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Taxes and the choice between risky and risk-free debt: on the neutrality of credit default taxation

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Abstract

Shareholders can decide if their corporation issues risky or risk-free debt. We identify tax systems in which the choice between risky and risk-free debt is not distorted by taxes. These credit default neutral tax systems make it possible to make capital structure decisions and firm valuations neglecting credit default risk, even after taxes. Thus credit default neutrality is a characteristic of a tax system that helps to reduce planning costs. Moreover, credit default neutrality is a necessary condition for financial neutrality of taxation. We find one class of credit default neutral taxes that preserves and another class that modifies the expected tax distribution between creditors and debtor firm. Finally, we show the influence of personal taxation on credit default neutrality.

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Notes

  1. See Homburg et al. (2004), p. 276.

  2. The twiddle sign indicates random variables.

  3. See Duffie (2001), p. 28.

  4. See Harrison and Kreps (1979); Harrison and Pliska (1981).

  5. See Bond and Devereux (2003), p. 1292, for possible justifications of this assumption.

  6. See Kruschwitz et al. (2005), p. 223f., for a discussion of this assumption.

  7. λ refers to the investment I 0. This implies that λ refers to the book value of the investment.

  8. The tax bases of these taxes will be described in Sect. 5.

  9. See König and Wosnitza (2004), p. 91, for a discussion of the conditions under which the “full loss offset” assumption is in line with the current German tax law.

  10. See Löffler and Schneider (2003).

  11. Note that taxes may also influence the threshold value λcrit.

  12. See Maiterth and Sureth (2006), p. 226.

  13. According to German tax law ψ can be 0 or 1 for natural persons, and 1 for firms (esp. banks).

  14. This is, for example, the case in German law. Section 366 of the German Civil Code grants an option to the debtor. The taxation follows the exercise of this option. See Bundesfinanzhof (German Supreme Tax Court) of 10 June 1975, VIII R 71/71, Bundessteuerblatt II 1975, p. 847.

  15. We use the term “recognized interest” for \(\widetilde{D}-\lambda\cdot I_0\) to indicate that “recognized interest” can also be negative in the states of credit default. Therefore, “recognized interest” has to be distinguished from \(\widetilde{\rm Int}\) which denotes the part of the payments to the creditors that are declared as interest (see Footnote 13).

  16. According to current German tax law only 75% of interest for long-term debts are deductible for trade tax purposes. Therefore, in 2008 z averages about 0.12 (2007: about 0.16) if we consider trade tax, corporate income tax as well as solidarity surcharge.

  17. Before 1998, debt relief gains were exempted from German income tax according to Sect. 3 No. 66 of the German income tax code. However, under certain conditions the fiscal authority forgives the tax liability on debt relief gains. See Bundesfinanzministerium, administrative regulation, 27.3.2003, IV A 6—S 2140—8/03, Bundessteuerblatt I 2003, p. 240. According to the Finance Court Munich, 12.12.2007, judgment 1 K 4487/06, this administrative regulation violates the Sect. 3 No. 66 of the German income tax code. The Bundesfinanzhof (German Supreme Tax Court) will have to adjuciate upon the appeal against this judgment.

  18. We assume that interest owed to creditors, multiplied with (1−z), is deductible. In the states of credit default the interest owed to creditors may be greater than the interest actually paid to creditors. However, the interest amount owed to creditors increases the debt default gain. If we take this into account, we find the result that with β = 1−z only the paid interest, multiplied with (1−z), is deductible.

  19. Since the German insolvency law reform in 1999 tax debts have been without priority. See Frotscher (2005), p. 53, for a description of tax debt as insolvency claims according to Sect. 38 of the German Insolvency Statute. Recently, there have been several attempts to reintroduce tax priority, see Bundestags–Drucksache 16/886 from 9th March 2006 and the proposed amendment to Sect. 251 of the German General Fiscal Code (“Abgabenordnung”) by the Tax Amendment Act 2007 (“Jahressteuergesetz 2007”).

  20. See Footnote 13.

  21. See Bringewat and Waza (2004), p. 214; Dziadkowski and Treisch (1995), p. 333; Kroschel and Wellisch (1998), p. 1662.

  22. See Kruschwitz et al. (2005).

  23. We assume that only the paid interest, multiplied by (1−z), is deductible.

  24. See appendix.

  25. For example, the previous German “half income system” with a 50% shareholder relief had a γ = 0.5. According to the German Business Tax Reform Act 2008 γ will increase to 0.6 from 2009 onwards for income from shares held as business assets. Private investment income will be taxed with a final withholding tax from 2009 onwards (γ = 1, τ i  = 0.25).

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the editor, Wolfgang Kürsten, two anonymous referees, Frank Hechtner, Lutz Kruschwitz, Andreas Löffler, Leonhard Knoll, Ekkehard Wenger, and the participants at the Second arqus meeting for helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Kay Blaufus.

Appendix: Deriving Eq. (37)

Appendix: Deriving Eq. (37)

We start with Eq. (32):

$$ \begin{aligned} \Updelta_s &= T_{Ds}^{{\rm mod}}- T_{Ds}^{{\rm pres}} \\ &= \tau_i\cdot {\rm Int}^{\rm mod}_s +\psi\cdot\tau_i\cdot(R^{\rm mod}_s-\lambda \cdot I_0)-\tau_i\cdot(D^{\rm pres}_s-\lambda \cdot I_0) \\ &= \tau_i\cdot(D^{\rm mod}_s-R^{\rm mod}_s)+\psi\cdot\tau_i\cdot R^{\rm mod}_s+\lambda \cdot I_0\cdot\tau_i\cdot(1-\psi)-\tau_i\cdot D^{\rm pres}_s \\ &=\tau_i\cdot(D^{\rm mod}_s-D^{\rm pres}_s)-R^{\rm mod}_s\cdot\tau_i\cdot(1- \psi)+\lambda\cdot I_0\cdot\tau_i\cdot(1-\psi). \\ \end{aligned} $$

If we consider Eq. (33) we can rearrange the above equation to:

$$ \Updelta_s=\tau_i\cdot \Updelta_s+\tau_i\cdot(1-\psi)\cdot(\lambda\cdot I_0-R^{\rm mod}_s). $$
(48)

Solving Eq. (48) to Δ s leads to:

$$ \Updelta_s=\frac{\tau_i\cdot(1-\psi)}{1-\tau_i}\cdot(\lambda\cdot I_0-R^{\rm mod}_s). $$
(49)

In a similar way we can rearrange Eq. (34):

$$ \begin{aligned} \Updelta_s &= T_{Cs}^{{\rm pres}}- T_{Cs}^{{\rm mod}} \\&=-\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot(D^{\rm pres}_s-\lambda\cdot I_0) \\& \quad -\left(-\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot {\rm Int}^{\rm mod}_s + \tau_c\cdot\beta \cdot \left(\lambda \cdot I_0 - R^{\rm mod}_s\right)\right) \\&=\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot(\lambda\cdot I_0-D^{\rm pres}_s)+\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot(D^{\rm mod}_s-R^{\rm mod}_s) \\& \quad -\tau_c\cdot\beta \cdot \left(\lambda \cdot I_0 - R^{\rm mod}_s\right) \\&=\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot(D^{\rm mod}_s-D^{\rm pres}_s)+\tau_c\cdot(1-z- \beta)\cdot\left(\lambda\cdot I_0-R^{\rm mod}_s\right). \\\end{aligned} $$

We can simplify the above equation considering Eq. (33):

$$ \Updelta_s=\tau_c\cdot(1 - z)\cdot\Updelta_s+\tau_c\cdot(1-z-\beta)\cdot\left(\lambda\cdot I_0-R^{\rm mod}_s\right). $$
(50)

If we solve Eq. (50) to Δ s we obtain:

$$ \Updelta_s=\frac{\tau_c\cdot(1-z-\beta)} {1-\tau_c\cdot(1-z)}\cdot\left(\lambda\cdot I_0-R^{\rm mod}_s\right). $$
(51)

Using Eqs. (49) and (51) leads to:

$$\frac{\tau_i\cdot(1-\psi)} {1-\tau_i} =\frac{\tau_c\cdot(1-z-\beta)}{1-\tau_c\cdot(1-z)}. $$
(52)

Finally, we solve Eq. (52) to τ c :

$$ \tau_c =\frac{{\tau_i \cdot \left({1 - \psi} \right)}}{{\left( {1 - z} \right) \cdot \left({1 - \psi \cdot \tau_i} \right) - \beta \cdot \left({1 - \tau_i} \right)}}. $$

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Blaufus, K., Hundsdoerfer, J. Taxes and the choice between risky and risk-free debt: on the neutrality of credit default taxation. Rev Manage Sci 2, 161–181 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-008-0020-3

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