Abstract
Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.
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Notes
The first two sorts of examples have received a tremendous amount of attention. For those not familiar with the third sort of example see Pike [“Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin” American Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1969) pp. 208–216], Carter [“Omnipotence and Sin” Analysis, 34 (1982) pp. 102–105, and “Impeccability Revisited” Analysis, 42 (1985) pp. 52–55], Mackie [“Evil and Omnipotence’ Mind, 64 (1955) pp. 200–212] and Morriston [“Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are they Compatible?” Religious Studies, 37 (2001) pp. 143–160] who have, for example, offered arguments for the position God’s perfect goodness precludes the ascription of omnipotence to God because God would be unable to do things like commit a sin. Similarly, Geach [“Can God Fail to Keep Promises?” Philosophy, 52 (1977) pp. 93–95] has explored some of the problems associated with God’s failing to keep a promise. Rowe [“The Problem of the No Best Possible World” Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994) pp. 269–271] has put forward an interesting example of the third sort. He argues that God cannot create a “surpassable world,” as this would impugn his omnibenevolence.
Anselm [Prosologion, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, (1979) p. 79].
Aquinas [Summa Contra Gentiles, Garden City: Hanover House, (1955) 1, 2, 25].
See especially Aquinas [Summma Theolgica, New York: Benziger Brothers, (1948) 1, 25, 3].
For such arguments in favor of the compatibility of omnipotence and the inability to bring about what is impossible, see, for example, Anderson [“Divine Omnipotence and Impossible Tasks: An Intensional Analysis” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 15 (1984), pp. 109–124], Cargile [“On Omnipotence” Nous, 2 (1967) pp. 201–205], LaCroix [“The Impossibility of Defining Omnipotence,” Philosophical Studies, 32 (1977) pp. 181–190, and “Descartes on God’s Ability to do the Logically Impossible” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14 (1984) pp. 455–476], Movrades [“Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotnece” Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963) pp. 221–223], McLean [“The Unmakable-Because-Unliftable Stone” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4 (1975) pp. 717–721], and Trakakis [“The Absolutist Theory of Omnipotence” Sophia, 36 (1997) pp. 55–78].
See Wierenga [“Omnipotence Defined” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43 (1983) pp. 363–375, and “Omnipotence” in his The Nature of God: An Enquiry Into Divine Attributes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (1989) pp. 12–35]. Others appear to respond to examples of the third sort in this way, though not as explicitly as Wierenga. For example, Swinburne’s [“Omnipotence” American Philosophical Quarterly, 73 (1973) pp. 231–237] analysis of omnipotence lends itself very plausibly to making this type of response to examples of the third sort.
Of course, God also fails to be able to do something accomplishable in being unable to make a stone too heavy for Him to lift (i.e., you could presumably make a stone too heavy for you to lift), but I will soon say why such an inability does not impugn God’s power.
See Geach [“Can God Fail to Keep Promises?” Philosophy, 52 (1977) pp. 93–95].
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to the folks at the Santa Barbara Brewing Company for their libationary support while writing this paper and for offering an interesting perspective on the divine attributes.
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Steinberg, J.R. Concerning the Preservation of God’s Omnipotence. SOPHIA 46, 1–5 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-007-0017-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-007-0017-4