Abstract
If asked to define ‘omnipotence,’ the man on the street would probably say that it’s the ability to do anything. That’s about it, he’d think; nothing more needs be said. Philosophers are never so easily satisfied. They take it as matter of professional duty to find serious problems in important concepts, and to suggest that the concept be rejected or that solutions are at hand. This paper falls into the latter camp. Beginning with a relatively simple definition of ‘omnipotence,’ increasingly complex definitions are proposed, problems are found with them, and newer, refined definitions are offered. In all, seven unsatisfactory definitions are examined before an adequate one is arrived at. Both traditional and new problems are addressed, and novel solutions are advanced. The definition argued to be adequate is itself novel, but also very much in keeping with our pre-reflective understanding of omnipotence. On the basis of the definition it’s concluded not only that an adequate definition of ‘omnipotence’ is possible, but that various problems alleged to attend attributing the notion to God can also be solved.
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Notes
Three important points about what follows. First, written as a stand-alone piece, this paper is intended to be comprehensible independently of acquaintance with the literature on omnipotence. To ensure such self-containment and accessibility, references to the literature are virtually non-existent, and a number of issues that could be critically explored at greater length—alternative definitions of ‘omnipotence,’ the distinction between a power and a capability or capacity, different solutions to the paradox of the stone, for example—are bypassed or no more than brushed upon. Space limitations, clarity, and coherence would dictate such limitations, even if the desire for ready accessibility didn’t.
Second, given the long history of discussions of omnipotence, not all of the many positive or negative arguments that follow are wholly original, a fact to be expected in this context, especially in light of the treatment accorded omnipotence here. A fair number of them are, however, and both sorts of argument are seamlessly interwoven into what follows.
Third, some meta-level remarks. The general view expressed in the preceding two paragraphs is unusual in philosophy, given that most journal literature is steeped in responses and counter-responses to numerous particular points, large, small, and in-between, in previous journal literature. But my sentiments are shared by some others (as well as being exemplified in other papers of my own). John Kekes’ remarks about his work on well-being, for example, need only slight adjustment to describe this paper: “This… is about [omnipotence], not about what others have written about [omnipotence]. I have, of course, read and learned from the work of others, but I have decided, for better or worse, not to engage in detailed discussions of what is called ‘the literature.’… I wanted to make what I have to say accessible to the non-specialist readers who are likely to be interested in [omnipotence], rather than how I arrived at my views about it. This has led me to avoid detailed discussions of the works of others. I came to think of such discussions as the scaffolding without which no structure can be built, but which should be removed once the structure is completed. I hope that the end product will be judged on the basis of its merits, not on the basis of the scaffolding necessary for building it.” Kekes, (2010, pp. 5–6). That said, I should add that the bibliography of the scaffolding necessary for building this paper is available from the author upon request. It covers a great many, even if not quite all, of the issues surrounding omnipotence.
My thanks to Cara Wreen for bringing this objection to my attention.
My thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of as much.
I am again grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing a relevant objection to my attention.
Empiricists will no doubt seize on this necessary state of affairs as evidence for empiricism’s superiority to rationalism.
Once again I am indebted to an anonymous referee for bringing a relevant objection to my attention.
My thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me that my statement needs to be qualified: Not all orthodox Christians are libertarians.
My thanks to Teddy Shim, Cara Wreen, and an anonymous referee for a large number of useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
References
Kekes, J. (2010). The human condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J.L. (1995). Evil and omnipotence. Mind 64:200–212. (Reprinted in Philosophy of religion: Selection readings, 2nd ed., pp. 263–273, by M. Peterson, H. William, R. Bruce & B. David, Ed., 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Wreen, M. Omnipotence. Int J Philos Relig 84, 205–221 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9645-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9645-y