Zusammerfassung
Der Artikel geht dem in der Literatur umstrittenen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Vorhandensein demokratischer Institutionen und dem wirtschaftlichen Wachstum nach. Es wird argumentiert, dass die Zunahme der politischen Partizipation in Autokratien eine Umschichtung des Hauschaltes von der Gewährleistung von Rentengewinnen für eine Oligarchie zu verstärkten Investitionen in öffentliche Güter hervorruft. Diese Hypothese lässt ein höheres Wirtschaftswachstum in politisch relativ partizipatorischen Autokratien erwarten. Eine mit variierenden Operationalisierungen und Methoden durchgeführte quantitative Studie bestätigt die Hypothese.
Abstract
The article analyses the widely debated impact of democracy on economic growth. It is argued that an increase of political participation causes a shift in the support-seeking strategies of opportunistic governments. Pure autocrats rationally ensure political support by providing rents to a small group of supporters. With growing political participation, however, public goods become a more efficient political instrument. While rents are assumed to be economically neutral, public goods have an positive impact on economic performance. Hence, growing participation in autocracies is related to higher growth rates of per capita income. This hypotheses is supported by the data.
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Plümper, T. Die Politik wirtschaftlichen Wachstums in autoritären Staaten. PVS 42, 79–100 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-001-0005-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-001-0005-1