Abstract
To solve the highly counterintuitive paradox of confirmation represented by the statement, “A pair of red shoes confirms that all ravens are black,” Hempel employed a strategy that retained the equivalence condition but abandoned Nicod’s irrelevance condition. However, his use of the equivalence condition is fairly ad hoc, raising doubts about its applicability to this problem. Furthermore, applying the irrelevance condition from Nicod’s criterion does not necessarily lead to paradoxes, nor does discarding it prevent the emergence of paradoxes. Hempel’s approach fails to adequately resolve the paradox.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chen Xiaoping (1994). Inductive Logic and Inductive Paradoxes. Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 152 (in Chinese)
Hempel C G (1945). Studies in the logic of confirmation. Mind, Vol. LIV, No. 213, 10, 12–19
Hempel C G (1945). Studies in the logic of confirmation. Mind, Vol. LIV, No. 214, 103
Nicod J (1930). Foundation of Geometry and Induction. London: Routledge, 219
Von Wright G H (1983). Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 40–43
Wilson P R (1964). On the confirmation paradox. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XV, 196
Zhang Jianjun (2002). Introduction to the Study of Logical Paradoxes. Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 8, 30–33 (in Chinese)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
__________
Translated from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2005, (8): 33–37
About this article
Cite this article
Dun, X. Queries on Hempel’s solution to the paradoxes of confirmation. Front. Philos. China 2, 131–139 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0008-0
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0008-0