Abstract
The debate surrounding eliminative materialism, and the role of empiricism more broadly, has been one of the more prominent philosophical debates of the last half-century. But too often what is at stake in this debate has been left implicit. This essay surveys the rhetoric of two participants in this debate, Paul Churchland and Thomas Nagel, on the question of whether or not scientific explanations will do away with the need for nonscientific descriptions. Both philosophers talk about this possibility in language reminiscent of revolutionary politics. These authors do not see eliminative materialism merely as an idea to be evaluated, but a revolution to be welcomed or quashed. After surveying their rhetoric, the paper turns to the work of four philosophers—G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Winch, Paul Holmer, and G.H. von Wright—to suggest that there is within Wittgensteinian tradition a ‘nonrevolutionary’ approach to the question of eliminative materialism.
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Notes
This story—allegedly true—was recounted to me by Ray Barfield.
I should note that by calling it a myth, I am not thereby saying it is untrue. By ‘myth,’ I mean an overarching story through which people interpret the world.
By ‘intentional’ in this sense, I mean the quality of ‘aboutness’ that beliefs or thoughts have, their directedness to an object.
The apparent tension between prediction and argument is famously present in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In the Communist Manifesto, for example, they argue that bourgeois capitalism is incoherent and ought to be rejected, while also asserting that its revolutionary rejection is ‘inevitable’ (Marx and Engels 2002). The claim is simultaneously that the proletariat should revolt and that they will revolt. Many other parallels between Marxist rhetoric and Churchland’s rhetoric are alluded to but not made explicit in the rest of this section.
Churchland (1981, pp. 72–3. Cf. 78), where he writes, ‘Functionalism has too long enjoyed its reputation as a daring and avant-garde position. It needs to be revealed for the short-sighted and reactionary position it is.’ To make the parallel explicit once again, this is reminiscent of Marxist criticisms of liberal progressivism.
Churchland elsewhere talks of eliminative materialism in revolutionary terms, writing, ‘The magnitude of the conceptual revolution here suggested should not be minimized: it would be enormous. And the benefits to humanity might be equally great’ (1988, p. 45).
Nagel (1986, p. 11). Emphasis mine.
On the flexibility of what empiricism has meant and can mean, see Van Fraassen (2002).
Wittgenstein considered this quotation from King Lear as a motto for his never-completed book. See Rhees (1981, p. 171).
On Holmer’s work and influence on the ‘Yale School’ of philosophical theology, see Rollefson (2014).
Wittgenstein himself does this, most notably in ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,’ wherein he derides Frazer for assuming that myths and rituals are pseudo-scientific explanations. See Wittgenstein (1993, pp. 115-155).
Wittgenstein (1972, p. 27). Wittgenstein quotes this ‘motto’ from Joseph Butler.
Wittgenstein (2009, §66).
Wittgenstein (1980, p. 45).
Wittgenstein himself saw his contribution to philosophy more as a method or set of strategies, rather than an argument or set of conclusions. As G.E. Moore reports of Wittgenstein, ‘As regards his own work, he said it did not matter whether his results were true or not: what mattered was that ‘a method had been found.’’ Moore (1962, p. 322). I am not arguing that the nonrevolutionary strategy is the only way to employ Wittgensteinian insights on the topic of materialism and the philosophy of mind; for another perspective, see Malcolm (1971).
For this term, see Hadot (2001). Pierre Hadot was one of Wittgenstein’s earliest supporters and interpreters in France.
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Johnson, R.P. Won’t Get Fooled Again: Wittgensteinian Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Empiricism. SOPHIA 59, 345–363 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0728-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0728-3