Abstract
Critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly interdependent and vulnerable to cascading failures. Existing studies have analyzed the vulnerability of interdependent networks to cascading failures from the static perspective of network topology structure. This paper develops a more realistic cascading failures model that considers the dynamic redistribution of load in power network to explore the vulnerability of interdependent power-water networks. In this model, the critical tolerance threshold is originally proposed to indicate the vulnerability of network to cascading failures. In addition, some key parameters that are important to network vulnerability are identified and quantified through numerical simulation. Results show that cascading failures can be prevented when the values of tolerance parameter are above a critical tolerance threshold. Otherwise interdependent networks collapse after attacking a critical fraction of power nodes. Interdependent networks become more vulnerable with the increase in interdependence strength, which implies the importance of protecting those interconnected nodes to reduce the consequences of cascading failures. Interdependent networks are most vulnerable under high-load attack, which shows the significance of protecting high-load nodes.
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Yanlu Zhang is a lecturer of School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical Unversity, Xi’an, China. He received his PhD in management science and engineering from Northwestern Polytechnical University. His research interests focus on complex systems modeling and simulation, risk management of complex systems. He currently published many high-level papers in Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Safety Science, Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, Chinese Journal of Management Science, etc.
Naiding Yang is a professor and doctoral mentor of School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China. He received his PhD in management science and engineering from Xi’an Jiaotong University. His research interests include management system engineering, risk management, decision analysis. He is the executive director of Emergency Management Institute of Northwestern Polytechnical University, and a member of Systems Engineering Society of China, Management Science and Engineering Society of China, Project Management Research Committee China, etc.
Upmanu Lall is the Alan and Carol Silberstein Professor of Engineering at Columbia University and the Director of the Columbia Water Center. He is a world-renowned expert in statistical and numerical modeling of hydrologic and climatic systems and water resource systems planning and management. His research areas include hydro-climatology, nonlinear dynamics, applied statistics, natural hazards, water systems and risk management, etc. He has pioneered statistical methods and their application to the prediction of hydrologic and climate conditions, and advanced tools for decision analysis and risk management.
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Zhang, Y., Yang, N. & Lall, U. Modeling and simulation of the vulnerability of interdependent power-water infrastructure networks to cascading failures. J. Syst. Sci. Syst. Eng. 25, 102–118 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-016-5295-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-016-5295-3