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Notes
I will use male pronouns to refer to God. My only reason for this is simplicity.
Marsh (2015) also considers the similarities between these issues. He explores how it can change our view of the ethics of procreation.
Kretzmann (1991a) is a helpful overview on these two options.
It should be noted that in another article (1991b), Kretzmann claims that divine love is the explanation of creation. In discussing the Dionysian principle, he claims Dionysius ‘insightfully identifies this aspect of goodness as love’ (245). Hence, it might seem our positions are not distinct. However, Kretzmann goes through goodness to get to love. I appeal directly to love. Morality has no fundamental role in the explanation of creation.
Adams (1972: 323) makes this point.
I find Wolterstorff (1988) to be a compelling argument for passability.
By ‘God’s reasons’ I mean what justifies his actions, not what motivates them. God’s reasons might be morally praiseworthy if, as I do, you accept a de re account of moral motivation. See Smith (1994) for an argument for a de re account.
An anonymous referee made this objection.
See Benatar (2006) for an interesting argument against the permissibility of procreation.
I abstract away from religious reasons to have children. Premises regarding the afterlife or duty to God are too controversial for an argument for the permissibility of procreation.
One response I will not consider is the hypothetical consent of the child. I take Shiffrin’s criticism of this to be persuasive (1999: 131–135). See also Singh (2018).
Velleman invokes an Aristotelian conception of flourishing, so the emotional component is likely implicit in what he says.
An anonymous referee wondered about a case where a woman agrees to become a surrogate, but the intended parents die late in the pregnancy. Does this obligate the woman to care for the child as a mother would because she was involved in the causal process that leads to the child’s existence? My tentative response is that it would be virtuous to adopt the child as one’s own, but not required. The surrogate is a vessel of creation, so she does not have the same obligations as the creators.
This may be too strong. It is not clear that parents need to do this for adult children who act in morally reprehensible ways. However, given my goals I would rather err on the side of being too demanding rather than not demanding enough.
A helpful referee doubts that this is possible because humans experience overwhelming suffering that dominates them. God cannot be overwhelmed or dominated. I agree, but can know what it is like for a finite creature to experience overwhelming and dominating suffering.
References
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