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‘Surabhi Candanam’: the First Acquaintance of Fragrant Sandal: a Problem

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Abstract

Sometimes seeing sandal from non-smellable distance we obtain cognition in the form ‘surabhi candanam’ (that sandal out there is fragrant). According to the Naiyāyikas, this cognition is a single qualified visual perception, where fragrance is grasped by visual sense-faculty. Normally visual sense cannot grasp fragrance. But here fragrance is grasped by visual sense through an extraordinary sense-connection. The Nyāya holds that the memory of fragrance, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), connects its object, fragrance, with visual sense. The Naiyāyikas use this thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa to explain illusion. For a direct realist like the Naiyāyikas, it is always difficult to explain illusion. But jñānalakṣaṇa explains how an object, which is absent in front, can be accessed directly by the operating sense-organ through an extraordinary sensory connection. However, there is a possible threat to the thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa. In the mechanism of jñānalakṣaṇa, memory plays a vital role. If one is already acquainted with the fragrance of sandal in some previous occasion, then the memory of fragrance can work as an extraordinary sensory connection for her. But the question arises as to what happens when she acquires the knowledge of fragrant sandal for the first time? Is it also an instance of extraordinary jñānalakṣaṇa perception? It is obvious that in such case no memory is there to help her connect her visual sense to fragrance. However, this first acquaintance is a precondition for the possibility of the later acquaintances of fragrant sandal. Hence, it is necessary for the Naiyāyikas to explain the mechanism of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal. The Naiyāyikas will be able to save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa (and also their direct realism) if they can depict a moment-wise account of the whole process of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal remaining consistent with their own basic tenets. It would require moment-analysis (kṣaṇavicāra) of that cognitive situation. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, several attempts have been made to solve the problem. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī mentions that ‘madhura śarkarā’ or ‘sugandhi ketakī’ are cases of mental perception or mānasa pratyakṣa. He says that here manas functions as the means of perception being aided by external senses to produce such cognition. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains the other cases like illusion and recognition by the same model. On the other hand, Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyakandalī says that in the case of the first acquaintance, at first the fragrance is grasped by the olfactory sense. Then, the visual sense-faculty, taking the perception of the fragrance as an associate cause, produces a cognition of the qualificand. The paper constructs several versions of moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra) for both of these suggestions and evaluates them. It is observed that although Jayanta’s thesis may be accepted as an alternative Nyāya account of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandalwood, Śrīdhara’s account fails partially. On the other hand, Jayanta fails to explicate the inner psychological steps involved in the said cognition. This paper suggests that we can successfully construct moment examination of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal; hence, the Nyāya thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa suffers no threat of internal inconsistency. However, the relevant sensory connection working there is not an olfactory perception. Rather, it also is a memory cognition, which is generated out of the memory-trace of fragrance produced on the spot from the aforesaid olfactory perception. Thus, the Naiyāyikas may save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa as well as their direct realism.

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Notes

  1. Only visual and tactual senses have common objects to grasp;

    KV 92–92 (439, 1–4): gurutvabegau sāmānyaguṇā ete prakīrtitāḥ / saṃkhyādiraparatvānto dravatvaṃ sneha eva ca // ete tu dvīndriyagrāhyā atha sparśāntaśabdakāḥ / bāhyaikaike ndriyagrāhyā gurutvādṛṣṭabhāvanāḥ //;

    Siddhāntamuktāvalī on KV 92–92 (439–440, 5–3): saṃkhyeti / saṃkhyāparimāṇpṛthakatvasaṃyogvibhāgparatvāparatvānītyarthaḥ / dvīndriyeti / cakṣuṣā tvacāpi grahaṇayogyatvāt /

  2. Kar (2008: 113, 128).

  3. KV 65a (279, 1): viṣayī yasya tasyaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇaḥ //; Muktāvalīsaṃgraha of Panchanan Shastri on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on BP 65 (309, 8–9): jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣaśca svasaṃyukta-manaḥsaṃyuktātmasamaveta jñānarūpa /

  4. According to the Naiyāyikas, there are four other cases of cognition where objects are perceived through the extraordinary cognition-characterized sensory connection or jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti — illusion, recognition, perception of negatum of an absence, and perception of the object of cognition in the mental perception of that cognition. So, the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa has sufficient explanatory power.

  5. Such as Jñānalakṣaṇavicārarahasya of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa and the commentary on it named Vimarśinī composed by Anantakumar Bhattacharya (1958).

  6. Siddhāntamuktāvalī on KV 8 (75–77, 6–1): tathā ca uktam / “vyakterabhedastulyatvaṃ saṃkaro’thānavasthitiḥ / rūpahānirasaṃbandho jātibādhaka saṃgrahaḥ /

  7. Dinakarī on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on KV 8 (78, 4–8): nanu sāṅkaryasya jātibādhakatve kiṃ mānamiti cet, svasāmānādhikaraṇyasvābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyobhayasambandhena jātiviśiṣṭajātitvāvacchedena svasamānādhikaraṇābhāva-pratiyogitvābhāva iti niyamasya bhaṅgaprasaṅga eveti / tādṛśaniyame mānābhāvānna sāṅkarya jātibādhakamiti navyāḥ /

  8. TCMK (779-781, 14-1): atha dīrghaśaṣkulī-bhakṣaṇe kathaṃ pañca jñānāṃ / kramastatreti cet / na / …….. anuvyavasāyasyaikatvāsiddheḥ anuvyavasāyāḥ pañcaiva, samayasaukṣmyātteṣāṃ kramo na gṛhyate /; TCMP (565-567, 31-39).

  9. Vimarśinī on JVR (9–10, 23–10): yasya ca puruṣasya candanasaurabhe saṃskāraḥ prarūḍo vidyate tasya candanakāṣṭhena saha cakṣuṣaḥ saṃyoge sati pūrvāghrātasurabhitvena viśeṣitaṃ sadeva candanadārū cākṣuṣe sākṣātkāriṇi vijñāne pratibhātaṃ bhavatīti prāyaśo dṛśyate / tat ca vijñānaṃ candanam idaṃ surabhi ityākāreṇa utpadyate / candanakāṣṭhasya nayanayogyatvena tadaṃśa idaṃ candanam ityākāreṇa cākṣuṣavijñāna utpādasya satyapi sambhave ghrāṇayogyasya api surabhitvasya sarvathā nayanayoryogyatvena nāyanaṃ sākṣātkārivijñānaṃ kathaṃ surabhicandanam ityākāreṇa utpadyatām iti cet na / lokato nayana-ayogyasya api saurabhasya sarvathā tad-ayogyatvam iti asya vaktum aśakyatvāt alaukika-maryādayā tasyāpi cakṣuṣo yogyatvāt kalpanāyāḥ phalaikaniyamyatvāt / surabhitvena viśeṣitasyāpi candanakāṣṭhasya sākṣātkāri cākṣuṣavijñānaṃ jāyata iti anubhavasiddham / lokataśca gandhaścakṣuṣā na gṛhyata ityāpi satyameva / ato’abādhitānubhavasiddhasya tādṛśavijñānasya upapādanārthamupāyaḥ kaścid alaukikao’avaśyam abhyupagantavyaḥ / vinā saurabhasya pūrvasaṃskāraṃ tad vijñānaṃ na bhavati iti saurabhasmaraṇam eva upasthitam / atra nayanayoḥ saurabheṇa saha alaukikaḥ sannikarṣastena nayanasannikṛṣṭaṃ sat saurabhaṃ candanāmśe viśeṣaṇībhūya nāyane api sākṣātkārivijñāne pratibhātaṃ bhavati iti nyāyasiddhāntaviduttamānāṃ matam /

  10. PKM (512, 1-5): na hi parimalasmaraṇasavyapekṣaṃ locanaṃ ‘surabhi candanam’ iti pratyayamutpādayati / tatsavyapekṣalocanavyāpārānantaramete kāryakāraṇabhūtā ityavabhāsanāttadbhāvaḥ savikalpaka-pratyakṣaprasiddhaḥ / ityapyasamīcīnam / gandhasyāpi locanajñānaviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt /; Sinha 2008 vol.1: 86-87.

  11. PKM (512, 5-6): gandhasmaraṇasahakārīlocanavyāpārānaṇtaraṃ surabhi candanamitipratyayapratīteḥ / tanna pratyakṣeṇāsau pratīyate /; Sinha 2008 vol.1: 87.

  12. VPS (18, 4–6): ‘surabhi candanam’ ityādi jñanam api candanakhaṇḍāṃśe aparokṣam, saurabhāṃśe parokṣam; saurabhasya cakṣurindriya ayogyatayā yogyatvaghaṭitasya niruktalakṣaṇasya abhāvāt /; VPP (42–43, 1–1).

  13. VPS (19, 1–2): jātitva upādhitva paribhāṣāyāḥ sakalapramāṇa agocaratayā aprāmāṇikatvāt /; VPP (44, 1).

  14. Siddhāntamuktāvalī on KV 85 (434, 1): utpalaśatapatrabhedādivad yaugapadyapratyayasya bhrāntatvāt /

  15. This is an important Nyāya presupposition as opposite to the other schools that admit vṛtti-involved cognition that cognition exists as long as a particular modification of internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti) sustains. On the opposite end, there are the Buddhists for whom everything including cognition exists only for one moment. The Naiyāyikas have a reason behind rejecting Buddhists’ momentariness of cognition. There is a Nyāya rule that a product is destroyed if its non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) is destroyed. Now, Self-manas-contact (ātma-manaḥ-saṃyoga) is the non-inherent cause of cognition. And for the disjunction between Self and manas at least one moment is required after the production of cognition. So, cognition is existent at least for two-moments. Otherwise, the aforesaid Nyāya rule cannot hold. However, one may say that if Self and manas is disjoined at the moment of the production of cognition, then cognition may be momentary. The contact of manas with Self is required at the previous moment of the production of cognition. Cause may not exist at the moment of the production of the effect — rather it must be present at the previous moment of the production of effect (kārya-pūrva-kṣaṇa-vṛtti). However, a more global reason behind admitting the thesis that cognition (except apekṣābuddhi) exists for two moments seems to be to counter the Buddhist thesis that not only cognition, but everything is momentary. The Naiyāyikas hold on the contrary that there are permanent objects in the world.

  16. At a particular moment even though all of our external sense-organs are open an active (conjoined to their respective objects), we do not have simultaneous cognitions about all those objects. This non-occurrence of simultaneous cognitions implies that there must be some intermediate cause that connects Self only to one external sense-organ at a time. So, this is the reason behind admitting the existence of an internal sense-organ — manas. In Nyāya Sūtra, it has been argued by Gautama (NS 1.1.16 (19, 4): yugapad-jñāna-anutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam /). Gautama declares that due to the same reason, i.e. the non-occurrence of simultaneous cognitions, atomicity of manas also is established (NS 3.2.59 (209, 4): yathoktahetutvāt ca aṇu /). Vātsyāyana clarifies, if manas were extended in dimension (mahattva), it could have been conjoined with all the sense-organs at a time resulting simultaneous cognitions (NBh on NS 3.2.59 (209, 5–6): aṇu ca mana ekaṃ ca iti dharma-samuccayo jñāna-ayaugapadyāt / mahattve manas sarva-indriya saṃyogāt yugapad-viṣaya grahaṇaṃ syād iti /). If it were the case, we would become insane with overloaded flow of information.

  17. Nyāya holds that class-essences should be mutually exclusive. Among two such properties if one resides in the locus where the other is absent, then both of them cannot reside in the same locus. The rule ensures that an animal is not cow and horse at the same time. This rule also ensures another rule that there cannot be the absence of the pervader (vyāpaka) class where there is the pervaded (vyāpya) class-essence. Secondly, class-characters are non-partitive (avāpyavṛtti) — it cannot be the case that in one part of an object a class-character resides, whereas in the other part of the same object another class-character resides. An animal cannot be partly cow and partly horse. (Shaw, 2019: 47-48). The thesis that crosscutting (sāṅkarya) is a defeater of natural kind (jātibādhaka) is a controversial thesis which has not been admitted even by the Neo Naiyāyikas like Dinakara Bhaṭṭa. He refutes the thesis in his commentary on Viśvanātha’s Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī. In science and in commonsense, we categorize things and objects of this world. We sometimes claim that some categories are more natural than others. There may be several systems of categorizations those divide the same bunch of objects of the world into different sets of categories. The question is which system of such categories is natural and which are artificial. Now suppose a categorizing system N1 is a natural one. The question is can there be another natural categorizing system N2 in parallel so that the categories of N1 and N2 cross-cut each other? Some philosophers hold that if they do, then none of the categories fixed by system N1 and N2 qualifies to be natural kinds. Genuine natural kinds are either mutually exclusive or one of them is a subset of the other. So, an individual can belong to more than one kind only when one of the kinds is wholly subsumed under the other. Richmond Thomason, Peter Gardenfors, Ian Hacking, and Fred Sommers hold that crosscutting categories are not real kinds. This view seems to be implied from essentialism. Ali Khalidi (1998: 33-50) opposes these positions of hierarchic thesis. He argues that there are many examples of crosscutting in the categories of science, and lack of them is not a good criterion of the naturalness of a category. These crosscutting categories are real kinds; because we discovered rules or laws regarding them which were not implied from their first introduced meanings. But here we have to remember that the Naiyāyikas advance one form of essentialism. Hence, it is natural for them to subscribe to the thesis of sāṅkarya jātibādhaka. Secondly, unlike sciences, it advocates a single layered categorization scheme. We can also conjecture that there may be some socio-political influences working behind advocating this thesis of sāṅkarya jātibādhaka; because in those days if one had married someone from a different caste, it would result cross-breeding (varṇa-saṅkara) which was considered to be a cause of demotion from one’s own class (jāti). But even if we do not admit this thesis, our project is not harmed. The rules of the game mentioned earlier are nothing but the constraints abiding by which we have to construct moment examinations. If sāṅkarya jātibādhaka is not admitted to be a valid constraint then our moment examination will be easier than now. If we can construct moment examinations with more number of constraints, it will automatically ensure that we can do it with less number of constraints also.

  18. The Nyāya holds that an action involves four moments and three successive effects, occurring at each moment after the action is originated. Moments are described in terms of the action and its effects, which are imposed properties of the moment. In this way, action becomes an imposed property (upādhi) of time. In Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, Vātsyāyana says that that time (kāla) is expressed through action (kriyāvyaṅgya) (NBh on NS 2.1.40 (81, 14–17): na adhvavyaṅgyaḥ kālaḥ / kiṃ tarhi? / kriyāvyaṅgyaḥ patati iti / yā patanakriyā sā yad uparatā bhavati sa kālaḥ patitaḥ kālaḥ / yad utpatsyate sa patitavyaḥ kālaḥ / yadā tu dravye vartamānā kriyā gṛhyate sa vartamānaḥ kālaḥ / yadi ca ayaṃ dravye vartamānaṃ patanaṃ na gṛhṇāti, kasyoparamam utpatsyamānatāṃ ca pratipadyate? /). Now, cognition desire etc. mental qualities are not actions. Hence, the use of the term ‘moment’ in the context of cognition should be understood in terms of an action. (Shaw, 2022: 131–133; see fn. 3).

  19. The letter ‘M’ signifies ‘Moment’ and the number associated with it signifies chronological order, such as M1 signifies the first moment, M2 second, and so on.

  20. The Nyāya account of indeterminate and determinate perception may remind of Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, but they are not the same. For Russell, knowledge of sense-data (which is private) is knowledge by acquaintance, while the knowledge of, say, a table (which is a public object) is knowledge by description — which is indirect and inferential. Hence, this account paves the way for scepticism and phenomenalism. Nyāya account, on the other hand, does not suffer from such a problem. The content of indeterminate perception is not private, but as public as the content of determinate perception. The Naiyāyikas do not postulate sense-data. They are direct realists. Only they say that without postulating indeterminate perception determinate perception cannot be accounted for. In a determinate perception of, say, a table, the qualificand table, and the qualifier tablehood are known as being related in the relation of inherence. Since the cognition of relation presupposes the cognition of both the relata, we must say that an indeterminate perception of both the relata was produced before the determinate perception of the relation was produced. If this preceding cognition were a determinate cognition, it would need still another preceding cognition. It would result an infinite regress unless we stop somewhere and admit that the preceding cognition is an indeterminate one. Such cognition is always perceptual, non-verbalizable, beyond the category of validity and invalidity, and non-relational (Shaw, 2016: 90–92).

  21. NB 4 (43, 16): tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam /

  22. The Buddhists hold that determinate perception does not arise from sense-object contact; rather it depends on our memory or imaginary concepts; hence, it is invalid. While refuting this stand Jayanta says that determinate perception is produced by sense-object contact because even after the indeterminate perception is produced the sense-organ continues to function. In association of the remembrance, it produces determinate perception;

    NMS 1 (88: 16–30): atra pratividhīyate – tadidaṃ saṅkīrṇaprāyamativahuvilapatā bhavatā na niyataṃ kimapi vikalpānāmaprāmāṇyakāraṇamiti spaṣṭamāveditam, taducyatām – kiṃ śabdārthāvabhāsitvagarbhīkṛtamasadarthavācitvaṃ tadaprāmāṇyakāraṇamabhimatam? uta saṅketasmṛtyapekṣopanatamanindriyārthasannikarṣajatvam?/ ………… nā’pyanindriyārthasannikarṣajanyatvaṃ saṅketagrahaṇakālānubhūtaśabdasmaraṇa-apekṣanādyasya vaktavyam, sahakāryapekṣāyām api tadvyāpārāvirateḥ /; P. Bhattacharya (2006:431–432: 25–12).

  23. Vaidya (2013: 576).

  24. The term ‘induced’ here indicates the nature of the relevant sensory connection established for an extraordinary perception. If the sensory connection is a memory, the perception is a memory-induced extraordinary perception; and if the sensory connection is a perception, it will be called perception-induced extraordinary perception. However, in both the cases, it is a cognition-induced extraordinary perception, because both memory and perception are cognitions. Hence, the sensory connection is called jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (a sensory connection, which essentially is a cognition).

  25. Shaw (2016: 83

    ).

  26. It is an extraordinary perception of all the loci of a universal through the cognition of the universal. When we see a pot along with its potness, the cognition of potness, working as an extraordinary sensory connection, connects all the pots of past present and future to the operating sense. Thus, we see all loci of potness extraordinarily.

  27. Shaw (2005: 85, 2016: 59–60).

  28. Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa on NKSP 21 (444–445, 35 & 23–24): ghrāṇajasaurabhajñānasahakṛtena cakṣuṣā surabhi candanam iti jñānaṃ saurabhaviśeṣaṇakaṃ candanaviśeṣyakaṃ janyate, candanasaurabham iti jñānaṃ cakṣurupanita candanaviśeṣaṇakaṃ saurabhaviśeṣyakaṃ ghrāṇena janyate, yadindriyajanyaṃ jajjñānaṃ tattadindriyayogyaviśeṣyakamiti vyāpteriti arthaḥ //; IP 1 (92–93).

  29. S. Datta (2019: 247–248).

  30. That we can analyze this epistemic situation in the aforesaid manner has been indicated by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī, which we shall see later.

  31. For a detailed discussion over this issue, please see my article entitled, “Epistemic Category of the First Acquaintance of Fragrant Sandal: A Debate”, published in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4, October-December, 2018.

  32. NS 3.1.1 (135, 13): darśana-sparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt //;

    There is an important epistemological issue called ‘paradox of egocentricity’. It is as follows: (i) we know ourselves, (ii) self-knowledge is necessary for making a knowledge counted as knowledge, (iii) self, which is the subject of knowledge, can never be an object of knowledge; hence, knowledge is impossible. The question is, is it necessary to have a self-knowledge to know something? The Nyāya holds after a determinate cognition is produced in the form ‘this is a pot’, a subsequent mental perception (anuvyavasāya) may occur in the form, ‘I know that this is a pitcher’, in which the subject ‘I’ has become an object. So, the Naiyāyikas do not subscribe to the view that subject of knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge. The Nyāya holds that one may know a pot without ascribing the knowledge to self, or without an explicit knowledge of self. Self is known explicitly in the subsequent afterperception. It is also inferred as the ultimate binder of multisensory perception in the form, say, ‘I touch what I see’. When I recognize that the object what I see is the same object that I touch (pratisandhāna jñāna), I also realize that it is the same self, I, who experiences both. Now, the question Vaidya (2019) correctly brings in, is: don’t we require to distinguish self from other in order to be aware that it is ‘me’ and not ‘other person’ who knows the pot? This distinction we need to do prior to the knowledge ‘I know the pot’; and discrimination of self and other presupposes knowledge of both of the objects discriminated, namely, self and other. But even if this is the case, the paradox will not arise in the Nyāya framework, because the Nyāya does not hold that self cannot be an object of cognition. They hold that self is known as being characterized by its properties like cognition, pain, pleasure etc.

  33. NKSP 4.4 (473, 4–5): purvajñānopanītasyaiva manasā vedanāt /; NKS 4.4 (369, 14).

  34. SLP (17–18, 32–5; 27, 7–8 & 17–22; 55–57, 2–26; 83–96).

  35. I have discussed Jayanta’s account on this issue following the article “Perception of Sensible Qualities: A Problem for the Nyāya Epistemologists”, written by Professor Srilekha Datta (2019: 241–256).

  36. NMS 1 (75, 11-13): na ca yugapadindriyadvayadvārakamekamutpadyamānaṃ jñānaṃ kva cid dṛṣṭam, tatraitatsyāt, mānasamidaṃ jñānaṃ sugandhibandhukabodhavadbhaviṣyati /;

    NMS 1 (98, 31-32): śabdādyapāyāntaraviratau ca jāyamānamanavadyaṃ jñānaṃ mānasaṃ pratyakṣaṃ bhavati surabhi ketakakusumaṃ madhurā śarkareti jñānavadityapyayuktam /

  37. NMS 2 (33, 14–15): yathā hi locanagocare’pi kundakusume tadaviṣayagandhaviśeṣite bāhyendriyadvārakagrahaṇamaghaṭamānamiti mānasameva surabhi kusumamiti jñānam … /

  38. NMS 2 (33, 19–22): nanu kundāderviśeṣaṇaṃ vartamānamasti saurabham iha tvatīta pūrvavijñānamiti kathaṃ viśeṣaṇamatra, kiṃ tena satā kariṣyasi śatādibuddhiṣvatikrāntasyāpi kapitthādeḥ kāraṇatva darśanāditi tadevamantaḥkaraṇajanmanā’pi pratyabhijñānena sthairyamavasthāpyata eva bhāvānām /

  39. NMS 1 (65, 26–30): nanu kapitthādikāryasya sukhasyedānīṃ na cakṣurgrāhyatvamiti sambandhigrahaṇābhāvātkathaṃ cākṣuṣapratyakṣagamyaḥ sambandhaḥ, na cākṣuṣapratyakṣagamyaḥ sambandhaḥ, kiṃ tu mānasapratyakṣagamyaḥ, sukhādi manasā buddhvā kapitthādi ca cakṣuṣā / tasya kāraṇatā tatra manasaivāvagamyate //; for a detail discussion see the whole section ‘śakteḥ pratyakṣagrāhyatvanirūpaṇam’ (NMS 1: 65–66, 11–13).

  40. S. Datta (2019: 241–256).

  41. PBNKK (276–277, 9–4): ye tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayoḥ ekajñānālambanatvamāhuḥ, teṣām surabhi candanamityatra kā vārtā? nahi cakṣurgandhaviṣayaṃ na ca ghrāṇaṃ dravyamādatte / ata eva na tābhyaṃ samvandhagrahaṇam, ubhayasamvandhigrahaṇādhīnatvātsamvandhagrahaṇasy / yathā saṃskārendriyajanyaṃ pratyabhijñā pratyakṣam-ubhayakāraṇasāmarthyātpūrvāparakālaviṣayam, evaṃ cakṣurghrāṇābhyāṃ sambhuya janyamānamidaṃ kāraṇadvayasāmarthyādubhayaviṣayaṃ syādityeke samarthayanti /

  42. PBNKK (277, 5–9): tadapi na sādhīyaḥ, nirbhāgatvāya / yadi jñānaṃ sabhāgaṃ syāttadā kaścidsyāṃśo ghrāṇena janyate kaściccakṣuṣetyupapadyate vyavasthā, kintvidamekamakhaṇḍamubhābhyāṃ janitaṃ yadi gandhaṃ dravyaṃ ca gṛṇhāti, tadā gandho’pi cākṣuṣo dravyamapi ghrāṇagamyaṃ prasaktam, tajjanitajñānaviṣayatvalakṣaṇatvāttadindriyagrāhyatāyāḥ / na cāṇutvānmanaso yugapadubhayendriyādhiṣṭhānasambhavaḥ /

  43. PBNKK (277–278, 9–3): tasmād ghrāṇena gandhe gṛhīte paścāttadgrahaṇasahakāriṇā cakṣuṣā kevalaviśeṣyālamvanamevedaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ janyata ityakāmenāpyabhyupagantavyam / tathā ca satyanyeṣāmapi viśeṣyajñānānāmayaṃ nyāya upatiṣṭhate / vivādādhyāsitaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ kevalaviśeṣyālambanaṃ pratyakṣatve sati viśeṣyajñānatvāt surabhi candanamiti jñānavat. pratyakṣatve satīti laiṅgikajñānavyavacchedārtham /

  44. PBNKK (278–279, 3–13): nanu yadi dravyasvarūpamātrameva viśeṣyajñānasyālambanam, asatyapi viśeṣaṇe tathā pratyayaḥ syāt / atha viśeṣaṇasya janakatvānna tadabhāve viśeṣyajñānodayaḥ, tathāpi dravyarūpapratyayādasya na viśeṣaḥ, viṣayaviśeṣamantareṇa jñānasya viśeṣāntarābhāvāt, na, anabhyupagamāt / na viśeṣyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātramālambanaṃ vrumaḥ, kintu viśiṣṭam / viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇyeva, yā daṇḍīti jñāne pratibhāsate / na khalu tatra puruṣamātrasya pratītirnāpi daṇḍasaṃyogitāmātrasya…………… nanvevaṃ tarhyāpekṣiko’ayaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo na vāstavaḥ, kiṃ na dṛṣṭo bhavadbhiḥ kartṛkāraṇādivyavahāra āpekṣiko vāstavaśceti kṛtaṃ vistareṇa saṃgrahaṭīkāyām /

  45. TCMK (811, 7–8): tathāpi viśiṣṭajñānamātraṃ prati viśeṣaṇajñanatvena kāraṇatā bādhakābhāvāt /; TCMP (614, 25–26).

  46. Shaw (2022: 153–162, fn. 17).

  47. TSD on TS 47 (23, 3–6): ‘Nanu nirvikalpake kim pramānam’ iti cet na; ‘gauḥ’iti viśiṣṭajñānam viśeṣaṇajñānajanyam viśiṣṭajñānatvāt daṇḍī iti jñānavat’ityanumānasya pramāṇatvāt /

  48. TCMK (810–811, 9–1): surabhi candanamityādāvapi viśeṣaṇajñānārthaṃ tajjñānaṃ pratyāsattisthānīyamindriyasahakāri, bhramo viśiṣṭajñānameva nāstīti cet /; TCMP (613, 6–8).

  49. TCMP (615–616).

  50. The Nyāya admits belief-voluntarism in the cases of āhāryajñāna. It is a cognition which has been willfully produced by a person when the person is convinced that the cognition is false (bādhakālīnecchā-janya-jñāna); as for example, the willful false ascription (āropa) of Y on X and P on S, in the cognition ‘if X were Y, then S would have been P’; (G. Bhattacharya, 2006: 351–352).

  51. The possibility of such cognition has been admitted by the Neo-Naiyāyikas (Goswami, 1984: 330);

    TCMK (807–808, 3–1): aṃśe tatsaprakāramaṃ niṣprakārañceti narasiṃhākāraṃ tatraiva viśiṣṭajñāne jñānatvaviśiṣṭaṃ bhāsate,… /; TCMP (607, 9–11).

  52. TCMK (805, 1–3): jānāmīti vartamānatvena sthūla upādhirbhāsate na tu kṣaṇaḥ, tasyātīndriyatvāt /; TCMP (603, 13–14).

  53. JVR (91–93, 2–2): navīnāstu nirvikalpakasyāpyupanāyakatāmaṅgīkurvate / tanmate ca tadupanītabhānaṃ prati tadviṣayakajñānatvenaiva hetutā / na caivaṃ nirvikalpaka pratyakṣāpattiḥ, jñānapratyakṣasya viṣayāṃśe viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhitvaniyamāt /

  54. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Jñānalakṣaṇavicārarahasya of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, and Vimarśini commentary of Anantakumar Bhattacharyya on it (JVR 1958: 48-59).

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Acknowledgement

I am immensely grateful to my teachers Professor Amita Chatterjee, Emeritus Professor, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, and Professor Srilekha Datta, Former Professor, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, for guiding me to write this article. I am grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable advices. I am grateful to the Chief Editors of Sophia, especially Professor Purushottama Bilimoria, who guided me to improve my article. Also, I am thankful to the entire team who helped me in editing and preparing this article for publication.

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    Mainak Pal

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Pal, M. ‘Surabhi Candanam’: the First Acquaintance of Fragrant Sandal: a Problem. SOPHIA (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00980-1

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