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A Dilemma For Skeptical Theists

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to defend the evidential Argument from Evil from the challenge brought against it by skeptical theists. That challenge is rooted in skeptical theism's assessment that the so-called Noseeum Inference, which is at the heart of the Evidential Argument from Evil, is unsound due to the epistemic gap between God and humans. I will argue that that epistemic gap could be bridged if God were to build the bridge by assisting us to understand his morally sufficient reasons for causing or allowing horrendous suffering of the innocent. I further argue that if God exists, he would be able to assist us, given his omnipotence, and he would want to assist us, given his omnibenevolence manifested in the Summum Bonum for humans. If so, then the soundness of the Noseeum Inference and the Evidential Argument from Evil would be upheld against the epistemic gap challenge from skeptical theists.

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Notes

  1. Skeptical theists are theists who maintain that we should be skeptical about our ability to know what God’s reasons are for at least some of the things he does or does not do. More pertinently, they emphasize that we should be skeptical about our ability to know what God’s reasons are for horrendous suffering.

  2. The God of orthodox theism is held to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, in short, the most perfect being possible.

  3. Although God, strictly speaking, has no gender, I will follow common parlance and use masculine pronouns to refer to God.

  4. Henceforth, for linguistic expedience, I will use the simple phrase “horrendous suffering” in place of the more cumbersome phrase “God’s causing or permitting inscrutable horrendous suffering of the innocent.“

  5. Alvin Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, eds. James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (Reidel, 1985), p. 35.

  6. Impossible to determine or understand, even after careful examination.

  7. Having no morally sufficient reason for occurring.

  8. Henceforth, when I reference the EAE, I will be referring to this version. The defense of the EAE in this paper can be used to defend any version of the argument that contains a so-called Noseeum inference.

  9. See Michael Bergmann (2001).

  10. Note that many theistic philosophers, excluding most skeptical theists, believe that God has bridged the epistemic gap to explain what are his morally sufficient reasons are for horrendous suffering because they believe that there are probative theodicies inspired by God.

  11. “… and one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question to test him. “Teacher, which commandment in the law is the greatest?“ He said to him, “’You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.‘ This is the greatest and first commandment. And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.‘ On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.“ — Matthew 22:35–40. See also Deuteronomy 6:4–6: “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is one LORD: And thou shalt love the LORD thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart.“

  12. Although the phrase “Beatific Vision” is specifically a part of Christian theism, my point works equally well with any theistic description of a state of maximal, eternal, postmortem happiness for humans, such as the Muslim notion of Paradise.

  13. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p123a12.htm#II.

  14. It should be noted that the SB comprises intrinsic goods. Something is said to be intrinsically good if it is good in and of itself, as opposed to being good as a means to something besides itself. The latter kind of good is termed instrumental good.

  15. Epicurus famously said, “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”

  16. Hume basically repeated what Epicurus had said about the Problem of Evil two millennia earlier.

  17. Bertrand Russell (retrieved November 15, 2021) once commented that “no one can believe in a good God if they’ve sat at the bedside of a dying child.“

  18. For instance, Sam Harris (2005) said, “God visits suffering on innocent people of scope and scale that would even embarrass the most ambitious psychopath.“

  19. According to The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (2013), there are between 450 and 500 million atheists and agnostics in the world as of 2013. It is likely that the number is higher now.

  20. Incidentally, the argument developed in this paper supporting the soundness of NI* and the Argument from Evil could also be used, mutatis mutandis, to defend the soundness of the Divine Hiddenness and Confusion arguments from the challenge of skeptical theism.

  21. Thanks to an anonymous referee of this paper for raising this point.

References

  • Bergmann, M. (2001). Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New EAE. Noûs, 35, 279

  • Craig, W. L. (2015). The Problem of Evil. Retrieved November 16, 2021, from The Problem of Evil - bethinking.org

  • Floyd, S. (2018). Aquinas: Axiological Philosophy. In J. Fieser and B. Dowden (eds.), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 22, 2021, from https://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-axiological/

  • Harris, S. (2005). The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. (p.173). W. W. Norton & Company

  • Nagle, T. (2012). What Can Be Proved About God? The New York Review, December 6, 2012. Retrieved November 3, 2021, from What Can Be Proved About God? | by Galen Strawson | The New York Review of Books (nybooks.com)

  • Plantinga, A. (1985). Self-Profile. In J. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga (p. 35). Reidel

  • Rood, R. (1996). The Problem of Evil: How Can a Good God Allow Evil? http://www.leaderu.com/orgs/probe/docs/evil.html. Retrieved 10/6/2021

  • Russell, B. (Retrieved November 15, 2021). True or False: No one can sit at the bedside of a dying child and still believe in God. (godversusreligion.com)

  • Wykstra, S. (1996). Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The EAE (pp. 126–150). Indiana University Press

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Correspondence to Richard Schoenig Ph.D..

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Schoenig, R. A Dilemma For Skeptical Theists. Philosophia 50, 2113–2123 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00503-1

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