Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem

Abstract

This paper focuses on Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence, according to which if one is in a phenomenal state constituted by employing perceptual capacities, then one is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence. This view offers an attractive explanation of why perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence, and avoids difficulties faced by its contemporary alternatives. However, in spite of the attractions of this view, it is subject to what I call “the alien experience problem”: some alien experiences (e.g. clairvoyant experience) are constituted by employing perceptual capacities, but they do not provide phenomenal evidence. This point is illustrated by a counterexample which is similar to, but also different in some important respects from, Bonjour’s famous clairvoyant Norman example. At the end of the paper, I sketch a restricted version of Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence by putting some etiological constraint on the perceptual capacities employed.

This paper centers on Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence, according to which if one is in a phenomenal state constituted by employing perceptual capacities, then one is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence. I will argue that in spite of its theoretical attractiveness, Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence as it is currently formulated is subject to counterexamples. This motivates a restriction to Schellenberg’s account such that it is immune to these counterexamples.

According to Schellenberg’s ‘capacity view’ of perceptual evidence, perceptual experience provides us two kinds of evidence: phenomenal evidence and factive evidence. Phenomenal evidence is “determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing” (2018, p. 167) and is provided by perceptual experience regardless of whether it is perception, illusion or hallucination. Factive evidence is “determined by the perceived particulars such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment” (p. 167) and is only provided by perception. Both kinds of perceptual evidence are provided in virtue of the perceptual capacities employed.¹

In this paper, I will only concentrate on phenomenal evidence. In §1, I will consider Schellenberg’s Phenomenal Evidence Argument for the thesis that perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence. I will argue that this argument relies on the principle that if one is in a phenomenal state constituted by employing perceptual capacities, then one is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence (I call this principle “Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence”). In §2, I will illustrate the significance and theoretical attractiveness of Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence, and defend it against two recently raised objections. In §3, I will argue that Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence is subject to the alien experience problem: alien experiences are constituted by employing perceptual capacities, but they do not provide phenomenal evidence. In §4, I will conclude by briefly sketching a restricted version of Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence which puts some etiological constraint on the perceptual capacities employed.

1 Schellenberg’s Phenomenal Evidence Argument

Here is Schellenberg’s Phenomenal Evidence Argument.

The Phenomenal Evidence Argument

(P1) If a subject S perceives α or suffers an illusion or a hallucination as of α (while not suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious perception), then it sensorily seems to S as if α is present.

(P2) If it sensorily seems to a subject S as if α is present, then S is in a phenomenal state that is systematically linked to external, mind-independent particulars of the type under which α falls and that the phenomenal state is of in the good case.

(P3) If S is in a phenomenal state that is systematically linked to external, mind-independent particulars of the type under which α falls and that the phenomenal state is of in the good case, then S is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of α.

(C1) If it sensorily seems to S as if α is present, then S is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of α. (P2+P3)

(C2) If S perceives α or suffers an illusion or a hallucination as of α (while not suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious perception), then S is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of α. (P1+C1)

The conclusion of this argument (C2) is a strong version of the thesis that perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence. C2 states that perceptual experience not only can provide phenomenal evidence, but also is sufficient for phenomenal evidence. That is, as long as one has certain perceptual experience as of α, one thereby has phenomenal evidence for the presence of α. No other condition (e.g. reliability condition) needs to be met.

The second thing to notice is that this argument not only shows why we should think that perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence, but also explains why perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence. Perceptual experiences provide phenomenal evidence because they involve sensory seemings that are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case.

The argument is obviously valid, but is it sound? P1 is a plausible characterization of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Regardless of whether one is perceiving, hallucinating or suffering an illusion, as long as one has perceptual experience (that is, one is not suffering from blindsight or any other form of unconscious perception), the environment sensorily seems certain way to the subject. In a word, perceptual experiences involve sensory seemings. This distinctive phenomenal character is absent in other mental states such as beliefs, desires and fears.

P2 states that the sensory seeming (or the phenomenal state that involves the sensory seeming) is systematically linked to what it is of in the good case. A good case is a case in which the perceptual capacities employed fulfill their functions (i.e. perception), and a bad case is a case in which the perceptual capacities employed fail to fulfill their functions (i.e. illusion and hallucination). According to Schellenberg, P2 is supported by the following two premises (2018, p. 175).

(P2-1) If it sensorily seems to a subject S as if α is present, then S is in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out (and discriminate) external, mind-independent particulars of the type under which α falls and that the phenomenal state is of in the good case. (Mental Activism)

(P2-2) If S is in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out (and discriminate) external, mind- independent particulars of the type under which α falls and that the phenomenal state is of in the good case, then S is in a phenomenal state that is systematically linked to external, mind-independent particulars of the type under which α falls and that the phenomenal state is of in the good case.

The combination of P2-1 and P2-2 entails P2. P2-1 is a view of phenomenal character of perceptual experience which Schellenberg calls “Mental Activism”. Schellenberg develops Mental Activism in detail in chapter six of her 2018 book. According to Mental Activism, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constituted by engaging in a mental activity of employing perceptual capacities in a sensory mode.² Perceptual capacities, according to Schellenberg, are capacities that function to single out (and discriminate) external, mind-independent particulars (2018, chapter 2). Here, I will not question Mental Activism because doing so would take me too far afield. Let us grant Mental Activism.

P2-2 is intuitively true. If the phenomenal state is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out mind-independent particulars, then the phenomenal state is thereby systematically linked to these particulars through the functional relation between the perceptual capacities employed and the mind-independent particulars they function to single out. Such systematic linkage has both an explanatory aspect and a metaphysical aspect. “There is an explanatory primacy of the good over the bad case, since one can give an analysis of the perceptual capacities employed in the bad case only by appealing to their role in the good case” (2018, p. 175). This explanatory primacy is licensed by a metaphysical primacy. “The employment of a perceptual capacity C_α in cases in which C_α fulfills its function is metaphysically more basic than the employment of C_α in cases in which C_α fails to fulfill its function” (p. 172). There is an explanatory and metaphysical primacy because part of the nature of the perceptual capacities employed is that they function to do what they do in the good case (i.e. singling out particulars), rather than what they do in the bad case (i.e. failing to single out particulars). The explanatory and metaphysical primacy is simply a consequence of the functional relation between the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars they single out in the good case.

P3 is what is at stake here. It moves from a metaphysical claim (i.e. that the phenomenal state is systematically linked to certain mind-independent particulars) to an epistemological claim (i.e. that the phenomenal state provides phenomenal evidence). However, why can this systematic link bridge the gap between being in a phenomenal state and having phenomenal evidence? According to Schellenberg, P3 depends on two principles: (1) “if phenomenal states are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case in the sense specified, then it is rational to heed their testimony”; (2) “if it is rational to heed the testimony of phenomenal states, then they provide evidence” (p. 177). The second principle, as Schellenberg claims, is largely uncontroversial. The first principle still involves a move from a metaphysical claim to an epistemological claim (i.e. that it is epistemically rational to heed the testimony of the phenomenal state). Schellenberg gives no further explanation of why we can make such a move. However, this principle does have some intuitive plausibility. If I am in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out, say, white cups, then it seems that it is rational for me to invest at least some confidence in the presence of a white cup. After all, the nature of the perceptual capacities employed is constituted by their function to single out white cups.

As I will argue in Sect. 3, P3 is false. The systematic linkage is not sufficient for phenomenal evidence. However, instead of targeting P3 directly, I will target another closely related thesis which is explicitly held by Schellenberg.

Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence (hence, CPE)

If a subject is in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out F particulars, then the subject is in a phenomenal state that provides (phenomenal) evidence for the presence of F particulars. (2018, p. 184)

The Phenomenal Evidence Argument also relies on CPE since CPE is entailed by the combination of P2-2 and P3. Granting the intuitive truth of P2-2, if P3 is true, then CPE is true, and, if CPE is false, then P3 is false.

In the next section, I will illustrate the significance and attractiveness of CPE.

2 Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence

2.1 The signification and attractiveness of CPE

I choose CPE instead of P3 as my main target for three reasons. First, as will become clear, most recent discussions about Schellenberg’s account of phenomenal evidence center on CPE rather than P3.

Second, CPE, rather than P3, explicitly specifies the special kind of systematic linkage that is alleged to be sufficient for phenomenal evidence. As Schellenberg emphasizes, the notion of systematic linkage in play should be understood in terms of the explanatory and metaphysical primacy which is grounded in the function of the perceptual capacities employed (2018, pp. 177–178). Concentrating on CPE rather than P3 allows us to ignore other irrelevant notions of systematic linkage and primacy.

Third, the distinguishing feature of Schellenberg’s account of perceptual evidence is that it explains the epistemic force of perceptual experiences in terms of the perceptual capacities employed. This is why Schellenberg and some other philosophers call this account “capacity-first account” or “capacity view” (McGrath, 2016; Schellenberg, 2016b). This feature is well captured by CPE. As I will argue, CPE offers an attractive explanation of why perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence at the level of perceptual capacities.

Why should we hold CPE? The first motivation is that it is intuitively plausible. If the function of perceptual capacities is to single out mind-independent particulars, then it seems rational to heed what the employment of these capacities “tells” me about these particulars.

The second motivation is that CPE offers an attractive explanation of why perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence: Perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence because perceptual experience is a phenomenal state constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out mind-independent particulars. To illustrate this, let us compare CPE with two other principles.

Reliabilism about Phenomenal Evidence (hence, RPE)

If a subject is in a phenomenal state as of F particulars that is reliable, then the subject is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of F particulars.

Phenomenalism about Phenomenal Evidence (hence, PPE)

If a subject is in a phenomenal state in which it sensorily seems to the subject that F particulars are present, then the subject is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of F particulars.

Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence (CPE)

If a subject is in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out F particulars, then the subject is in a phenomenal state that provides phenomenal evidence for the presence of F particulars.

In contemporary epistemology of perception, there are two major approaches to explain the epistemic force of perceptual experience. According to the reliability approach, the epistemic force of perceptual experience is explained in terms of the reliability of perceptual experience. According to the phenomenal approach, the epistemic force of perceptual experience is explained in terms of the distinctive phenomenal character of perceptual experience.³ Though most epistemologists talk of perceptual justification rather than phenomenal evidence, these two approaches can also be used to explain phenomenal evidence.

The reliability approach would appeal to something similar to RPE to explain the evidential force of perceptual experiences: perceptual experiences provide phenomenal evidence because perceptual experiences are reliable.⁴ The reliability of perceptual experiences can be understood in at least two ways: (1) perceptual experiences reliably indicate how the world actually is, or (2) perceptual experiences are parts of processes that reliably produce true beliefs. This approach perfectly accommodates the idea that evidence is a good guide to how the world actually is: perceptual experiences are reliably connected to how the world actually is. However, not all cases can be explained in this way. Consider, for instance, a victim whose perceptual experiences are all fed by an evil demon. The victim’s perceptual experiences are extremely unreliable, but it seems that he still has evidence for believing what his perceptual experiences tell him.

The phenomenal approach would appeal to something similar to PPE. When I have certain perceptual experience, it sensorily seems to me that my environment is thus and so. The sensory seemings are “recommending their contents as true” (Tucker, 2010), or that it “feels as if” their contents are true (Pryor, 2000), or their contents “appear” to be true (Huemer, 2001). This distinctive phenomenology is absent in other non-evidential mental states such as desires and fears. According to the phenomenal approach, the evidential force of perceptual experiences is grounded in their distinctive phenomenal character.⁵ This approach can explain why the evil demon victim also has phenomenal evidence. Although perceptual experiences of the evil demon victim are extremely unreliable, they still retain their distinctive phenomenal character. Therefore, unreliability does not prevent the victim’s perceptual experiences from being evidential.

The problem with the phenomenal approach, according to Schellenberg, is that it takes it as given that phenomenal states with certain phenomenal character are evidential without explaining why (Schellenberg, 2016a, 2016b, pp. 931–932). More specifically, the phenomenal approach says nothing about the systematic link between perceptual experiences and how the world actually is. Phenomenal evidence can play the role of a good guide to how the world actually is “only if there is a systematic link between our sensory seemings and the way our environment actually is” (Schellenberg, 2018, p. 173). The phenomenalism says nothing about this systematic linkage.

CPE offers us an account of phenomenal evidence that is more attractive than both the reliability approach and the phenomenal approach. According to this capacity approach, perceptual experiences provide phenomenal evidence because they are phenomenal states constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out mind-independent particulars. The capacity approach, on the one hand, shows that there is a systematic link between perceptual experiences and how the world actually is, and, on the other hand, achieves this without recourse to reliability of any kind.

As is argued above, the systematic linkage is grounded in the functional relation between the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars they function to single out. Schellenberg keeps emphasizing that the notion of function is not tied up with the notion of reliability.

It is the function of a perceptual capacity to single out, say, instances of red. This is so regardless of how often the capacity is employed successfully to single out an instance of red. So this way of understanding why it is rational to heed the testimony of our senses has the advantage of not depending on any form of reliabilism. (2018, p. 177)

Even if some perceptual capacities are reliable, the epistemic significance of the experiences has nothing to do with reliability. The capacity approach is therefore non-reliabilistic.

The capacity approach, however, is compatible with the phenomenal approach. In fact, PPE is entailed by the combination of CPE and Mental Activism. The capacity approach does not have to deny the epistemic relevance of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences. The distinctive phenomenal character distinguishes perceptual experiences from non-evidential mental states such as desires, hopes and fears. The problem with the phenomenal approach is just that it says nothing about why such distinctive phenomenal character gives evidential force to perceptual experiences (see Schellenberg (2016a, 2016b, pp.931–932; 2018, p.2, p. 173)). This deficiency can be made up by appeal to CPE and Mental Activism: the distinctive phenomenal character gives perceptual experience evidential force because it is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out mind-independent particulars.

2.2 Two Recent Objections against CPE

Next, I will refute two recent objections against CPE raised by Neta and Byrne.

2.2.1 Neta’s Objection

Neta questions the connection between functioning to single out particulars and providing evidence. There are states that function to single out particulars without providing evidence (to the subject). Consider the primal sketch (in Marr’s theory of vision) which functions to single out edges and shapes in the visible array. The viewer herself typically is not conscious of the content of the primal sketch. The primal sketch functions to single out particulars, but it does not provide evidence to the viewer.⁶

In reply, Schellenberg argues that the primal sketch is a sub-personal state, and therefore it cannot provide evidence to the person. In contrast, perceptual experiences are mental states at the personal level, and therefore they provide evidence to the person if they are constituted by employing perceptual capacities. This reply is not ad-hoc. It is based on a widely accepted idea that since one’s evidence is possessed by oneself, it can only be provided by one’s mental states at the personal level.⁷

2.2.2 Byrne’s Objection

Byrne (2014) questions why we should think that phenomenal states constituted by employing perceptual capacities always provide evidence. Unsuccessful employment of capacities might not even approach success. A skillful but unlucky archer might miss the target by miles. Similarly, employing perceptual capacities might not even come close to accurate perception. If so, why should we think that employing perceptual capacities provides evidence? To illustrate this, Byrne gives the following example.

By reasoning in the following way, Harold unsuccessfully employ his capacity for epistemically impeccable reasoning:

• 1. If Obama was born in Kenya, he’s not a legitimate president.

• 2. Obama was born in Kenya.

  So: he’s not a legitimate president. (2014, p. 109)

Suppose that Harold’s belief in the second premise is not supported by any evidence. In this case, even if his belief in the conclusion is a product of the (unsuccessful) employment of his capacity for epistemically impeccable reasoning, this belief is as “epistemically worthless” (p. 109) as his belief in the second premise. Presumably, such an epistemically worthless belief does not provide evidence.

Schellenberg did not address this objection. Here is my response. Byrne is right to point out that unsuccessful employment of capacities might not even come close to success. However, it has nothing to do with CPE. When the evil demon victims employ their perceptual capacities, they do not thereby approach success. But it does not prevent their phenomenal states from being evidential. Being evidential does not require approaching success.

With regard to Byrne’s example, Harold’s belief that Obama is not a legitimate president is merely caused by, rather than constituted by, employing his reasoning capacity. Harold can have the very same belief without employing this capacity. Causal relation is much weaker than the constitution relation that is required by CPE.

3 The Alien Experience Problem

In this section, I will argue that CPE is subject to what I call “the alien experience problem”. I will argue that least some alien experiences are constituted by employing perceptual capacities to single out particulars, but they do not provide evidence.

By “alien experience”, I do not mean experience had by an alien. Rather, it refers to experience that is alien to someone. Alien experience can be had by an alien, but in that case, the experience must be alien to the alien. “Alien experience” is a relative notion. An experience that is alien to a human being might be quite normal to a member of some alien species. Also, an experience that is alien to a particular human being might be quite normal to another. If you acquire through learning the capacities to have experiences that are alien to me, then it seems that those experiences are not alien to you.

Experiences can be alien in at least two ways. First, an experience can be alien because of its alien content. For example, if I (a normal human being) suddenly have a temperature sensation with the specific content that the temperature is 104.1 degrees, this would be an experience with an alien content (Lyons, 2011, p. 298). Second, an experience can be alien because its sense modality is alien. For example, clairvoyant experience, echolocative experience and electeroceptive experience have sense modalities that are alien to a normal human being (Lyons, 2017).

In this section, I will concentrate on a paradigm alien experience, i.e. clairvoyant experience.

3.1 The Norma Example

Consider the clairvoyance case posed by Bonjour:

Norman Example

Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the president is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (Bonjour, 1985, p. 41)

Bonjour uses this example to argue against the sufficiency of reliability for doxastic justification. Norman’s belief is formed through a reliable process but is intuitively unjustified. Bonjour’s Norman example can be modified into a counterexample to CPE. In order to distinguish my modified version from the original version, let us call our clairvoyant subject “Norma”.

Norma Example

Norma has been unknowingly exposed to certain radiation and thereby acquires a clairvoyant sense. To have this sense is at least to possess capacities to single out particulars in a clairvoyant sensory mode (a sensory mode that is different from, and independent of, other ordinary sensory modes). Having this sense allows Norma to have clairvoyant experiences of things and events at a remote distance. (What is it like to have a clairvoyant experience? Maybe it is similar to the experiences that you would have if you saw people through a crystal ball, or to the experiences bats have when they echolocate distant objects.) Norma possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a clairvoyant sense or for or against the thesis that she possesses it. One day Norma wonders where the US president is now and accidentally exercises her clairvoyant capacities. Suddenly, she comes to have a clairvoyant experience in which it sensorily seems to her that the president is in New York. However, this clairvoyant experience is hallucinatory. The president is actually not in New York.⁸

The Norma example is a counterexample to CPE. Here is the argument.

The Norma Argument

(P4) Norma does not have prima facie justification for believing that the president is in New York (hence, abbreviated as P).

(P5) If CPE is right, then Norma’s clairvoyant experience as if P provides Norma with phenomenal evidence for P.

(P6) If Norma’s clairvoyant experience as if P provides Norma with phenomenal evidence for P, then Norma has prima facie justification for believing that P.

(C3) CPE is wrong.

Some clarifications are in order. First, I focus on propositional justification rather than doxastic justification. Propositional justification is the justification that one has to believe certain proposition, even if one does not actually believe the proposition, or believe it for some wrong reasons.

Second, justification is prima facie in the sense that it can be defeated by additional evidence (or other non-evidential defeaters, if any). In the absence of defeaters, prima facie justification would become ultima facie justification.

In the rest of this section, I will defend each premise of The Norma Argument in detail.

3.2 Support for P4

Intuitively, Norma has no prima facie justification for believing that P. Even though she has a clairvoyant experience, this sudden clairvoyant experience does not justify her in believing P.⁹

Some readers might not share this intuition about the case. Here are two ways to enhance the intuition.

First, we can make a further stipulation that Norma’s clairvoyant sense or capacity is not reliable. This stipulation might change the intuition of those who are somehow influenced by reliabilism. This stipulation is legitimate for two reasons. First, in Bonjour’s original Norman example, Norman’s clairvoyant power is stipulated to be reliable partly because the Norman example is designed to challenge reliabilism. However, our Norma example is designed to challenge CPE, which is non-reliabilistic. Second, Schellenberg’s notion of capacity is non-reliabilistic. According to Schellenberg, having a capacity that function to φ has nothing to do with whether the employment of this capacity reliably leads to success in φ-ing.¹⁰

Second, let us compare Norma to Nyrma, a member of an alien species to whom the clairvoyant experience is quite normal.

The Nyrma Example

Nyrma is a member of an alien species for whom clairvoyance is a normal cognitive capacity, which develops in much the same way as vision does for humans. One day, she comes to have a clairvoyant experience in which it sensorily seems to her that the president is in New York. Nyrma, however, is so extremely unreflective that she has no beliefs (a fortiori, no justified beliefs) about the reliability of her clairvoyance. (Modified from Lyons’ Nyrmoon example)¹¹

Neither Nyrma nor Norma have evidence for or against the clairvoyant experience and clairvoyant capacities (remember Nyrma is extremely unreflective), and their clairvoyant experiences share the same content and phenomenal character. The main difference between these two cases is that Norma’s clairvoyant sense is foreign to her and she acquired it through sheer accidence, while Nyrma naturally develops it.

Intuitively, Nyrma has prima facie justification to believe P, and Norma, in contrast to Nyrma, is not justified in believing P. Our intuition about justification differs in the Nyrma example and the Norma example. It shows that the difference between the etiologies of two subject’s cognitive capacities makes a deep difference in our intuitions about justification. This echoes a long tradition in epistemology which maintains that etiological considerations concerning faculties or capacities employed modulate our epistemological intuitions (Bergmann, 2006; Graham, 2012; Lyons, 2009, 2011; Plantinga, 1993).

Next, I will consider five possible objections against P4. The first four objections argue that the intuitive epistemic defect in the Norma case does not reflect a lack of prima facie justification. The fifth objection ignores our intuition and directly argues against P4.

• 1) Defeat Objection. As is argued by some philosophers, our intuitions about justification are usually intuitions about ultima facie justification. However, a lack of ultima facie justification does not entail a lack of prima facie justification, because the prima facie justification might be defeated by the defeaters possessed by the subject.¹²One might follow this line of thought and argue that our intuition in the Norma example is about ultima facie justification. Norma has defeated prima facie justification for P.

  Reply. We can simply stipulate that Norma has no defeaters. Norma might be an unreflective person who is extremely bad at reasoning. No defeater is possessed by or even available to Norma. In this case, our intuition that Norma does not have justification for P remains. On the other hand, we can also stipulate that both Norma and Nyrma are open to defeaters. In this case, Nyrma is still epistemically better than Norma. Therefore, the intuitive epistemic defect in the Norma example cannot be captured in terms of epistemic defeat.

• 2) Warrant Objection. There is a distinction between justification and warrant, where “warrant” refers to the property that turns a mere true belief into knowledge (Plantinga, 1993). Warranted true belief entails knowledge, while justified true belief does not. Based on this distinction, one might argue that what Norma lacks is warrant rather than justification. Nyrma has warrant and justification, while Norma only has justification.¹³

  Reply. The problem with this objection is that the Norma-Nyrma examples can be easily modified such that both Norma and Nyrma lack warrant while Nyrma is still epistemically better than Norma. Suppose that both Nyrma and Norma are evil demon victims and their clairvoyant experiences are fed by the demon. In this case, Nyrma also lacks warrant. If she comes to believe that the president is in New York on the basis of his clairvoyant experience and the belief happens to be true, his belief would not amount to knowledge. However, even in this case, the clairvoyant experience of Nyrma still has certain epistemic force that the clairvoyant experience of Norma lacks, and this difference cannot be captured in terms of warrant.¹⁴

• 3) Blameworthiness Objection. Tucker (2010) argues that there is a distinction between blameworthiness and unjustifiedness. One might be blameworthy but still retain the justification. For example, the evil demon victim might have begged the demon to deceive him and wipe out his memory of having begged the demon to do so. In this case, the victim has justification to believe what he experiences, but he is still blameworthy for his hallucinatory experience because it is caused by his past action.¹⁵ One might follow this line of thought and argue that although Norma has prima facie justification for P, she is still in some sense blameworthy (maybe for having the clairvoyant experience). The intuitive epistemic defect reflects this blameworthiness.

  Reply. I agree that blameworthiness is different from unjustifiedness. However, Norma should not be blamed for having such alien clairvoyant experience and clairvoyant capacities, since she is hardly responsible for them. Her clairvoyant capacities are acquired through sheer accident and her clairvoyant experience is not caused by her past actions that she is responsible for. One might argue that Norma is blameworthy because there are reasoning process that are easily available to her such that had she used it, she would have discovered some defeaters against the clairvoyant experience. However, as is argued above, we can simply stipulate that Norma is so extremely unreflective that no such reasoning process is available to her and the intuitive epistemic defect still remains. Or, we can stipulate that both Norma and Nyrma are blameworthy for their ignorance of defeaters. In this case the clairvoyant experience of Nyrma still has certain epistemic force that the clairvoyant experience of Norma lacks. Therefore, the intuitive epistemic defect cannot be captured in terms of blameworthiness.

• 4) Less Justification Objection. Given that justification comes in degree, it might be the case that Norma still has tiny amount of justification for P. The intuitive epistemic defect reflects a lack of enough justification.

  Reply. My intuition is that Norma does not have any prima facie justification in the first place. But for those who do not share this intuition, they can simply take “Norma does not have prima justification” to mean “Norma does not have enough prima facie justification”. I will come back to this point in section 3.4.

• 5) Conservatism Objection. In contrast with the first four objections, this objection ignores our intuition about the Norma example and directly argues for the claim that Norma has prima facie justification. The most straightforward idea is to appeal to something similar to the following principle:

               Phenomenal Conservatism.

If it seems to one that p and one has no defeaters, then one has prima facie justification for p.¹⁶

If Phenomenal Conservatism is right, Norma has prima facie justification for believing that the president is in New York because her clairvoyant experience involves a sensory seeming that the president is in New York.

Reply. It seems to me that Phenomenal Conservatism is false. Our alien experience example can be regarded as a counterexample to it. It faces many other counterexamples. Consider a case of the gambler’s fallacy. Suppose my friends and I are tossing a fair coin for fun and we have tossed ten heads successively. At this time, I have a strong feeling that the next flip would be much more likely to be tails rather than heads. Since I am bad at reasoning, I also do not have defeaters to such a seeming state. Intuitively, I am not justified to hold such a belief. Consider another example from Markie (2005). Suppose that I see a walnut tree. Due to some cognitive malfunction unknown to me, it suddenly seems to me that the tree was planted on April 24, 1914. Presumably, I do not thereby have prima facie justification to believe that the tree was planted on April 24, 1914. In order to avoid these counterexamples, one might retreat to a restricted version of Phenomenal Conservatism:

               Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.

If it sensorily seems to one that p and one has no defeaters, then one has prima facie justification for p.

However, Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism still faces many counterexamples. Consider the following ones.

GOLD. John is prospecting for gold and finds a yellow object. His desire for gold causes him to have a visual experience in which the yellow object looks to be gold. (Modified from Markie, 2005, pp. 356-357)

ANGER. Before seeing Jack, Jill fears that Jack is angry at her. When she sees him, her fear causes her to have a visual experience in which he looks angry to her. (Siegel, 2017, p. 67)

GUN. After seeing a face of a man who is black as a conscious prime, a participant whose task (in an experiment) is to decide whether a subsequent object he is shown is a tool or a gun has a visual experience of a gun when seeing a pair of pliers. (Siegel, 2017, p. 67)

These cases are usually called “cognitive penetration cases”. Intuitively, in these cases sensory seemings do not provide prima facie justification to the subject. In GOLD and ANGER, the experience is caused by the subject’s desire and fear. It seems that if the subject goes on to hold a belief on the basis of the experience, the belief would be as irrational as paradigm wishful thinking and fearful beliefs. In GUN, the visual experience is caused by an unjustified belief. If the visual experience provides prima facie justification, then an unjustified belief can become justified simply by causing an intervening experience.¹⁷ Given these counterexamples, I take Phenomenal Conservatism and its restricted version to be false.¹⁸

3.3 Support for P5

P5 states that if CPE is right, then Norma’s clairvoyant experience as if P provides Norma with evidence for P.

Norma has a clairvoyant experience in which it sensorily seems to her as if the president is in New York (i.e. as if the president, the New York City and certain spatial relation instanced between them are present). According to Mental Activism, given that it sensorily seems to her as if the president is in New York (i.e. as if the president, the New York and certain spatial relation instanced between them are present), Norma is in a phenomenal state constituted by employing clairvoyant capacities that function to single out particulars (i.e. the president, the New York and certain spatial relation). Since Norma is in a phenomenal state constituted by employing clairvoyant perceptual capacities that function to single out particulars (i.e. the president, the New York and certain spatial relation instanced between them), if CPE is right, then Norma is in a phenomenal state that provides her with phenomenal evidence for the presence of the president, New York and certain spatial relation instanced between them (that is, for the proposition that the president is in New York).

Schellenberg might reject P5 by arguing that although Norma has clairvoyant capacities to single out particulars, these capacities are not capacities for singling out particulars—that is, Norma’s clairvoyant capacities do not have a function to single out particulars. Just because Norma has capacities that enable her to clairvoyantly single out particulars, it does not mean she has capacities with a function to clairvoyantly single out particulars. If so, then one can accept CPE without accepting that Norma’s clairvoyant experience as if P provides evidence for P. CPE does not just require a capacity that enables one to single out particulars in order for it to provide phenomenal evidence. The capacity in question must have a function of doing so.

One might appeal to the etiological account of function and argue that capacities acquired through sheer accident (e.g. accidental exposure to radiation) can have no function at all. According to the etiological account of function, the function(s) of an item is determined by its history (e.g. the history of conscious design, natural selection, feedback-based learning, etc.)¹⁹ However, Norma’s clairvoyant capacities are neither consciously designed nor naturally selected nor acquired through learning, etc. They are acquired through sheer accident. Therefore, they do not have any function.

However, Schellenberg explicitly rejects the etiological account. According to Schellenberg, “there is no sense in which the phylogenetic or ontogenetic history of a subject is relevant for determining the function of her capacities” (2018, p. 35). The Swampman, an atom-for-atom duplicate of a normal human being that pops into existence through cosmic accident, also has perceptual capacities that function to single out particulars, even if he has no history at all. Hence ‘we can analyze the function of those capacities without appealing to how we came to have them.’ (p. 35).

Schellenberg could turn to certain non-etiological conditions of function and argue that since Norma’s clairvoyant capacities fail to meet these non-etiological conditions they do not have any function (or at least do not have a function to single out particulars).²⁰ However, Schellenberg herself does not offer any non-etiological account. To see if this non-etiological strategy works, let us consider two existing representative non-etiological accounts of function.

The most well-known alternative to the etiological account is Cummins’ (1975) ‘systemic theory’ of function. According to this systemic theory, function-ascription is closely related to ‘functional analysis’ that explains how a system works in terms of simpler dispositions of this system or dispositions of components of this system. It is appropriate to say that an effect f of a trait x in a system s is a function of x just in case some activity or capacity of s can be explained (in part) in terms of the disposition of x to f. In a word, an item’s function consists in its disposition to causally contribute to some output activity or capacity of a containing system.

It has been widely recognized that Cummins’ account of function trivialize the notion of function. An effect of an item can be deemed as a function of the item as long as it contributes to a chosen activity or capacity of a chosen containing system. For instance, given that water’s capacity to retract light and mists’ capacity to create rainbows can account for certain activity or capacity of some larger containing system, it implies that water functions to retract light and mists function to create rainbows.²¹ If Schellenberg’s notion of function is a notion of Cummins function, then it is not clear how she can deny that Norma’s clairvoyant capacities have a function to single out particulars. Norma may form thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes about particular things or events at a remote distance. We can explain these activities of Norma by appealing to her clairvoyant capacities which enable her to single out those particulars at a remote distance. It follows that we can appropriately ascribe a Cummins function to single out particulars to Norma’s clairvoyant capacities.

To achieve a more realistic and substantive condition of function, non-etiological theorists typically appeal to certain objective goals of the larger system. Within biology, such goals are usually taken to be the survival and the reproduction (‘fitness’) of the organism. According to this goal-contribution account of function, biological functions are understood in terms of contribution to fitness of the organism.²²One recent version of this account is Nanay’s (2010) ‘modal theory’ of function, according to which performing F is a function of a trait just in case its performing F would contribute to the inclusive fitness of the organism with this trait.,²³.²⁴

However, this goal-contribution account seems to support the assumption that Norma’s clairvoyant capacities have a function to single out particulars. It seems true to say that singling out particulars in a clairvoyant mode would contribute to the inclusive fitness of Norma. Thanks to her capacities to single out particulars clairvoyantly, Norma can acquire information about particulars even if those particulars are at a remote distance, and this certainly is contributive to Norma’s inclusive fitness. She would be able to form true beliefs, do correct reasonings, and perform actions on the basis of such information (even though such clairvoyant information may not necessarily constitute phenomenal evidence).

The existing representative non-etiological accounts of function seem to support the assumption that Norma’s clairvoyant capacities have a function to single out particulars. This does not exhaust all the alternatives. It is still possible to propose a new non-etiological account of function and argue that by this new account Norma’s clairvoyant capacities do not have a function to single out particulars. At the moment, it is not clear what this new account would look like.

More importantly, denying that Norma’s clairvoyant capacities have a function to single out particulars would threaten Schellenberg’s Mental Activism, according to which the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is constituted by engaging in a mental activity of employing perceptual capacities that function to single out and discriminate particulars. Given that Norma has a clairvoyant experience as if the US president is in New York, she is in a phenomenal state as of some particulars. By Mental Activism, it follows that Norma is engaging in a mental activity of employing perceptual capacities that function to single out and discriminate particulars. Denying that Norma’s clairvoyant capacities have a function to single out particulars amounts to rejecting Mental Activism. However, Mental Activism constitutes a crucial step in Schellenberg’s argument for CPE (see my discussions in Section One and Two). For someone who wants to accept CPE, Mental Activism cannot be easily dropped.²⁵

Given that the assumption that Norma has clairvoyant capacities with a function to single out particulars is supported by both the most representative non-etiological accounts of function and Schellenberg’s Mental Activism, I conclude that P5 should be accepted.

3.4 Support for P6

P6 has it that if Norma’s clairvoyant experience as if P provides Norma with phenomenal evidence for P, then Norma has prima facie justification for believing that P. In order to avoid the Less Justification Objection mentioned in Sect. 3.2, I have suggested to take “prima facie justification” in P4-P6 to mean “enough prima facie justification”.

P6 is intuitively plausible at first glance. In paradigm cases, phenomenal evidence does provide enough prima facie justification to justify the perceptual belief. For example, when I have a visual experience as if there is a white cup in front of me, I thereby acquire phenomenal evidence and this evidence provides me with justification. This justification is not tiny amount of justification, but enough justification to justify believing that there is a white cup in front of me.

I agree that there are cases where phenomenal evidence does not provide enough prima facie justification. The question is whether the Norma example falls under these cases. Normally, phenomenal evidence provides enough justification. If Norma does have clairvoyant evidence, what could reduce the justificatory force of Norma’s clairvoyant evidence? As is argued above, Nyrma’s clairvoyant phenomenal evidence provides enough justification. What could make Norma’s clairvoyant evidence provide less justification than Nyrma’s clairvoyant evidence does?

Next, I will consider three different accounts of what could reduce the justificatory force of Norma’s clairvoyant evidence, and refute them.

• 1) More Clairvoyant Evidence Account. Nyrma has more justification because Nyrma’s clairvoyant experience provides more evidence than Norma’s clairvoyant experience does.

  Reply. By stipulation, both of their clairvoyant experiences are not accurate, and therefore, both of their experiences only provide phenomenal evidence. In this case, if More Clairvoyant Evidence Account is right, Nyrma must have more phenomenal evidence. However, it is not clear how Nyrma could have more phenomenal evidence, because by stipulation, Norma’s and Nyrma’s clairvoyant experiences share the same phenomenal force and representational content. It is also hopeless to appeal to Schellenberg’s Capacitism here, because Norma’s and Nyrma’s clairvoyant experiences are constituted by employing the same clairvoyant capacities.

• 2) Extra Conditions Account. Evidence cannot provide justification by itself. Some extra conditions must be met. For example, one might argue that in order for evidence to justify, one must somehow appreciate the relation between the evidence and what is evidenced. Norma’s clairvoyant evidence does not provide justification because these extra conditions fail to be met.

  Reply. Whatever these conditions are, if they fail to be met in the Norma example, they also fail to be met in the Nyrma example. However, Nyrma’s clairvoyant experience intuitively provides prima facie justification.

• 3) Epistemic Downgrade Account. Now, the only possible option is to argue that the same amount of clairvoyant phenomenal evidence provides different amount of prima facie justification in these two cases. That is to say, the justificatory force of Norma’s phenomenal evidence is somehow downgraded.

  Reply. One form of epistemic downgrade is epistemic defeat. For example, if the subject knows that the experience is unreliable, the amount of ultima facie justification provided by the experience would be downgraded. However, this form of epistemic downgrade is irrelevant here. On the one hand, it can be easily stipulated such that Norma does not have defeaters or both Norma and Nyrma are open to the same defeaters without changing our intuition. On the other hand, epistemic defeat only downgrades ultima facie justification, but we only concentrates on prima facie justification. What about epistemic downgrade without defeat? Siegel (2013, 2017) argues that experiences are epistemically downgraded if they have certain problematic etiologies, such as being caused by desires, fears and unjustified beliefs. If my fear that there is a gun in my fridge causes me to have a visual experience as of a gun when I look into the fridge, this visual experience intuitively cannot provide enough justification for me. This is so even if I am not aware of the problematic etiology of my visual experience. Siegel says nothing about whether epistemically downgraded experience still provides evidence, but it seems possible to argue that my visual experience caused by fear provides evidence without providing enough justification because the evidence’s justificatory force is downgraded by its problematic etiology. However, Norma’s clairvoyant experience does not have such problematic etiology. It is not caused by desires, fears or unjustified beliefs. We can even stipulate that it has the same etiology as that of the clairvoyant experience of Nyrma to whom the clairvoyant capacity is completely normal.

Given that there is no good account of what could reduce the justification provided by Norma’s clairvoyant evidence (if she had any), P6 should be accepted.

4 Concluding Remarks

I have shown that CPE is subject to the alien experience problem: some alien experiences (e.g. clairvoyant experience) are constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out mind-independent particulars, but they do not provide phenomenal evidence.

However, this does not mean that Schellenberg’s capacity approach is totally wrong. The alien experience problem only shows that alien perceptual capacities should be ruled out. Consider the following restricted version of CPE.

Restricted CPE.

If a subject is in a phenomenal state that is constituted by employing perceptual capacities that function to single out F particulars and these capacities are non-alien, then the subject is in a phenomenal state that provides evidence for the presence of F particulars.

The Restricted CPE adds a new condition that the capacities employed must be non-alien capacities. It is very hard to give a clear-cut definition of what is a non-alien capacity. Paradigm non-alien capacities are innate capacities and capacities acquired through learning. In a word, Non-alien capacities have non-alien etiologies.

Restricted CPE both avoids the alien experience problem and preserves the theoretical attractiveness of Schellenberg’s capacity approach. It still offers an explanation of phenomenal evidence at the level of capacities: perceptual experience provides phenomenal evidence in virtue of the fact that it is a phenomenal state constituted by employing non-alien perceptual capacities.

Two worries immediately come to mind. First, as is argued above, cognitively penetrated experiences do not provide prima facie justification. However, cognitively penetrated experiences (e.g. the visual experience as of a gun cause by fear) are constituted by employing non-alien capacities (e.g. the capacity to single out guns). If Restricted CPE is right, then cognitively penetrated experiences provide phenomenal evidence. This seems to be incompatible with the fact that they do not provide justification. To reply, we can simply appeal to the Epistemic Downgrade Account mentioned in the last section and argue that the cognitively penetrated experience still provides phenomenal evidence, but the justificatory force of the evidence is downgraded by its problematic etiology.

Another worry is that since Restricted CPE adds an etiological constraint, it might have the counterintuitive implication that the Swampman’s perceptual experiences do not provide phenomenal evidence, because all of the Swampman’s perceptual capacities pop into existence by sheer accident. To reply, we can argue that all of Swampman’s perceptual capacities are innate to him, in the sense that they are determined by his initial state (i.e. the state he is in when he pops into existence). If so, all his perceptual capacities are non-alien.²⁶ Or, we can abandon the etiological account of non-alienness. For example, we can argue that a capacity is non-alien as long as it is somehow well-integrated with the subject’s other perceptual and cognitive capacities.²⁷ Although well-integrated capacities are usually innate capacities or learned capacities, they do not have to be.