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Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

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Abstract

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.

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Notes

  1. I am among those theorists. See Ferzan (2011b).

  2. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).

  3. Ashworth (2011); Dubber (2001).

  4. Ashworth & Zedner (2010, p. 87):

    Yet if the criminal law is conceived not only in substantive terms, as corresponding to particular principles of responsibility and liability for wrongdoing, but also … in procedural terms, as pertaining to and invoking a particular set of procedural practices and, most importantly, protections, it can be argued that recent government initiatives resort to criminal law too little as well as too much.

  5. Control orders were replaced with “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” (TPIMs). In substance, these measures remain largely the same. See Ryder (2011).

  6. See, e.g., SSHD v. JJ (and others), [2007] 3 W.L.R. 642; SSHD v. AF, [2009] 3 W.L.R. 74 (2009).

  7. Ashworth (2006, p. 63).

  8. Id. (p. 90).

  9. See Bassiouni (1993, p. 266 n. 142 & 143)(finding five international conventions and sixty-seven constitutions with the PoI); Stuckenberg (this issue) (“there seems to be no legal order left which openly rejects the maxim”).

  10. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) § 6(2).

  11. Coffin v. US, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).

  12. Stuntz (2001).

  13. I borrow the term “preventive justice” from Ashworth and Zedner. See http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/projects/PreventiveJustice. (Accessed: 10/28/13).

  14. Ashworth and Zedner (2012) (“The development of appropriate restraining principles and of procedural protections in respect of coercive civil preventive measures is, therefore, no less pressing than in respect of the criminal law itself.”).

  15. Notably, Ashworth (and Zedner) agree that the criminal law ought not to be distorted in the name of procedure. See id.

  16. Ferzan (2011a).

  17. Id.; see also Alexander and Ferzan (2012); Ferzan (2011b).

  18. See Frowe ( 2010 ), Quong (2009).

  19. See Nozick (1974, pp. 34-35)(offering the original formulation of this problem). For ease of exposition, I have omitted Innocent Aggressors, whom I would group with Innocent Threats.

  20. Frowe (2010, pp. 267–268); McMahan (2009, p. 159).

  21. Ferzan (2012).

  22. Id.

  23. Id.

  24. See id.

  25. Quong (2009).

  26. I owe this phrase and objection to Sandra Marshall.

  27. See generally Dressler (2009, § 5.03); Slobogin (2006, p. 115).

  28. Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 [hereinafter “PTA”].

  29. See Tadros (2007a), Zedner (2007).

  30. Ryder (2011).

  31. PTA §2.

  32. PTA §1(4).

  33. See also Ohana (2006, p. 26).

  34. Ferzan (draft).

  35. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).

  36. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

  37. 425 US 501 (1976).

  38. Laudan (2006, p. 40); Stumer (2010, p. 38).

  39. [1995] 20 EHRR 557, [1995] ECHR 15175/89.

  40. [2007] ECHR 30810/03.

  41. Laudan (2006, p. 91).

  42. For a cautionary note against an expansive reading of the presumption, see Schwikkard (1998)ing (1) by conjoining other rights with the presumption, these rights become vulnerable when the presumption itself is inapplicable and (2) different policy justifications lead to different conclusions about when rights may be infringed and the normative force of the presumption will be undermined if it is allowed to be overridden frequently).

  43. Kitai-Sangero (2009, p. 908).

  44. Campbell (2013).

  45. See, e.g., Duff (2013) (offering an account that reconciles the PoI at trial, pretrial detention, and police investigative practices).

  46. Laudan (2006, p. 12).

  47. Although the “no evidence” presumption is not a presumption of innocence, Rinat Kitai-Sangero argues in favor of the PoI because of the psychological effect it will have; she claims that innocence prevents alienation of the accused from the state and it also provides a stronger psychological barrier to improper investigative methods and unnecessary pretrial detention. Kitai (2002, pp. 275, 278, 280). Note, no proof is not equivalent to even odds. See Friedman (2000).

  48. Laufer (1995).

  49. Cf. Lippke (2013).

  50. Cf. Stuckenberg (this issue).

  51. Id.

  52. Salabiaku v. France (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 379.

  53. Laudan (2006, p. 40), Stumer (2010, 38).

  54. Laudan (2006, pp. 101–103).

  55. Id. p. 106.

  56. Cf. Laudan (2006, p. 113) with Jeffries and Stephan (1979).

  57. Dripps (1987); Sundby (1989).

  58. Salabiaku v. France, (1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 379.

  59. Sheldrake v. DPP, [2004] UKHL 43; Stumer (2010, p. 26).

  60. Ashworth (2006), Stumer (2010), Tadros (2007b).

  61. Campbell (2013); Ashworth (2006).

  62. Cf. Stuckenberg (this issue).

  63. Baradaran (2011), Husak (2013).

  64. Baradaran (2011).

  65. See also Duff (2013).

  66. Stuckenberg (this issue) (presumption protects against anticipating the outcome of the criminal trial, circumventing the outcome, and undermining the outcome).

  67. Laufer (1995, pp. 332–334), Stumer (2010, p. 39).

  68. See Kitai (2002, p. 269) (discussing how some scholars claim that the presumption raises a logical contraction because if “the innocence of the person is assumed…it is impossible to explain logically why an investigation is being conducted and charges filed without reaching an absurd conclusion that all accused persons are prosecuted by law enforcement agencies without basis”).

  69. Laudan (2006, pp. 93–94).

  70. See Stuckenberg (this issue).

  71. Ashworth (2008).

  72. Kitai-Sangero (2009).

  73. Campbell (2013).

  74. Tadros and Tierney (2004). Although I have tried to remain agnostic about the use of the PoI, this usage strikes me as too broad. See Ashworth (2006, pp. 77, 78) (limits on construction of criminal offenses come from a different fundamental principle); Duff (2012) (arguing for a formal reading of the PoI and a distinct principle for criminalization); Roberts (2005, p. 154)(“On my account, substance and procedure are independent, incommensurable dimensions of penal law that cannot be reduced to interchangeable tokens and traded like currency”). Moreover, a properly tempered usage would appeal to the political morality of which the PoI is a part. For an excellent example, see Tomlin (2012).

  75. Campbell (2013).

  76. Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] AC 462, 481.

  77. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 384 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).

  78. This formulation of what is otherwise called an “autonomy” or “free will” objection is due to Patrick Tomlin’s insightful interjection during the Minnesota preventive justice conference.

  79. But see Ferzan (2011a).

  80. Stuckenberg (this issue).

  81. Id.

  82. Campbell (2013).

  83. Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).

  84. See Husak (2004), Jareborg (2004).

  85. Ashworth and Zedner (2012)ing that the last resort principle is about effectiveness and the nature of the wrongdoing determines whether the action should be handled within the civil or criminal domain); Husak (2004).

  86. See Campbell (2013) (suggesting this remedy is sufficient with respect to ASBO’s).

  87. Although this is the obvious reading of the ECHR, other interpretations have been advocated. See Campbell (2013); Trechsel with Summers (2006, §I.C.1).

  88. Leipold (2000).

  89. Laudan (2006, p. 68).

  90. Stein (2005, p. 175).

  91. Id.

  92. Id. p. 177; see also Stumer (2010, p. 21).

  93. Tomlin (2012).

  94. One might think that BRD is over determined by a number of factors. Ashworth includes the citizen/state relationship, the imbalance of resources, the fallibility of the system, and the official censure as all justifying BRD. Ashworth (2006, p. 75).

  95. Tomlin (2012).

  96. I thank Liz Campbell for pressing me on this point.

  97. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).

  98. Laudan (2006).

  99. Thanks to Antony Duff for continually pressing me on this point every chance he got.

  100. See Waldron (2012).

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Acknowledgments

I thank the participants at the International Conference for Law and Society (June 2012) and the University of Minnesota Law School’s Robina Institute’s Conferences on the Presumption of Innocence (May 2012) and Preventive Justice (September 2012). Special thanks are due to my commentators at all three venues: Jeff Brown, Liz Campbell, Sharon Dolovich, and Susan Rozelle. This paper was supported by NYU Law’s Center for the Administration of Criminal Law, while I was a Scholar in Residence, and I thank my research assistant, Jules Torti, for her excellent work. Rutgers-Camden Reference Librarians David Batista and Genevieve Tung also provided invaluable assistance.

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    Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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Ferzan, K.K. Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence. Criminal Law, Philosophy 8, 505–525 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9275-0

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