Abstract
Patriotism is not commonly associated with freedom. Even less so when Hegel is evoked. By reading Hegel’s concept of patriotism through the lens of revolutionary France, I present a notion of patriotism that is tied to the realization of freedom. This paper demonstrates what happens when Hegel’s philosophy of law is re-read through the political philosophy of the French Revolution itself. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and its lectures are marked by tensions. The legacy it leaves traces it leaves behind can be re-appropriated to explore the inconclusive hints left by the philosopher. The idea of patriotism is one of them, simply defined as an intersubjective link between the concrete individual and the state or as particular and general interests coinciding. This paper expands this analysis by introducing two elements: Hegel’s discussion on the character of the law and how it comes to be law; and the revolutionary phenomenon itself. The revolutionaries’ views on patriotism and its functions within a revolutionary moment can help us transform the mere traces left by Hegel into a wider vision that incorporates and promotes freedom.
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Notes
I will use the standard citation system for Hegel’s texts of paragraphs, instead of page numbers. An “A” [Anmerkung] or “Z” [Zusatz] will be added if it is, respectively, a remark by Hegel or an addition by the editors to the aforementioned paragraph.
As stated, my aim is not the scrutinize Hegel’s notion of patriotism per se, but to explore the interpretative possibilities his text opens. For a closer analysis of the notion itself see Baker (2020), James (2007, p. 104ff) and, albeit I do not fully endorse his reading, as I will explore below, Hudson (2017).
The idea to bracket Hegel’s reading of the French Revolution in order to make the dialogue between the two possible may seem, at first hand, odd, but it derives from my general proposition to understand the revolutionaries’ intellectual contribution as political theory. In a sense, I am asking us to apply to the French Revolution the same standard we apply when Hegel mentions other philosophers. For example, Hegel’s take on revolutionary so-called Terror in the Phenomenology is not connected, at least directly, to his notion of patriotism. But simply ignoring Hegel’s interpretation of the French revolution would leave some preliminary fundamental issues as unsaid presuppositions. I would like to thank the reviewer for pointing out this omission and some aspects of Hegel’s reading of the French revolution discussed here. An expanded version of the argument briefly sketched here is the object of an upcoming paper.
In Hyppolite’s words, “La volonté générale ou la Liberté absolue succède donc à cet utilitarisme transitoire. Le peuple devient la volonté une et indivisible au sein de laquelle chaque citoyen veut seulement la volonté générale” (Hyppolite, 1939, p. 344).
A more complete presentation of this trend would not fit in this paper, but some examples should give the reader an adequate picture. Within this philosophy, Bosc presents Paine’s republicanism after Thermidor (Bosc, 2016, pp. 14ff), Belissa discusses the rights of the people according to Grégoire and Robespierre (Belissa, 1998, pp. 318ff) and Gauthier explains the right to existence as defended by Robespierre (Gauthier, 2014, pp. 87ff). On the use of the expression ‘philosophy of modern natural law’, I am using the term only in reference to the French revolutionary thought and not as a general reference to the much larger tradition of modern natural law theory, that would include, for example, Hobbes and Locke.
A complementary point to the abstraction thesis is the non-historicity thesis of the French revolution as exemplified in Ritter’s seminal text Hegel and the French Revolution: “When, however, the subjective sensibility seeks to rescue the divine from it, society therewith gets stripped of the substance which it historically bears. The powers maintaining it are destroyed; the rescue itself calls into being the demise it wishes to forestall. This deadly danger confronted Hegel” (Ritter, 1984, p. 82). As delving into this would detour us from the discussion I am proposing on patriotism, I would point the reader to Gauthier’s notes on Brian Tierney’s The Idea of Natural Rights and its relation to the French Revolution (Gauthier, 2009) and the n. 64 edition of Corpus, edited by Gauthier.
A list of some other passages in which Hegel makes use of the term include: Band 4: Texte zur Philosophischen Propädeutik, § 56, p. 266; Gymnasialreden, p. 334. Band 12 (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte): p. 235. Band 19 (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II), p. 253. Among others minor uses.
My view is also similar to that of Moland, but I provide an alternative justification for distancing Hegel’s patriotism from “illiberal nationalism” (Moland, 2011, p. 152). Both mine interpretation and that of Moland diverge from Cobben’s claim that Hegel remain stuck to a monocultural view of society (2011).
Gauthier’s approach is central to my joined reading of Hegel and the French revolution. Not only she delineated the philosophy of modern natural law, but the French historian also highlighted its intersubjective dimension, as I will discuss in this paper. Gauthier’s work helps us understand that universality, within the revolutionary context, was not an abstract notion, but socially mediated through fraternity and freedom as non-domination.
All translations from French are my own, unless otherwise stated.
The italics, unless otherwise noted, are by Hegel himself. I would thank the second reviewer for pointing out the error in the English translation of this paragraph. As a basis for translating the original text, I made use of Kaan’s French translation (1940) and Vásquez (2000) and Díaz (1993) Spanish translations. The same thanks is extended regarding the translation of the Encyclopedia, in which case I made use of Valls Plana (2017) Spanish translation.
Following the second reviewer’s suggestion, I eschew the original English translation of Wollen as ‘volition’ and adopted ‘want’, following the option made by most Spanish translators of the text.
“[…] das Besondere der Gefühle (auch des Bewusstseins)” (Hegel, 1986a, § 410).
Novakovic presents a very interesting and extended discussion on the connection between Hegel’s anthropological discussion on habit in the Encyclopedia and Hegel’s take on habit within a political setting (Novakovic, 2017, pp. 56ff).
This is one of the reasons for my disagreement with Goldstein (2004) claim that patriotism is a custom an not habit, in Hegel. According to the author, “ the practical universality (Allgemeinheit) of patriotism reminds us more strongly of the ‘general [allgemeine] mode of behaviour’ uniquely defining customs, that it does of habit” (Goldstein, 2004, p. 494). I would claim patriotism as custom is more akin to national character (see Cesaroni, 2019, p. 98) than to the notion of patriotism this paper proposed. This seems to be Barba-Kay’s interpretation as the author expressly describes patriotism as a kind of “volitional second nature” (Barba-Kay, 2022, p. 297).
“Gegen die Sphären des Privatrechts und Privatwohls, der Familie und der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist der Staat einerseits eine äußerliche Notwendigkeit und ihre höhere Macht, deren Natur ihre Gesetze sowie ihre Interessen untergeordnet und davon abhängig sind; aber andererseits ist er ihr immanenter Zweck […]”. (Hegel, 1986b, § 261)
Respectively, paragraphs 252, 270 A and 288.
See Monnier (1989).
Robespierre’s full speech can be read in the Archives Parlementaires (AP, t. XXV, p. 685ff), as well as Kersaint’s defense of the primary assemblies’ right to address the Legislative body (AP, t. LXIII, p. 420ff) and Debry statement that any individual, private associations, citizens’ bodies or subnational political body could do so (AP, t. LXIII, p. 236ff).
Chap. 2 of James (2007) presents a good introduction to the notion of subjectivity and the universal for the purposes of this paper, especially considering that the overall aim of his book is Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. For a broader view of how the secondary literature has read the notion, see Carlson (2005). Amengual Coll highlights the link between this discussion and ethical life: Sin duda se da una afirmación de la subjetividad, entre otras razones, porque sin ella el Estado y cualquier otro orden no serían éticos, sino sólo órdenes organizativos o administrativos” (2003, p. 60).
I will come back to Hegel’s notion of freedom and its connection to patriotism in Part 4 and in my final remarks. Since a more detailed exploration of the former would exceed the scope of this paper, I would like to present some brief remarks on the topic. We can find papers on Hegel’s notion of from the XIXth century (Dyde, 1894) to the work of contemporary philosophers (Pinkard, 1986), as well as book dedicated solely to the topic (Patten, 1990). According to Vieweg, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right develops “basic principles of the spiritual- practical universe, of free will and of action, the core determinations of what, deep down, holds the practical, ethical- cultural world together – freedom” (Vieweg, 2020, p, 61). Freedom is not the (only) lack of external constraints, but a way of being the world – a world in which one is at home as its determinations are also one’s own. We could explain Hegel’s practical philosophy, using Vieweg’s expression, without resorting to patriotism (and Vieweg does precisely that), but what I aim to show is that Hegel’s notion of patriotism can help us better understand even his notion of freedom, as patriotism is a specific kind of relation between the person and institution and not one of blind adherence. Being at home with oneself “is the ‘substance’ (and ground and essence) of all modes of being at home in communal or intersubjective relations” (Peperzak, 2001, p. 156). Hegel’s notion of patriotism helps us understand what it means in an institutional setting and this paper explores an emancipatory reading of this dynamics, more suited to today’s fragmented social environment.
I use the term “to realize” and, more generally, “realization” in the sense of making something real in the technical Hegelian sense of the expression. Not as “to perceive” or other more common usages of the word.
I chose not to translate the French word patrie. The English language does not provide a satisfying direct translation. “Country” is better suited for pays and I believe “homeland” or “fatherland” give an incorrect impression. For a succinct but excellent discussion on the meaning of patrie, see Soboul, 1989, p. 822.
Although the paper does not claim Robespierre, or the philosophy of modern natural law, is in complete accord with Hegel, since I am proposing the analysis of a specific notion (that of patriotism), some aspects of their thought relevant to our discussion may seem to be, at first, irreconcilable. Another issue is Hegel’s view on Robespierre himself. I do not believe Hegel’s remarks on Robespierre are particularly relevant to the discussion I am proposing. Nevertheless, I would point out that Hegel does not seem to have a good grasp of the actual events taking place in France. In his defence, it would not be possible to have an even remotely comprehensive view during his lifetime, as he did not have the archival access we have today. For example, in his Christmas Eve’s letter to Schelling, in 1794, the says: “You probably know that Carrier has been guillotined. Do you still read French papers? If I remember correctly, someone mentioned to me that they are banned in Württemberg. This trial is very important and has revealed the complete ignominy of Robespierre’s party” (Hegel, 1984, p. 29). But Jean-Baptiste Carrier was tried for war crimes and executed after Robespierre’s fall and the claim that Robespierre in any way directed his actions is not supported by historiography (see Belissa, 2012). On an early draft for the Pheonomenology of Spirit, written during his Jena years, Hegel seems to imply Robespierre was a dictator (see Hegel, 1976, p. 260, and, in a similar vein, 2012, § 133 A). For a canonical discussion on the claim, see Soboul (1983) and, more recently, Belissa & Bosc (2013).
“Si l’on entend que l’univers entier aura les mêmes lois, il est évident que, quoique les principes de la nature et la déclaration des droits soient de tous les lieux, comme de tous les temps, leur application est subordonnée à une foule de circonstances locales qui nécessitent des modifications” (AP, t. LIII, p. 610) – ‘AP’ stands for Archives Parlementaires. For Gauthier’s argument, see Gauthier (2014, p. 158ff).
As noted by one of the reviewers, a better translation for Recht, in this context, would be “law”, not “right”, as it refers to objektives Recht and not subjektives Recht. Since this is a direct quote from the English translation, I opted to not correct Knox’s translation, revised by Houlgate in 2008.
“La conception sans-culotte de la démocratie ne correspond pas à une ‘démocratie directe’ au sens où les attributions de l’Assemblée seraient directement exercées par le peuple. Ce qu’Albert Soboul a décrit comme un ‘gouvernement direct’, contribuant ainsi à l’ancrage d’un lieu commun erroné, correspond en fait à l’exercice de la citoyenneté fondé sur le contrôle du pouvoir délégué, donc exercé dans le cadre d’un système représentatif” (Bosc, 2019, p. 15).
“[…] le mot de représentant ne peut être appliqué à aucun mandataire du peuple, parce que la volonté ne peut se représenter. Les membres de la législature sont les mandataires à qui le peuple a donné la première puissance; mais dans le vrai sens on ne peut pas dire qu’ils le représentent. La législature fait des lois et des décrets; les lois n’ont le caractère de lois que lorsque le peuple les a formellement acceptées” (Robespierre, t. 9, p. 569). He is, however, proposing a procedure for sanction the law after the “representatives” did their job. The compatibility of this proposal with Hegel’s system is debatable, but the issue does not invalidate my argument on patriotism.
For Hegel, in the corporation “[i]t is also recognized that he belongs to a whole which is itself an organ of society in general, and that he is interested and actively engaged in promoting the less selfish end of this whole” (Hegel, 2008, § 253) and “[a]s the family was the first, so the corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society” (Hegel, 2008, § 255). For the discussion of the primary assemblies’ role in political education, see Aberdam & Crook, 2010.
Partially adapted from: <https://revolution.chnm.org/items/show/437>
For example, it appears as a condition for respecting the law: “[…] la force des lois dépend de l’amour et du respect qu’elles inspirent” (Robespierre, t. 7, p. 436).
The English translation as “[p]atriotism en masse” does not precisely express the original German massenhafte Patriotismus. As a common expression, in the Langenscheidt dictionary, massenhaft is translated as “massive” or “massive quantities of”, both of which would not fit the above quote. I retained the original translation, but the reader should keep in mind that Hegel is not criticizing a state in which patriotism is a generalized disposition, but a kind of patriotism that is not true to his definition of said disposition.
This mirrors Peperzak’s distinction between a civilized patriotism and mass patriotism, as mentioned in section one.
“L’Assemblée nationale, considérant […] Que tous les Français doivent se regarder comme de véritables frères, toujours disposés à se donner mutuellement toute espèce de secours réciproques […]” (AP, t. 8, p. 511). “AP” is the standard notation used in French historiography to refer to the collected volumes of the Parliamentary Archives (“Archives Parlementaires” in French).
“L’assemblée nationale détruit entièrement le régime féodal” (AP, t. 8, p. 356).
Although the insurrectional aspect of this debate is not my focus here, as this is another point the reader may believe to fundamentally opposed Hegel and the philosophy of modern natural law, I will briefly address the matter. Hegel recognized the factual existence of bad states. Merely factual existence, since these are states without “genuine reality” (Hegel, 2008, § 270Z). The literature recognizes that the duty to obey and accept the laws is not the same under Hegel’s “bad state”. Houlgate’s comment on Hegel’s remark to § 137 reads: “Note, however, that when Hegel says this, it is the state as Idea, the rational state, that he has in mind. Bad states exist, and patriotic acceptance, even if conscientious, of their bad laws would not in Hegel’s view be the working of ‘true’ conscience, which is the conscientious acceptance of rational laws and institutions only” (Houlgate in Hegel, 2008, p. 345). There is an even more radical interpretation in Vieweg: “The inversive right of resistance thus includes the determination of a state of need or emergency at levels of increasing generality, and of a justified struggle against need and oppression: the various stages of self-defence, that of second coercion and that of the right to resistance.” (Vieweg, 2018, p. 170).
The relation between this discussion and Hegel’s philosophy is not my point here, but we should not that he also does not understand the economic order as a natural system (see Chap. 3 in Ver Eecke, 2008). Adam Smith’s influence in Hegel is well-documented (Henderson & Davis, 1991), but Hegel’s does not endorse Smith’s “invisible hand”. Although the starting point is a free market economy, as Hegel’s description of civil society starts with particularity being given “free rein” (Hegel, 2008, § 185), his discussion of the clash between producers and consumers states that “public care and direction are most of all necessary in the case of the larger branches of industry, because these are dependent on conditions abroad and on combinations of distant circumstances which cannot be grasped as a whole by the individuals tied to these industries for their living” (Hegel, 2008, § 236) – for a more careful and complete discussion on Hegel’s relation to free market see Herzog (2013). In the Zusätz to § 236, Hegel lists matters that would be subjected to regulation and he includes “the pricing of daily necessities”. The parallel with the revolutionaries’ maximum is self-evident – for an introduction to the loi du maximum général, see Mathiez (1932).
“AM” is standard notation for the republication of what became the official newspaper of the Legislative Body (the “Ancién moniteur”). Republication started in 1858.
I avoid using the expression “positive law” here, since Hegel also employs it in relation to law in accordance with the science of law. He establishes a distinction between the German positives Recht and Gesetz. The latter refers the promulgated text of the law, and it can be in accordance with positives Recht or not. Since we use the expression ‘positive law also is such a sense, the terminology can be misleading, so I am using ‘statutory law’ when referring to the German Gesetz. But, I should add that the translation can be misleading, as Gesetz is not limited to statutory or enacted law, but refers, more broadly, to what is considered to be state sanctioned legislation, even if it is not, strictly speaking, a statute.
This alludes to another issue that may seem to oppose Hegel and the revolutionaries. The latter understood that they had the right to establish their own constitution, but when Hegel discusses the constitution, it is not always clear with a people possesses such a right. In Hegel, the constitution can have two different meanings. In § 217 of his Philosophy of Right, a constitution is defined as “the organization of the state and the self-related process of its organic life”. In this sense, a people cannot establish a new constitution. That is why he claims, in his The German Constitution, that “Germany is no longer a state” (Hegel, 2004, p. 6). However, this is not the same as opposing the revolutionaries’ views. Hegel also recognized the need for a written constitution, as he rejected the historicism of German jurisprudence (see Hegel, 2008, § 211 A).
We should not understand Hegel’s remarks as being applicable to any legal document under the name ‘constitution’. I already discussed the notion of ‘bad state’ in Hegel and the same logic is valid here. Furthermore, even theoretically the Hegelian notion of constitution is of something sacred, Hegel himself did not shy away from directly engaging with constitutional texts and constitutional change. At least three essays published in Hegel’s Political Writings exemplify this: The Magistrates should be elected by the people; On the English Reform Bill; and Assessment of the Proceedings of the Estates Assembly of the Kingdom of Württemberg in 1815 and 1816 – the latter was not included in the 2004 edition by Dickey and Nisbet but can be found in Knox’s 1964 version.
See Belissa, 1998, pp. 255 ff.
“[…] nur die Persönlichkeit ein Recht an Sachen gibt und daher das persönliche Recht wesentlich Sachenrecht ist […]” (Hegel, 1986b, § 40 A). Although Persönlichkeit is a legal concept (translatable as ‘personality from a juridical point of view’ or ‘juridical personality’), the quote signals the intrinsic relation between Recht and human life, as, for Hegel, it would be meaningless to talk about law and rights outside the realm of human experience.
Hegel is not here talking about the “ultimate determinacy required by reality” (Hegel, 1986b, § 214 A), as this is done by the judge when deciding concrete cases.
See Hegel’s remarks to § 258: “Wenn der Staat mit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verwechselt und seine Bestimmung in die Sicherheit und den Schutz des Eigentums und der persönlichen Freiheit gesetzt wird, so ist das Interesse der Einzelnen als solcher der letzte Zweck, zu welchem sie vereinigt sind, und es folgt hieraus ebenso, daß es etwas Beliebiges ist, Mitglied des Staates zu sein. - Er hat aber ein ganz anderes Verhältnis zum Individuum […]” (Hegel, 1986b, § 258 A). This opens up an interesting discussing between Hegel’s Philosophy of Right chapter on civil society and the economic policies of the Montagnard Convention. As it is not possible to engage in it here, on the French revolution, see Gross (1997), and on Hegel’s market economy, see Herzog (2013).
When listing those components, Hegel uses the term das ständische Element instead of die Stände. See Hegel, 1986a, § 300. The institution of the Estates should not be confused with something like the active-passive citizens distinction proposed by some during the French revolution. The Estates are the representative body of civil society according to the corporate organization of these Stände (see Hegel, 2008, § 303). The corporations, however, are not representative only of professional classes, as they also “represent communities” (Hegel, 2008, § 288). The corporations can set requirements for entry and Hegel talks about the corporations’ right to “admit members, qualified objectively by the requisite skills and rectitude” (Hegel, 2008, § 252), but there are no monetary of proprietary requirement for taking part in corporate life, as there was under the censitary suffrage of the active citizens’ proposal. On this matter of political participation, some interpreters of Hegel claim that “From what Hegel says in GC [The German Constitution], we can see that, for him at least, patriotic discourse did entail civic engagement for everyone.” (Dickey & Nisbet in Hegel, 2004, p. xii). In Dickey and Nisbet’s interpretation of a much later text (On the English Reform Bill), Hegel’s opposes a representation based on property, not exactly because of principles, but because that would prevent the government from adequately addressing the material needs of the dispossessed, leading to social unrest (Ibid., p. xvii).
“Als vermittelndes Organ betrachtet, stehen die Stände zwischen der Regierung überhaupt einerseits und dem in die besonderen Sphären und Individuen aufgelösten Volke andererseits” (Hegel, 1986a, § 302).
Although less directly related to my argument on patriotism, an objection could be raised claiming § 308 A proves the impossibility of setting up a dialogue between Hegel and the French revolution, as the philosopher states that the claim that all individuals should decide on universal affairs is “das demokratische Element ohne alle vernünftige Form in den Staatsorganismus, der nur durch solche Form es ist, setzen wollen” (Hegel, 1986b, § 308 A). Hegel is here discussing how the deputies of civil society form the second section of the Estates and rejecting direct democracy (for an reading about Hegel’s position on democracy, see Kervégan, 2018, and Pérez, 1999). I would not deny this points to a difference in principle between Hegel and the philosophy of modern natural law that cannot be solved by exegesis alone. However, I claim this difference does not invalidate my discussion about patriotism, as, with very few exceptions, the French revolutionaries also rejected absolute, or direct, democracy. Although they agree with the need to organize and structure society as to allow decisions to be made at different levels (they would with Hegel on this point), they would not agree with Hegel’s reasoning, since, as a rule, people do have the right to take part in the universal affairs of the state.
Robespierre presents fundamentally the same idea: […] let us leave to the communes the power to regulate their own affairs, in all that is not essential to the general administration of the republic. In short, let us restore to individual freedom all that does not naturally belong to public authority […]. (Robespierre, t. 9, pp. 501-2)
I do not claim there is a perfect homology between the Hegel’s early political writings and the Grundlinen, but that we can identify some interesting continuities that are relevant for the specific discussion I am proposing.
“Les délits des mandataires du peuple et de ses agents ne doivent jamais être impunis. Nul n’a le droit de se prétendre plus inviolable que les autres citoyens” (AP, t. 62, p. 107).
See Lanthenas’ proposal in Archives nationales, Série AD/XVIIIc/291, nº 3.
This quote also points to Hegel’s analysis of the French Revolution. In an extract from Hegel’s 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion, we can see Hegel discussing Robespierre’s distrust of the Executive power (Hegel, 2004, p. 233; Hegel, 1986d, p. 246). This distrust does not appear in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. On the contrary, the philosopher seems to stress the importance of building a subjective link between the citizen and the state and the Executive, more precisely the prince or monarch, plays a fundamental role. There is no direct way to resolve this opposition. However, they are speaking within two different contexts. Hegel is exposing the rational kernel of the state, while the revolutionaries are living in a state where the institutions, especially the Executive, have proven to be untrustworthy – a “bad state”, in Hegelian jargon. I claim this does not invalidate my argument on patriotism. Precisely because they are dealing with different environments, we can build a bridge between the two using the notion of patriotism to explore how this notion itself is reshaped by this exchange.
This is not to say that the institutional arrangement proposed by Hegel and the revolutionaries are the same. They are not. Hegel’s quote defining the people as “a particular section of the members of the state […] that section which does not know what it will” (Hegel, 2008, § 301 A) is not precluding the people from participation in law-making, as I have explained in this paper. Hegel reserves part of this for civil society to regulate, even though he does not delineate the precise boundaries.
Although, some of their solutions seem perfectly compatible with our current political life, such as popular vetoes, recall procedures and popular control over judicial appointees – see Baker (2022).
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Baker, E. Patriotism as Freedom and the Law: Hegel as Read by Robespierre. Philosophia 51, 1063–1092 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00629-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00629-w