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Presenting an economic interaction bi-level model between electricity retailer and customer in bilateral electricity market contract

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Abstract

Players, especially electricity retailers have an important role in achieving optimal economic models in the electricity market. They act as intermediaries between customers and energy suppliers. In this regard, this study proposed an interactive bi-level model in bilateral electricity contracts from the retailer’s viewpoint. At the first level of this interaction, the retailer maximizes its profit by selecting some customers and determining the length of the bilateral contract with each customer. At the second level, customer cost is minimized based on new interactive parameters that are introduced for maximum interaction. In this regard, the optimal amount of energy sales to each customer is also determined based on the proposed bi-level model. Finally, after linearization and determination of the single-level equivalent of the proposed model, the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model will be implemented in GAMS software and solved via the CPLEX solver. The results indicate the effect of the proposed interactive model on maximizing retailer profit and minimizing customer costs in bilateral electricity contracts.

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Abbreviations

\({\text{W}} = \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,{\text{w}}} \right\}\) :

Sets related to wholesalers

\({\text{C}} = \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,{\text{c}}} \right\}\) :

Sets related to customers

\({\text{T}} = \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,24} \right\} \) :

Sets related to hours time periods of a day

\( {\text{P}} = \left\{ {0,1 \ldots ,{\text{p}}} \right\} \) :

Sets related to duration of bilateral contract between retailer and customers

\({\text{C}}^{\prime } \subseteq {\text{C}} \) :

A customer subset with whom the retailer has a contract in any situation and supplies their energy needs

\({\text{D}}_{{\text{c}}} \left( {MW} \right) \) :

Amount of demand for customer C in a day

\( {\text{r}}_{{{\text{ct}}}} \left( \% \right)\) :

The rate of consumption for customer C during time period t

\({\text{V}}_{{\text{c}}} \left( {MW} \right) \) :

The capacity of storage for customer C

\(\delta _{{{\text{cp}}}} \left( \% \right) \) :

Discount desired by customer C (per unit of energy) in contract with length P (per contract length)

\(\beta _{{{\text{cp}}}} \left( \$ \right) \) :

The revenue from extending the contract with customer C with length P

\({\text{h}}_{{\text{c}}} \left( {\frac{\$ }{MWh}} \right) \) :

Storage cost for a customer C

\(\varphi _{{\text{t}}} \left( {\frac{\$ }{MWh}} \right) \) :

Energy prices during time period t

\(\rho _{{{\text{wt}}}} \left( {\frac{\$ }{MWh}} \right) \) :

Cost of energy supplied by wholesaler W during time period t

\({\text{cap}}_{{{\text{wt}}}} \left( {MW} \right) \) :

Capacity for wholesaler W during period t

\( {\text{x}}_{{{\text{wt}}}} \left( {MW} \right)\) :

Quantity of supplied energy via wholesaler W during time period t

\( {\text{s}}_{{{\text{ct}}}} \left( {MW} \right)\) :

Sales of energy to customer C during time period t

\( \upalpha _{{{\text{ct}}}} \left( \% \right)\) :

Rate of discount offered to customer C during time period t

\({\text{y}}_{{{\text{cp}}}} \) :

This variable is binary and equals to 1, if retailer has a bilateral contract with customer C for length P, otherwise this variable is 0

\({\text{I}}_{{{\text{ct}}}} \left( {MW} \right) \) :

Customer’s energy storage during time period t

\( {\text{a}}_{{{\text{ct}}}}\) :

This variable is binary and equal to 1, if customer C agrees to obtain additional energy during time period t via discount offered by retailer/otherwise this variable is 0

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Correspondence to Soodabeh Soleymani.

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Apornak, K., Soleymani, S., Faghihi, F. et al. Presenting an economic interaction bi-level model between electricity retailer and customer in bilateral electricity market contract. Sādhanā 47, 89 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-022-01814-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-022-01814-5

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