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Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations

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Abstract

The literature on social capital has strongly increased in the last two decades, but there still is a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of international trust. This empirical study analyzes a cross-section of individuals, using micro-data from the World Values Survey, covering 38 countries, to investigate trust in international organizations, specifically in the United Nations. In line with previous studies on international trust we find that political trust matters. We also find that social trust is relevant, but contrary to previous studies the results are less robust. Moreover, the paper goes beyond previous studies investigating also the impact of geographic identification, corruption and globalization. We find that a higher level of (perceived) corruption reduces the trust in the UN in developed countries, but increases trust in developing and transition countries. A stronger identification with the world as a whole also leads to a higher trust in the UN and a stronger capacity to act globally in economic and political environment increases trust in the UN.

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Notes

  1. For an overview about the topic social capital and politics see also Jackman and Miller (1998).

  2. It should be noted that Switzerland and Serbia, included in our data set, were not members at the time the survey was conducted. Switzerland joined the UN in 2002, Serbia in 2000.

  3. Interestingly, Dreher and Schneider (2006) find the tendency that shadow economy and corruption are substitutes in high income countries while in low income countries these factors are complements.

  4. There is some evidence in the environmental economics literature that indicates that geographic identification affects environmental preferences (see Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007).

  5. Our specifications will have enough degrees of freedom at the country level to be able to consider an aggregated country variable in the regression.

  6. A typical World Values Survey can be viewed at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

  7. These countries are Poland, Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, China, Columbia.

  8. Western Europe Countries & USA & Australia (USA, Western Germany, Eastern Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Norway, Finland, Spain), CEE and FSU (Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina), Latin America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay), Asia (South Korea, India, Taiwan, China, Philippines, Bangladesh), Africa (Nigeria).

  9. Questions: How much of the time can you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?” and “Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?”

  10. The sign is negative because for all three ratings used (TI, ICRG and Quality of Government), a higher score corresponds to a lower corruption.

  11. The data can be downloaded under http://www.kof.ch/globalization/download/globalization_2006_long.xls.

  12. Only one country represents Africa (Nigeria).

  13. They argue that groups that were historically discriminated have a lower level of trust.

  14. We use the following question to measure political interest: How interested would you say you are in politics? (4 = very interested, 1 = not all interested). The results remain robust when using alternative proxies such as importance of politics (Question: How important is politics in your life (4 = very important, 1 = not at all important).

  15. However, it can be argued that a stronger involvement at the local level may lead to a stronger skepticism toward international organizations that are more centralized.

  16. Corresponding question: Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never).

  17. In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Scale from 1 to 10.

  18. Africa has not been considered independently, as Nigeria was the only African country in the data set.

  19. Questions: To build good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand others’ preferences (value 1); To build good relationships, it is most important to express one’s own preferences clearly. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (1 = dissatisfied, 10 = satisfied).

  20. Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:... Cheating on taxes if you have the chance. Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled ( 10 = “never justified,” 1 = always). Index: sum of both questions, scale from 1 to 20.

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Acknowledgments

For advice and suggestions thanks are due to Doris Aebi and two anonymous referees.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD, 4001, Australia

    Benno Torgler

  2. CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Basel, Switzerland

    Benno Torgler

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  1. Benno Torgler
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Correspondence to Benno Torgler.

Appendix

Appendix

Table 5 Description of variables
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Table 6 Countries in the sample (38 countries)
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Torgler, B. Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations. Rev Int Org 3, 65–93 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-007-9022-1

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