interactive competition is actually betrayed. What we have, in fact, is a centralized and authoritarian quasi-socialist grant distribution system.

The article disputes the common belief that the major problem of a granting system is "government under-funding." On the contrary, it argues that much of a trivial research is actually OVER-funded. The main problem is the distribution system, not the overall level of funding. An alternative funding model is proposed. In a nutshell, it is a "fund researchers, not proposals" strategy. Drastic simplification of the funding process is advocated. The proposed measures are largely at odds with the present paradigm of selectivity and fierce competition as catalyzers of "excellence." The latter notion is dismissed as misleading. In order to see more innovation, we need a more uniform funding system (a sliding funding scale), even it means lower average funding levels.