Abstract
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur.
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Notes
In support of my contention that there are likely many Kantian theists, I would note that I have had many students and friends who believe that God exists and who accept the Kantian formula of humanity. Also, one way of understanding the second great commandment, ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself,’ is to treat it as an assertion that we should respect the dignity and autonomy of others, as we want our own dignity and autonomy to be respected.
Furthermore, I would direct the reader’s attention to the work of Robert Kraynak (2001), who argues that many twentieth century theists have embraced the Kantian formula of humanity; he finds evidence in the works of Jacques Maritain, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Pope John XXIII, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Martin Buber. See esp. Kraynak (2001), pp.148-164.
A referee for this journal drew my attention to this issue concerning the flawed nature of such relations and directed my attention to Bishop and Perszyk (2011) in which they appeal to this flawed aspect of our relation with God to build what they call a ‘normatively relativized logical argument from evil,’ which suggests that the existence of an all-good, omnipotent God is inconsistent with certain sorts of moral beliefs that a number of theists are likely to hold.
Nagel (1997, p.130).
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Lemos, J. God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity. SOPHIA 56, 265–278 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0511-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0511-7