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Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries

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Abstract

Public opinions regarding the international economic organizations (IEOs; the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) are understudied. I contrast five lines of argument using a multi-country survey of developing countries, focusing on evaluations of the economy, skills, gender, and ideology and measures of involvement with the organizations themselves. At the individual level, respondents have negative views if they have negative views of the state of the economy. More educated respondents are more likely to have negative views of the IEOs. Women are more likely to have positive views of the IEOs than men. National levels of engagement with the IEOs also affect public evaluations of them. Evaluations of the state of the economy are more influential determinants of IEO evaluations in states that receive IMF and World Bank loans, as well as in states that are active in WTO dispute resolution.

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Notes

  1. These findings mirror those in the American and comparative literatures (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewet 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988).

  2. Compliance with IMF and World Bank programs is an important issue. For the IMF, Mussa and Savastano (1999) note that between 1973 and 1997, more than a third of all Fund arrangements ended with disbursements of less than half of the original support. World Bank (1997) reports that less than 30% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have a good record of program compliance. As Nsouli et al. (2005:140) note, successfully implemented IMF programs exhibit better performance in inflation and fiscal policy. This is not to imply that noncompliance with IMF programs is costless. Recent work evaluating the catalytic effects of IMF programs (Edwards 2005) notes that program suspensions by the IMF lead to capital flight. Vreeland (2006) provides an extensive overview of the issues surrounding compliance with IMF programs.

  3. The results of the survey are available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf, and the codebook and data are available at http://people-press.org/dataarchive/. The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.

  4. As Hayo (1999) notes, actual knowledge by Europeans about the EU is quite low.

  5. The appendix contains the exact text of all questions used in the data analysis.

  6. Not all the surveys were based on random samples. Thus, the analysis presented here relies on weighted data to ensure that urban respondents were not oversampled relative to rural ones.

  7. Relying on data on flows help mitigate concerns about omitting the degree of program compliance, since the money is only given if the Fund certifies that the conditions have been met. For more on this, see Dreher (2006).

  8. The VIFs between these national-level regressors were very low (1.81 for model with IMF, 2.73 for model with IBRD flows), which mitigates concerns about collinearity between these aggregate-level variables.

  9. I also reestimated these models replacing the Freedom House score with the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. The variable is significant in all models and in the same direction as the Freedom House score for education, partisanship, gender, and changes in future economic situation. The variable was significant and in the opposite direction for economic situation and household income.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, 106 McQuaid Hall, South Orange, NJ, 07079, USA

    Martin S. Edwards

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  1. Martin S. Edwards
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Correspondence to Martin S. Edwards.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Countries and Questions

Individual Level Model One (34 Countries): Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam.

Individual Level Model Two (24 Countries): Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela.

Individual Level Model Three (14 Countries): Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Turkey, Venezuela.

1.1 Dependent Variable:

Here is a list of groups, organizations, and institutions. For each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of international organizations like the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in (survey country)?

1.2 Independent Variables:

Economic Situation: Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe the economic situation in (survey country) is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Change in Economy: Over the next 12 months, do you expect the economic situation in our country to improve a lot, improve a little, remain the same, worsen a little, or worsen a lot?

Household Income: As I read each of the following, please tell me whether you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this aspect of your life. Your household income?

Unemployment: What is your current employment situation? (Dummy variable created from all those who self identified as unemployed).

Education: What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (Responses on nine-point scale: No formal education, Incomplete primary education, Complete primary education, Incomplete secondary education (vocational school), Complete secondary education (vocational school), Incomplete secondary education (preparatory school), Complete secondary education (preparatory school), Some university, University graduate.

Ideology: Some people talk about politics in terms of left, center, and right. On a ten-point scale, with 1 indicating extreme left and 10 indicating extreme right, where would you place yourself?

Free Market Economy: Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement: “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.”

Consumerism: Which comes closer to your view? Consumerism and commercialism are a threat to our culture, or consumerism and commercialism are not a threat to our culture?

Foreign Influence: Here is a list of statements. For each one, tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with it. Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

National Level Data

Net IBRD Lending per capita

3.090624

6.862637

−5.382596

17.52678

Net IMF Lending per capita

34.99793

76.3888

−21.18483

247.3083

Gross National Income per capita

4310.646

3359.331

830

11440

Freedom House Score

2.18781

.6536976

1

3

Trade Dispute Count

2.941823

5.594166

0

18

Gender Loans Count

3.517959

3.401729

0

13

Individual Level Data

Opinion regarding IEOs

2.208352

.9774555

1

4

Economic Situation

3.130802

.841776

1

4

Change in Economy

2.646443

1.128196

1

5

Gender

1.459916

.4984269

1

2

Household Income

2.598283

.9131254

1

4

Unemployment

.0854067

.2795062

0

1

Education

5.386731

2.337317

1

9

Ideology

5.066056

2.356968

1

10

Free Market Economy

2.214026

1.021607

1

4

Consumerism

1.522334

.5793826

1

4

Foreign Influence

1.922159

.9287288

1

4

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Edwards, M.S. Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries. Rev Int Organ 4, 185–209 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9057-6

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