Abstract
The question of whether psychology can properly be regarded as a science has long been debated (Smedslund in Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 50, 185–195, 2016). Science is typically understood as a method for producing reliable knowledge by testing falsifiable claims against objective evidence. Psychological phenomena, however, are traditionally taken to be “subjective” and hidden from view. To the extent that science relies upon objective observation, is a scientific psychology possible? In this paper, I argue that scientific psychology does not much fail to meet the requirements of objectivity as much as the concept of objectivity fails as a methodological principle for psychological science. The traditional notion of objectivity relies upon the distinction between a public, observable exterior and a private, subjective interior. There are good reasons, however, to reject this dichotomy. Scholarship suggests that psychological knowledge arises neither from the “inside out” (subjectively) nor from the outside-in (objectively), but instead intersubjective processes that occur between people. If this is so, then objectivist methodology may do more to obscure than illuminate our understanding of psychological functioning. From this view, we face a dilemma: Do we, in the name of science, cling to an objective epistemology that cuts us off from the richness of psychological activity? Or do we seek to develop a rigorous intersubjective psychology that exploits the processes through which we gain psychological knowledge in the first place? If such a psychology can produce systematic, reliable and useful knowledge, then the question of whether its practices are “scientific” in the traditional sense would become irrelevant.
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Mascolo, M.F. Beyond Objectivity and Subjectivity: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Science. Integr. psych. behav. 50, 543–554 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-016-9357-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-016-9357-3