Introduction

In this article, I trace the two conflicting lines of understanding of the philosophical status of Palamism and Barlaamism in the context of the Name-Glorifiers debate in Russian thought at the beginning of the twentieth century. I will trace two lines of interpretation of the philosophical status of Palamism and Barlaamism. One line, initiated by Fyodor Uspensky, associated Palamism with Aristotelianism and nominalism, and Barlaamism with Platonism and realism. The other line, stemming from Mitrofan Muretov, conversely, linked Palamism with Platonism, and Barlaamism with nominalism. I explore the development and transformation of these lines during the debate involving monk Antony (Bulatovich), Mitrofan Muretov, Sergey Troitsky, Vladimir Ern, and Pavel Florensky.

Before I turn to the main subject of this research a few preliminary remarks are in order. Palamism, a theological doctrine that was formulated in fourteen- century Byzantium by Gregory Palamas, posits a distinction in the Divinity between the unknowable and imparticipable essence, on the one hand, and the knowable, participable, eternal, and uncreated energies, on the other. One of these uncreated energies is the Tabor light—the light, which appeared to the Apostles during the Transfiguration of Christ (Mt. 17:2; Mk. 9:2). Gregory Palamas spoke about the two types of divine energies: creating and “God-making”; through participation in the latter a human being unites himself with the Divinity (is deified). As the authors studied below raise the question of whether the teaching of Palamas belongs to Platonism and realism (in the sense of the problem of universals), I would also like to note that Palamas’ teaching assumes the existence of the universal before things, in the sense of the hierarchy of the beginnings-energies (existential — living — sensible — rational — intellectual / wisdom‐like — spiritual) in which the created naturally participate (Biriukov, 2014, pp. 295–301; Biriukov, 2024, pp. 103–109; Kyrlezhev & Birukov, 2023, pp. 85–89). In this respect, it may be classified as Platonism, in its Christian version, and as philosophical realism (cf. Gunnarsson, 2002, pp. 233–252).Footnote 1 Barlaam the Calabrian was one of Palamas’ opponents. He denied the possibility of a distinction between the essence and uncreated energies in God and insisted that the Tabor light was created. Barlaam’s doctrine also has Platonic features (Whittaker, 1984, pp. 155–158; Demetracopoulos, 2003, pp. 85, 87, 90, 99, 101, 103 etc.).

However, the notions of “Palamism” and “Barlaamism”, denoting respectively the teachings of Gregory Palamas (and his companions) and Barlaam the Calabrian, are used below as concepts rather than as referring to historical phenomena. The reason for it is that the attitude towards Palamism and Barlaamism in the authors discussed in the article—except for the Byzantinist Feodor Uspensky—was not an academic exercise, but was conditioned by polemical purposes, as we shall see.

The Philosophical Basis of Palamism and Barlaamism in Russian Thought: Prehistory

The first author in the Russian intellectual milieu who suggested a correlation of the teachings of the Palamite and anti-Palamite theologian parties with certain philosophical positions, was Feodor Uspensky, a famous pre-revolutionary Russian historian, philologist and Byzantinist. In his “Essays on the History of Byzantine Education”, published in 1891, which had a great impact on the subsequent scholarly and philosophical thought in Russia, Uspensky considers the struggle between Orthodox and non-Orthodox thought in Byzantium to be the continuation of the controversy between Platonist-Realists and Aristotelian-Nominalists (F. Uspensky, 1891, pp. 177–178, 278–279, 311). (He identified Platonism with realism and Aristotelianism with nominalism.)Footnote 2 Accordingly, he regards the polemic between Palamas and Barlaam not as a theological but as a philosophical controversy.Footnote 3 He correlates the position of Palamas with nominalism-Aristotelianism and the position of Barlaam with Platonism-realism. He understands the position of Palamas in this way because of Palamas’ declared anti-rationalism and anti-logicism, as well as Palamas’ teaching about the sensual perception of the divine Tabor light. As for the figure of Barlaam, Uspensky regards him as a logician-rationalist, for whom uniting with God is identical with the comprehension of truth and who, unlike Palamas, denies the possibility to comprehend God with the sense organs (F. Uspensky, 1891, p. 279). In this respect Uspensky sees the Palamite controversies as a continuation not only of the general philosophical polemics about the problem of universals, but also of the discussions between Platonists-Realists and Aristotelians-Nominalists, which manifested itself in the previous Byzantine theological controversies of the eleventh-twelfth centuries, in particular those connected with the name of John Italus (condemned in the Byzantine Orthodox Church in the eleventh century for Platonism).

At the time when he wrote his “Essays”, Feodor Uspensky had access to manuscripts of the “Synodikon for the Sunday of Orthodoxy”, a Byzantine compilation that anathematises heretics and acclaims their opponents. He prepared an edition accompanied by the Slavonic translation, which was published two years after the publication of the “Essays”, as an appendix to it (F. Uspensky, 1893). In his “Essays”, Uspensky mentions Barlaam’s Platonism-realism is confirmed by the fact that the “Synodikon” (not yet published) quotes the conciliar decision of 1351 against Barlaam and Akindynos, who “dared to introduce the teaching about the Platonic forms and Hellenic myths” into the Church.Footnote 4 These words are actually present in the “Synodikon”, in the 10th section of the chapters “Against Barlaam and Akindynos”.Footnote 5

Uspensky’s interpretation was criticized by Pavel Bezobrazov in his review of Feodor Uspensky’s two works (“Essays” and “Synodikon”), which was published in 1896. Bezobrazov drew attention to the fact that during the Palamite controversy accusations of Platonism were mutual, i.e. both sides accused each other of it. He claimed that Palamites and anti-Palamites looked at the subject from a common point of view, differing only in details, and that they cannot be contraposed as representatives of different schools of philosophy (Bezobrazov, 1896, pp. 125–50; see: Ermilov, 2011, pp. 188–189).

It seems to me that the text of the “Synodikon for the Sunday of Orthodoxy” played an important role in the reception of Palamism, which took place in Russian religious thought at the beginning of the twentieth century. I believe that it was used as the most important source for this subject (cf. Senina, 2011, p. 382; Kenworthy, 2014, p. 99; Biriukov, 2021, p. 151). Indeed, Russian thinkers at the beginning of the twentieth century did not use to read the texts of Palamas and other Church fathers in the original,Footnote 6 but relied on Russian translations. As for Palamas’ works, only a very small part of them had been translated into Russian before the 1990s, and those were not the dogmatic, but homiletical and ascetical texts. Meanwhile the anathemas against anti-Palamites, included in the “Synodikon” published by Uspensky (the Greek original with a Church Slavonic translation), functioned as a convenient summary of Palamite teaching, and it also gave an idea of the teaching of the anti-Palamites.

The Philosophical Qualification of the Palamite Controversy in Mitrofan Muretov and Antony Bulatovich in the Context of the Emergence of the Name-Glorifiers Polemic

The question about the correlation between Palamism / anti-Palamism on the one hand and Platonism-realism / nominalism on the other hand began to be relevant again (after the discussion of this topic by Uspensky and Bezobrazov) in the course of the Name-Glorifiers controversy of the 1910s, i.e. the discussions about the status of divine names. (Here the identification of nominalism and Aristotelianism, as it was in Uspensky, became irrelevant, while the identification of realism and Platonism, of course, remained).

I would like to point out that the representatives of the Name-Glorifiers movement maintained that when Christians think about God and name Him, as in prayer, they participate in God Himself in His energies, and therefore divine names, which a human being thinks of and utters, are divine energies, which means they are God Himself.Footnote 7 In his “Apology of the Faith in the Name of God and in the Name Jesus” Anthony (Bulatovich), an Athonite monk without any background in philosophy, developed this teaching, using the language of “forms (ideas)”. His “Apology” was finished in July 1912 and published in 1913 as part of the series called “Religious and Philosophical Library” edited by Mikhail Novosyolov (Bulatovich, 1913).

The publication of Bulatovich’s “Apology” marks the beginning of the reception of Palamism in Russian thought in the proper sense of the word.Footnote 8 While before, the Palamite controversies and the teaching of Palamas were considered within the Russian intellectual field as something external, as a subject of pure academic interest, now, in the Name-Glorifiers movement Palamism acquired an existential dimension, and came to be understood as something important for a Christian here and now.Footnote 9 To convince his readers that God’s name is God, in the sense of divine action, in his “Apology” Bulatovich appeals to the Palamite doctrine of the distinction between the ineffable divine essence and nameable divine energies,Footnote 10 where the energies are identified with divine properties and understood as divine (uncreated) in the proper sense.Footnote 11 However, there are no references to the works of Gregory Palamas in this treatise; Palamas’ teaching in its Hesychast dimension is mentioned only in a retelling by Paisius Velichkovsky.Footnote 12 This is connected to the above-mentioned fact that Palamas’ dogmatic works at the time of the Name-Glorifiers polemic were mostly untranslated into Russian. However, there are frequent references in “Apology” to the Palamite discussions. This is because Bulatovich equates the position of his opponents with the teaching of Barlaam the Calabrian. This is a point of great importance for Bulatovich. At the very beginning of his treatise he says — and then repeats this thought further on—that the position of the opponents of Name-Glorifiers, who deny that divine names are God in the sense of the divine energies, is identical with the teaching of Barlaam the Calabrian, who rejected the divinity of the Tabor light, the idea of the Tabor light as the divine energy, and the distinction between the essence and energies in God as such.Footnote 13

Clarifying in his “Apology” the thesis that God’s name is God, Bulatovich uses the language of “forms” (see Senina, 2011, p. 384). He claims that divine names are mental representations of nameable properties of God (Bulatovich, 1913, p. 52). According to Bulatovich, created letters and sounds are conventional signs, a conventional shell for divine names, which represent forms in God and are God Himself (Bulatovich, 1913, p. 101), in the sense of divine actions (energies). Sounds and letters in the divine names are actions of the human body, but with divine grace inherent in them, for they express the divine truth and the ideas about God (Bulatovich, 1913, p. 188). The key intuition of Bulatovich’s thought is that “any truth and thought (idea) about God is God himself” (Bulatovich, 1913, p. 26).

The language of forms (thoughts, ideas) is also used in the anonymous preface “From the editors of the Religio-Philosophical Library” to the text of Bulatovich in Mikhail Novosyolov’s edition of the “Apology”. The preface was written by Pavel Florensky (Bulatovich, 1913, p. VII-XIV). The preface also contains an anonymous “text of a response, which appeared as an answer to a semi-official inquiry about [Bulatovich’s work] by a bishopFootnote 14” (Florensky, 2000, p. 291). The response expresses support for the doctrine of the Name-Glorifiers and its apology in the field of philosophy. The real author of the response is Mitrofan Muretov.Footnote 15 The teaching expressed in the response closely follows the position of Bulatovich, as given in the “Apology”. The response states that any word of any living language is a reflection of a form and is connected by the human mind to this form. Therefore in the case the names applied to Christ, the one who pronounces them always comes into some kind of relationship with Him.Footnote 16

In his response, Muretov also offers a qualification of the philosophical foundations of Palamism and Barlaamism. This qualification goes against, and is directly opposite to, the conception of Uspensky, who saw the Byzantine orthodoxy as gravitating towards Aristotelianism and heterodoxy towards Platonism, and accordingly classified Palamas’ doctrine as nominalism-Aristotelianism and Barlaam’s doctrine as Platonism-realism.

On the contrary, Muretov holds that “true Christianity and the Church always stood on the ground of Idealism in the decision of two emerging questions — of the creed and of life. But pseudo- and anti-Christianity and heterodoxy always stuck to nominalism” (Bulatovich, 1913, p. XI). Accordingly, as opposed to Uspensky, Muretov correlates the figure of Palamas with Platonism and realism, and the figure of Barlaam with nominalism: “The facets of the history of nominalism: Sophists and so on, up to Nietzsche. This is in philosophy, and in the Church: the High Priests crucifying Christ, ebionites, Arius and so on, up to Barlaam and Count Tolstoy. Facets of the history of realism: Socrates with Plato… up to Hegel with his right school and Dostoevsky – in philosophy and fiction, and in the Church: the Gospel, Apostle Paul and so on, up to Palamas and Father JohnFootnote 17” (Bulatovich, 1913, p. XII).

What stands behind such an understanding of the philosophical foundations of the doctrines of Gregory Palamas and Barlaam the Calabrian? It is built upon the idea that Palamas (as well as the Name-Glorifiers), when speaking about the distinction between essence and energies in God and insisting that energies of God are knowable and nameable for man, follows the Platonic and realist line in philosophy, for the energies, which, due to their divinity, exist really and are transcendent and accessible for human perception, act in the same role as the Platonic forms. While Barlaam (and the opponents of the Name-Glorifiers doctrine, similar to him), denying the Palamite distinction between the essence and the energies in the Divinity and considering the divine manifestations created, reduce their status to something insignificant, therefore his position corresponds to nominalism.

As we shall see, the paradigm for understanding the philosophical foundations of Palamism and Barlaamism, which Muretov hastily formulates here, had a significant influence on the future understanding of these topics in Russian thought.

For now, I just note that Bulatovich in his subsequent works (after the “Apology”), was under the influence of his companion-philosophers (evidently, MuretovFootnote 18 and Florensky). He used the conceptual pair realistic / nominalistic (still absent in his “Apology”) as broad categories in order to denote the two positions concerning the status of divine names: according to him, the supporters of Name-Glorification regard divine name as reality, while their opponents understand it in the sense of nominality.Footnote 19 The nominal understanding of the status of the divine names was connected by Bulatovich, following Muretov, with the position of Barlaam the Calabrian.Footnote 20

Gregory Palamas, Barlaam the Calabrian and Philosophy in the Opponents of the Name-Glorifiers: Sergey Troitsky

The edition of Bulatovich’s “Apology” with Florensky’s preface and Muretov’s response was published in March–April of 1913. An immediate reaction followed: in May 1913 a detailed and large article “The Athonite Upheaval” was published in “Addenda to the Church Bulletin” (Pribavlenija k Cerkovnym vedomostjam), which criticized the theses of Bulatovich’s “Apology” and the anonymous response (by Muretov) published in its preface. The article was written by Sergey Troitsky.Footnote 21

A considerable part of Troitsky’s article is devoted to the Palamite controversies. Of course, he does not agree that the position of the opponents of Name-Glorification is identical to the teaching of Barlaam the Calabrian, as Bulatovich claimed. Troitsky returns the accusations of Barlaamism to Bulatovich and the author of the response (Muretov). According to Troitsky, Bulatovich and the author of the response, by teaching that divine names necessarily refer to the forms in God, which are God Himself (in the sense of the divine energies), stand in opposition to Palamas’ teaching of deification, for the latter is given by the grace of the Holy Spirit and consists in supranatural illumination, and not in cognition by mind. The teaching of Name-Glorifiers about knowing God through the divine names, necessarily refers to the forms in God, which means that one can reach God solely with one's faculties, without divine grace, which contradicts the Palamite teaching (Troitsky, 1913, p. 898). Troitsky thinks that Bulatovich and the author of the response, when developing the teaching of the necessary connection between the names of God and the forms in God, occupy the rationalist position and follow Barlaam the Calabrian, who was condemned in 1352Footnote 22 for introducing Plato’s forms into the Church—here Troitsky refers (Troitsky, 1913, p. 898–899) to the same words of the conciliar decree which Uspensky had quoted before, when speaking about Barlaam’s Platonism.Footnote 23 Bulatovich and the author of the response claim that our thought about God is commensurate with God and is therefore God himself. In this respect, in Troitsky’s view, they stand on the side of Barlaam and Plato (Troitsky, 1913, p. 899). According to Troitsky, the Barlaamites—like the Name-Glorifiers—“taught that divine energy is God”,Footnote 24 and it is exactly in this sense the Name-Glorifiers state that our thoughts about God are commensurate with God. By contrast, the Palamites, as champions of the Orthodox teaching, “taught that divine energy is the Divinity, but not God”. Therefore, the thought of God does not give a true cognition of Him, which can be given only by grace (Troitsky, 1913, p. 893–894; see Dykstra, 1988, p. 85).

In his qualification of the philosophical foundations of Palamism and Barlaamism, Troitsky follows Uspensky and classifies Barlaamism as Platonism (acknowledging Aristotle’s influence on Barlaam’s teaching as well), relying on the same place in the “Synodikon”, as Uspensky. As for the teaching of Gregory Palamas, he does not agree with the conception of Uspensky,Footnote 25 who saw the Orthodox thought in Byzantine and Palamas’ doctrine in particular as Aristotelian in its essence. However, Troitsky indignantly rejects the classification of Palamas’ teaching as realism, idealism,Footnote 26 and Platonism (Troitsky, 1913, p. 899, left column, note 1; cf. 889) made by the author of the response to Bulatovich’s “Apology” (i.e. Muretov).

Vladimir Ern, Italian Philosophy, Palamism, and Name-Glorification

In 1913, a close friend of Florensky and defender of the Name-Glorifiers teaching, Vladimir Ern (see Nivière, 1988, p. 184–185, 187), in the wake of the heated debate over Name-Glorification, spoke about Platonism, Name-Glorification, and their philosophical status in his speech “Dispute between Gioberti and Rosmini” which he delivered at the Higher Women's Courses in Tiflis, where Ern taught philosophy, on September 24 (see Kejdan, 1997, p. 534). Ern prepared an article based on this speech which was published in 1914 in the “Proceedings of the Tiflis Higher Women's Courses” (Izvestija Tiflisskih vysshih zhenskih kursov) (Ern, 1914a) and as a separate brochure (Ern, 1914b; cf. Malusa, 2018, p. 325; Scherrer, 1979, p. 301).

The content of the speech and of the article by Vladimir Ern reflected his interest in the dispute between two Catholic philosophers of the nineteenth century, Vincenzo Gioberti and Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, about the ontological premises of cognition.

In Ern’s opinion, the dispute between Gioberti and Rosmini “is full of universality and meaning for everyone”, reflecting in itself the dispute between Aristotle and Plato about forms and the collision of nominalism and realism in the philosophy of the Middle Ages (“Dispute between Gioberti and Rosmini,” Introduction). In Ern’s presentation, Rosmini, acknowledging that the forms are deduced from perceptions, accepts one innate idea—the idea of being. This idea includes what is real and present, as well as what is possible, which is not present, but can be thought. Everything is known through this being. It is the light of reason, by which every man is illuminated. This light, although is divine by virtue of its super-empiricity, is not the Divinity itself, but its likeness and reflection; and being is not the Logos of Christianity (Ibid., I). Ern insists that Gioberti’s philosophy represents the direct opposite to Rosmini’s. According to Ern, unlike Rosmini, “Gioberti relies in part on Patristic thought and Plato.” Gioberti declares that all new philosophy since Descartes is plagued by psychologism: sometimes psychological data are taken as the starting point for philosophical systems, or in general, something that is not quite logical in itself. The “super-psychological link” of the host of intertwoven chains of being is, according to Gioberti, a synthesis of “logicality with ontologicity”. Such a link must be an ideal formula, embracing all. This is the following formula: being creates existence. This formula, upon which “the whole encyclopedia of human sciences” is built, is an act of both divine revelation and divine creation. The human spirit, which has come to know this formula, is already not a judge, but a witness of truth (Ibid., II).

Ern supports Gioberti, who criticized Rosmini for psychologism. The essence of this criticism boils down to the statement that Rosmini is a nominalist and a “psychologist”, for he “denies the noumenal vision of God” and “states that an idea, appearing to human cognition, is numerically different from the divine idea”. As for Gioberti, he insists that an idea as the object of cognition and the noumenal being is uncreated and a property of the Creator; the noumenal being is the Word and Logos of God itself—as opposed to what Rosmini states about it (Ibid., III). This is not the created light, which is only the image of the Spiritual Sun, but the Prototype itself (Ibid., IV).

In the last part of his work, Ern makes a historical-philosophical generalization and creates a bridge to contemporaneity. He draws a parallel between the polemic of Gioberti and Rosmini on the one hand, and the Palamite controversy on the other, noting the similarity between these debates, both in essence and even “in the terminology itself” (evidently, having in mind the problem of experiencing the divine light).

Ern associates the position of Gioberti with the teaching of Palamas, and the position of Rosmini with the doctrine of Barlaam (Ibid, V). Then he turns to contemporaneity and indicates that the position of the opponents of the Name-Glorifiers, who, according to Ern, deny the uncreatedness of the Noumenal Light, “constituting our mind as a cognitive ability”, corresponds to the teaching of Rosmini.Footnote 27 By contrast, the teaching of the proponents of the Name-Glorifiers, who insist that divine names are uncreated and act as the divine grace, corresponds to Gioberti’s doctrine.

In this way, Ern juxtaposing the doctrines of Gioberti and Rosmini as examples of a confrontation of two main—respectively, realist and nominalist—lines in philosophy in connection with the Name-Glorifiers dispute, which he was concerned about, touches upon Palamism and Barlaamism. Following the line drawn by Muretov, Ern classifies Palamism (and Name-Glorification) as Platonism and realism, and Barlaamism (and the teaching of the opponents of Name-Glorifiers) as nominalism.

In 1914, when the “Dispute between Gioberti and Rosmini” was published in Tiflis, Ern’s article “Dispute about Psychologism in Italian Philosophy” was published in the “Theological Bulletin” (Bogoslovskij vestnik), in Sergiev Posad.Footnote 28 This article is the extended version of the “Dispute about Psychologism in the Italian Philosophy”, and partially identical to it. However, in the “Dispute about Psychologism” the part of the “Dispute about Psychologism in the Italian Philosophy” devoted to the Name-Glorifiers controversy is missing. Only one paragraph in this article (Ern, 1914d, p. 78, note 3) touches upon Palamas (in a note), where Ern associates Gioberti’s position with Palamas’ teaching. Probably, despite the fact that by that time Pavel Florensky had become the editor of “Theological Bulletin,” who urged Ern to become an active author and feel free in choosing his themes,Footnote 29 passages devoted to such a hot topic could not be published due to the circumstances of the time.

The Philosophical Qualification of the Palamite Controversy in Pavel Florensky

The association of Palamism with Platonism-realism and of Barlaamism with nominalism, which Muretov initiated, was also picked up by Pavel Florensky.Footnote 30 Florensky, whose philosophy was based on radical Platonic and realist (in the sense of the problematic of universals) intuitions,Footnote 31 inserted it into the holistic philosophical context.

His article “The Meaning of Idealism,” written in the fall of 1914, is an apology for Platonism. In the second chapter of this work Florensky turns to the problem of universals. In this regard, Florensky refers to a number of research papers of his time, including Uspensky’s “Essays on the History of Byzantine Education”.Footnote 32 Florensky refers to pp. 177–178 of this book, where Uspensky, prefacing his exposition of the debates around John Italus, gives a short summary of the problem of universals. This testifies that Florensky was familiar with the qualification of the philosophical schools of Byzantine thought suggested by Uspensky, and in particular with his conception of a correlation between Palamism and Barlaamism on the one hand and Platonism-realism and nominalism on the other. However, in this matter he proceeded from his own, quite opposite premises.

Obviously, these premises are connected to the fact that Florensky, taking the side of the Name-Glorifiers in the dispute, became acquainted with Palamism, which was referred to by the proponents of Name-Glorification in order to justify their position. In this context the newly discovered Palamism could not avoid becoming, in Florensky’s system, a variety of philosophical realism and Platonism, which were his key intuitions. The Platonism of Palamism is accepted by Florensky, following Muretov and Ern, by default.

In particular, references to the Palamite doctrine appear in the “Onomatodoxy as a Philosophical Premise” written by Florensky in 1922, in the context of the problem of universals. In this work, Palamism is regarded as a variety of Platonism (Florensky, 2000, p. 274; see Oppo, 2018, p. 391) and medieval realism (Florensky, 2000, p. 252). The opposite to the Platonism-realism of Palamas should be the nominalism of Barlaam. I do not find in Florensky’s texts an explicit association of Barlaam’s doctrine with nominalism, however the implicit association of Barlaamism and nominalism is scattered throughout Florensky’s works. In his speech “On the Name of God” (1921) Florensky presents the teaching of Barlaam, equated with the position of the opponents of Name-Glorification (who are nominalists in Florensky’s mind), in such a way that what humans discern in God holds only the status of a subjective abstraction (Florensky, 2000, p. 356–357). Furthermore, in many of his works, Florensky associates nominalism and Barlaam’s stance with the same passage from the “Synodikon”.

Indeed, when Florensky speaks about the theological position of Barlaam and the anti-Palamites, his main source is the “Synodikon”, as it was for Uspensky. However, Florensky and Uspensky refer to different passages of the “Synodikon”, that strictly correlate with their opposing views on the philosophical position of Barlaam. As I have mentioned, Uspensky refers to the 10th section of the chapters “Against Barlaam and Akindynos” of the “Synodikon”, which states that Barlaam and Akindynos “dared to introduce the teaching about the Platonic forms and Hellenic myths” into the Church. For Uspensky this was the reason to ascribe Platonism-realism to Barlaam. As for Florensky, he refers in the same context to the passage from the 2nd section of the same text, which states: “only that, which does not exist, does not have energy”.Footnote 33 He associates this with the position of Barlaam (“On the Name of God” [Florensky, 2000, p. 357]) and nominalism (“Magic of the Word” [Florensky, 2000, p. 242]). The logic of Florensky's thought here is the following: if Barlaam, like the opponents of Name-Glorification, denies the energetical manifestations of the Divinity, then his position corresponds to nominalism, while the Palamite teaching about the distinction of energies and essence in God presupposes realism and Platonism.

Conclusion

Thus, the two opposite identifications of the philosophical foundations of the Palamite and Barlaamite (anti-Palamite) doctrines in Russian thought at the beginning of the twentieth century are based on different passages of the same conciliar decree of 1351 against Barlaam and Akindynos, quoted in the “Synodikon”. Each of the thinkers I have discussed classified Palamism and Barlaamism philosophically on the basis of their own predefined attitudes. Uspensky suggested an understanding of the course of Byzantine theology and philosophy within a framework in which Orthodox Byzantine thought is associated with Aristotelianism-nominalism, and the non-Orthodox with Platonism. In his scheme, Palamism is associated with Aristotelianism-nominalism and Barlaamism with Platonism-realism. Concerning the latter, he referred to the 10th section of the chapters “Against Barlaam and Akindynos” of the “Synodikon” published by Uspensky himself. This scheme was not fully accepted by subsequent Russian thought. However, it raised a question. This question was solved in some ways in the following years, during the Name-Glorifiers debate. Muretov expressed the understanding directly opposite to Uspensky’s scheme, associating Palamism with Platonism and realism, and Barlaamism with nominalism. He accepted such a qualification of Palamism and Barlaamism by default, without turning to the sources. This acceptance was grounded on his historical and philosophical presuppositions, as well as shaped by the pragmatics of his stance in the Name-Glorifiers controversy. Bulatovich did not expressly formulate his views in the philosophical qualification of Palamism and Barlaamism, however, he integrated Palamism into his own theology, put forward the teaching about forms in the context of Name-Glorification, and polemically ascribed the Barlaamite position to his opponents. Troitsky, an opponent of Name-Glorification, criticized the teaching of Muretov and Bulatovich about forms and accused them of Barlaamism, associating the latter with Platonism, partially following the scheme of Uspensky and referring, as the latter did, to the “Synodikon”. On the basis of their own philosophical positions, Ern and Florensky, acting as apologists of the Name-Glorifiers doctrine, developed the understanding of Muretov, in which Palamism was connected with Platonism and realism, while Barlaamism and the teaching of the opponents of Name-Glorification with nominalism. In this regard, Florensky also refered to the “Synodikon”, however, to the 2nd section of the chapters “Against Barlaam and Akindynos”.Footnote 34