Abstract
In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation Colleen Murphy develops a rich and potentially transformative account of political reconciliation. The potential of this account is not fully realized because of limitations in how Murphy conceptualizes political relationships. For example, group-differentiated integration into states opens up important questions about partial legality and group-differentiated experiences of repression that Murphy does not address. However, Murphy’s framework is well-suited to take up these questions, once they are acknowledged, and this is an important strength of the work.
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Notes
Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 34.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 44.
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law. Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 42–45.
Murphy, op. cit., p. 62.
See Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 210–231; Leslie Green, "Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals." New York University Law Review 83 (2008): pp. 1035–1058; David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining Fuller’s Canons,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2 (2010): pp. 29–47, esp. pp. 42–44.
Raz, op. cit.
Murphy, op. cit., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 59.
Ibid., p. 61.
Ibid., pp. 61–62.
Ibid., p. 62.
Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Revised Edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Ted Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).
For critical discussion of how transitional justice is defined see Rosemary Nagy,“Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World Quarterly 29(2) (2008): pp. 275–289; Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117(3) (2004): pp. 761–825.
Murphy, op. cit., p. 29. Legal regimes governing indigenous land claims and the political standing of indigenous communities in settler states such as Canada and Australia are obvious examples of this. See Gordon Christie, “Delgamuukw and the Protection of Aboriginal Land Interests,” Ottawa Law Review 32 (2000–2001): pp. 85–116; Kent McNeill, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation and Judicial Discretion,” Ottawa Law Review 33 (2001–2002): pp. 301–346; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “Aborigines, Mining Companies and the State in Contemporary Australia: A New Political Economy or ‘Business as Usual’?” Australian Journal of Political Science 41(1) (2006): pp. 1–22.
Murphy, op. cit., pp. 2, 11, 25.
Ibid., p. 78.
Ibid., pp. 71, 91.
Ibid., pp. 150–159.
Ibid., p. 155.
Regan describes this process as “unsettling the settler within.” Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada. (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC Press, 2010).
Karen Jones, “The Politics of Credibility” in L. Anthony, C. Witt and M. Atherton (eds.), A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 154–176.
James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
Murphy, op. cit., p. 25.
On this see Diane Nelson, A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), Chris Hale, “Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala,” Journal of Latin American Studies 34(3) (2002): pp. 485–524.
Murphy, op. cit., pp. 99, 104–105.
For discussion of this phenomenon in theories of distributive justice see Charles W. Mills, From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
For a critical discussion of the limitations of this way of thinking about group membership see Cindy Holder, “Culture as an Activity and Human Right: An Important Advance for Indigenous Peoples and International Law,” Alternatives 33 (2008): pp. 7–28 and “Devolving Power to Sub-State Groups: Some Worries,” The Monist 95:1 (2012): pp. 87–103.
Murphy, op. cit., pp. 77–79, 83–84.
See Cindy Holder, “Democratic Authority from the Outside Looking In: States, Common Worlds and Wrongful Connections,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5(3) (2011), www.jesp.org.
Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder, “Who’s Sorry Now? Government Apologies, Truth Commissions and Indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala, and Peru,” Human Rights Review 9(4) (2008): pp. 465–489; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition,” New Left Review 3 (2000): pp. 107–120; Chris Hale, op. cit.; Finn Stepputat, “Marching for Progress: Rituals of Citizenship, State and Belonging in a High Andes District,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 23(2) (2004): pp. 244–259.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Matt James, Colin Macleod, and Val Napoleon for their contributions during the drafting of this essay.
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Holder, C. Transition, Trust and Partial Legality: On Colleen Murphy’s A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation . Criminal Law, Philosophy 10, 153–164 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9297-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9297-2