Abstract
A number of recent discussions of atheism allude to cosmological arguments in support of theism. The five ways of Aquinas are classic instances, offered as rational justification for theistic belief. However, the five ways receive short shrift. They are curtly dismissed as vacuous, arbitrary, and even insulting to reason. I contend that the atheistic critique of the Thomistic five ways, and similarly formulated cosmological arguments, argues at cross purposes because it misrepresents them. I first lay out the context, intent and structure of Aquinas’ arguments, then show in what way recent discussions misrepresent them, and finally conclude with a comment on metaphysical orientation, which I take to be central, not only to a proper understanding of the Thomistic five ways but generally to the debate between atheism and theism on the existence of God.
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Notes
ST I, Q 2, a 2 ad 2; and the preamble to both Q 2 and Q 3.
ST I, Q 2, a 1. See also Summa contra Gentiles [SCG] I, ch 10–11.
ST I, Q 2, a 2. See also SCG I, ch 12.
ST I, Q 2, a 3: “Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest.” (I reply by saying that the existence of God can be proven in five ways.) Translations of Aquinas’ Latin text are mine throughout. Aquinas remarks, similarly, in SCG I, ch 13: “Ostenso igitur quod non est vanum niti ad demonstrandum Deum esse, procedamus ad ponendum rationes, quibus tam philosophi quam doctores catholici Deum esse probaverunt.” (Therefore having shown that it is not in vain to attempt to demonstrate that God exists, let us proceed to consider the reasons by which philosophers as well as catholic thinkers have proven that God exists.)
ST I, Q 2, a 1. The identity between existence and essence is shown in Q 3, a 3 and a 4.
ST I, Q 2, a 1.
See his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate (On the Trinity), ch 2, Q 5, a 1.
ST I, Q 1, a 3, a 4, and a 5. See also West (2007).
ST I, Q 2, a 2. See also Twetten (1996, pp. 264–265).
See Twetten (1996, pp. 264–265).
ST I, Q 2, a 3, the first way: “Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo” (For it is certain and established by sense experience that some things in this world are changed, literally, ‘are moved’.)
Ibid., the second way: “Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium” (For we find that there is among certain sensible things an order of efficient causes.)
Ibid., the third way: “Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse: cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse.” (For we find that among things there are some of which it is possible that they exist and it is possible that they do not exist, since some are found to be generated and to be corrupted and consequently it is possible that they exist and that they do not exist.)
Ibid., the fourth way: “Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile; sic de aliis huismodi.” (For among things some are found to be more and less good, than others, and true, and noble; and thus of other things of this kind.)
Ibid., the fifth way: “Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem: quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur.” (For we see that some things which lack knowledge, that is, natural bodies, operate on account of an end, which is apparent from the fact that they operate always or more frequently in the same way.)
In the terms of syllogistic logic, the premises are all particular, rather than universal, affirmative categorical claims.
SCG II, ch 16 and ch 34; and his commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle II, Bk 7 and Bk 12. He attributes the principle to Aristotle, Physics I, 34 and IV, 2, applying it to physical entities and a causal account of their nature, attributes, and activities. However, Aquinas seems to broaden the principle to account for the existence of any entity, so that it is either self-sufficient and necessarily existent in and of itself or else it derives its existence from another; see here Owens (1980, pp. 134–137), Pruss and Gale (2005, p. 119) and Pruss (2006, pp. 22, 26–28 and 58–62).
ST I, Q 2, a 3: “Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum: de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum nisi per aliquod ens in actu .... Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem sed solum secundum diversa .... Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri.” (For to change or to move is nothing other than to bring something from potentiality into actuality; however something cannot be led from potentiality into actuality except through something that already is in actuality.... However it is impossible that something should be in actuality and potentiality simultaneously in the same respect or that it should change, move itself. Therefore it is impossible that something, in one and the same respect, should be the cause of change or moving and yet be changed or be moved in that respect. Therefore, anything which is changed or is moved is necessarily changed or moved by something else.)
See Johnson (1969, pp. 1143–1154) and Johnson (1970, pp. 135–144). With a slight modification to the causal factors at play in the first and fifth way, Wilcox (1998, pp. 245–268), follows Johnson. However, Wippel (2000, pp. 498–499) thinks the attempt “forced,” namely, to impose a single logical structure on the five ways in terms of the four Aristotelian causes.
In the eighteenth century both Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clark reformulated the argument so as to include specific reference to a principle of sufficient reason. See Rowe (1975, pp. 6–8) and Rowe (2007, pp. 20–24). Pruss (2006) offers an extensive discussion of the principle, its application to the cosmological argument, and a plausible defense.
ST I, Q 2, a 3, the first way: “Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens quod a nullo movetur.” (Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at something which is first and moving but is not moved by any other.)
Ibid., the second way: “Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam.” (Therefore, it is necessary to admit some first efficient cause.)
Ibid., the third way: “Ergo est necesse ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis.” (Therefore, it is necessary to admit something which would be necessary through itself, not having a cause for its necessity from elsewhere, but which is the cause of necessity in others.)
Ibid., the fourth way: “Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis.” (Therefore, there is something which in all things is the cause of their being, goodness, and any perfection whatsoever.)
Ibid., the fifth way: “Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem.” (Therefore, there is something intelligent, by which all natural things are directed towards an end, in their activity.)
Ibid.: “... et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.... quam omnes Deum nominant. ... quod omnes dicunt Deum.... et hoc dicimus Deum.... et hoc dicimus Deum.” (... and all understand this to be God.... which all call God.... which all say is God.... and we say that this is God.... and we say that this is God.).
Both Avicenna (2005, I, ch 6 and 7) and Maimonides (1963, I:58 and II:1), predecessors to Aquinas, offered such demonstrations. Craig (1980, pp. 86–98 and pp. 131–140, respectively) briefly details their arguments. In ST I, Aquinas successively discusses and offers a demonstration for divine simplicity (Q 3), perfection (Q 4), goodness (Q 5 and Q 6), infiniteness (Q 7), relation to others (Q 8), immutability (Q 9), eternality (Q 10), and unity (Q 11). See also Wilcox (1998), O’Connor (2004) and Craig (1980, pp. 192–195).
See Rowe (1975, p. 10) — repeated in Rowe (2007, p. 331) and in Rowe (2007, p. 20) — Plantinga (1998, p. 86), Pruss and Gale (2005, p. 118) and Oderberg (2007, p. 342). Despite his otherwise careful historical and contextual analysis, with a cautionary note towards “positive misunderstandings,” Craig (1980) remarks, “Of the Five Ways only the first three are cosmological arguments.” (p. 158 and 160).
Craig (1980, p. 160) does not classify the fourth way among cosmological arguments at all, considering it the “most Platonic of Aquinas’s proofs.”
See Owens (1980, pp. 136–137).
ST I, Q 4 – Q 11. See also SCG I, ch 14–28.
The reductio argument hinges on the implied view that all possibilities would be actualized within infinite time and furthermore that, if entities are non-existent because of their contingency, they are also causally ineffective. Their material substratum would not be available to account for the generation or production of other thing. Johnson (1970, pp. 139–140) shows how the third way deals with material causality without identifying God with ultimate matter.
Besides using a perceptible feature, smell, which clearly does not fall within the intended scope of the fourth way of Aquinas, Dawkins’ example also overlooks a distinction between a positive feature and a privation. A privation is the lack or absence of a feature that something might otherwise posses. Examples of privations are being bald or being poor, the former indicating a lack of hair and the latter a lack of wealth. Dawkins presumably uses the example of ‘smelliness’ because it is something unpleasant and therefore any maximum, claimed by parallel reasoning to be God, would be the height of unpleasantness. But the unpleasantness associated with smell is a privation, a lack of pleasurableness that would or could be associated with other sensible features.
See Wippel (2000, pp. 481–485).
Braine (1998, p. 48) contends that the principle of intelligibility in Aquinas overlaps with the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz. Pruss (2006, pp. 58–62) argues that the principle of sufficient reason entails a principle of intelligibility, what he labels the ‘ex nihilo nihil’ principle. I believe an argument could be made that, in some formulation at least, the two principles are equivalent. For if reality, whatever it is, is fundamentally intelligible, then it has some reason for its being the way it is. And if it is the case that for any entity there is a reason why it is what it is, then it follows that it is, in principle at least, intelligible. The four causes—formal, material, efficient, and final—are instances of reasons by which some entities are rendered intelligible. The self-sufficiency and necessary status of existence, captured by the contention that—unlike the case of all other creatures—in the case of God essence is identical with existence, are also reasons for intelligibility, even if we do not fully grasp this reality.
For a critical discussion of the principle see Rowe (1975, pp. 73–114) and more briefly Rowe (2007, pp. 19–36). Meynell (1982) offers a plausible defence within the context of Lonergan’s epistemology. However, O’Connor (2004, pp. 424–425), for one, presents a plausible, yet also weaker (because probable rather than demonstrative) version of cosmological argument that by-passes the principle of sufficient reason.
Russell (1986) highlights the quite different orientation and questions raised by the cosmological argument.
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Buijs, J.A. On Misrepresenting the Thomistic Five Ways. SOPHIA 48, 15–34 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0089-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0089-9