I will briefly argue that theological fatalism is not a genuine ‘theological’ problem, for it can be reduced to another alleged incompatibility that arises independently of the existence or non-existence of God. I will conclude that the way of arguing against the existence of God or His omniscience by appealing to theological fatalism is blocked for libertarian atheists.
Theological fatalism God’s foreknowledge Necessity of the past Future contingents
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Fischer, J. M. (1992). Recent work on God and freedom. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29, 91–109.Google Scholar
Fischer, J. M., Todd, P., & Tognazzini, N. (2009). Engaging with Pike: God, freedom and time. Philosophical Papers, 38, 247–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hasker, W. (1989). God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar