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Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time

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Abstract

Using a historical case study this article provides an example of how heterogeneity of interests within a government may affect the interplay between country ownership of reforms and conditionality in IMF-supported programs. The case study also highlights how pro-reformers’ preferences may be conditional on reforms advancing their personal agendas. This suggests a new issue to be addressed by formal models of conditionality. Two main themes emerge from the analysis: (a) the importance of a clear hierarchy to unify heterogeneous interests among decision makers; and, (b) a flexible country-tailored approach to conditionality can contribute to domestic ownership of reforms.

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Notes

  1. The diary is held at the Bank for International Settlements. A copy is available in the library of the London School of Economics. Jacobsson (1976: 348–349) provides a biography of Per Jacobsson based on his diary, though it only briefly discusses the case studied here.

  2. For a primer on the genesis and evolution of the authoritarian coalition led by Franco see Grugel and Rees (1997). The classic studies on the political economy of the Franco regime are Anderson (1970) and González (1979).

  3. Juan José Rovira (director general of economic cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Manuel Arburúa (Minister of Commerce), Madrid, 21 January 1957 in Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1.

  4. La Vanguardia, as reported in The Economist, 9 October 1954, p. 137.

  5. Editorial of magazine SP. The pro-reformers were, however, in a position of enough power to order the seizure of the publication. As reported by E. Tertsch (Spanish economic news service) to Per Jacobsson, Madrid, 6 July 1959, in Archive of the IMF central files (hereafter AIMF), C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959.

  6. J. Bastos (Director of the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute—in charge of forex reserves) to H. Merle Cochran (IMF Deputy Managing Director), Madrid, 29 January 1959; in AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, February 1959.

  7. Ferras to Cochran, Madrid, 26 February 1959, in AIMF, C/Spain/810 Mission, Jacobsson, Ferras and Staff, June 1959.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Von Mangoldt to Jacobsson, 1 April 1959, in AIMF, C/Spain/420 Stabilization Program, 1957—July 6, 1959.

  10. Ferras to Jacobsson, 29 May 1959, in AIMF C/Spain/420 Stabilization Program (oversize file).

  11. Per Jacobsson diary, entry 25 June 1959. On the same day Jacobsson would give the interview in which he publicly stressed that programs can only succeed if countries freely come to the conclusion that the program is in their best interest.

  12. Ibid.

  13. Per Jacobsson diary, entry 23 June 1959.

  14. Navarro to Jacobsson, Madrid, 25 June 1959, in General Archive of the Spanish Administration, box 36624.

  15. Ibid.

  16. Per Jacobsson diary, entry 23 June 1959. See also Ullastres (1994).

  17. Ferras to Jacobsson, 29 May 1959, in AIMF C/Spain/420 Stabilization Program (oversize file).

  18. Ibid.

  19. Lodge (US Ambassador to Spain) to Secretary of State Dulles, Madrid, 30 January 1959, in Spain, Madrid Embassy, CGR 1953–1963, Foreign Service Post Files, Record Group 84 (entry 3167B, box 11), National Archives at College Park.

  20. Ruiz Morales to Areilza (Spanish Ambassador to the US), Madrid, 20 March 1958 and Ruiz Morales to Vallaure, Madrid 25 March 1958, in Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1.

  21. Domínguez Passier (Counsellor of Embassy in Washington) to Ruiz Morales, 8 April 1958 and unsigned note for Castiella (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 1 July 1958, in Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leg. 5908, Exp. 1 and Leg. 5910, Exp. 1, respectively.

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Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Christina Beharry, Albert Carreras, Nick Crafts, Jean Marcouyeux at the IMF Archive, Arnaud Mehl and three anonymous referees for their comments and assistance. Research on which this article is based was largely conducted prior to the author joining the staff of the European Central Bank and was made possible thanks to financial support from the London School of Economics and the University of London Irwin Studentship. Any views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to any of the above-mentioned institutions.

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  1. European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez

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Correspondence to Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez.

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Calvo-Gonzalez, O. Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time. Rev Int Org 2, 329–343 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-006-9005-7

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