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Theodicy on Trial

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Abstract

Moral anti-theodicists have posed a consequentialist argument against the theodical enterprise: that theodicies lead to harmful consequences in reality and that this should be sufficient reason to motivate abandoning the practise of theodicising altogether. In this paper, I examine variants of this argument and discuss several prominent responses from theodicists, including the separation thesis. I argue that while these responses are effective in resisting the global conclusion by the anti-theodicist, it still leaves the theodical enterprise vulnerable to a weaker version of the consequentialist critique. In response, I develop an account of ‘theodicies-of-embrace-protest’ which is able to preserve the meaningful strides made in traditional theodicies while taking seriously the criticisms of the moral anti-theodicists. I suggest that sceptical theism fits this bill. 

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Notes

  1. It is worth noting that, while anti-theodicists generally think that theodicies reject the moral status of theodicies and defences, individual anti-theodicists may differ in terms how they understand the specific issues in this debate. For instance, they may differ about the reason they think some theodicy is morally acceptable or not. Alternatively, some anti-theodicists might be more open to the morality of defences instead of theodicies (after all, defences do not purport to provide an actual explanation for an individual’s suffering, only a logically possible one).

  2. Against this, Søvik points out that “One important counter-argument is that because some theodicies are bad, that does not mean that no theodicies should be made, but rather that better theodicies should be made” (Søvik 2008: 479-480).

  3. There have been many attempts to demonstrate that the theoretical and practical distinction is not as clear as it is often made out to be in the literature, e.g., Leow 2011: 180-181 and Culp 2015).

  4. The literature available is vast and I cannot, in this paper, do justice to the literature. Instead, I pick out several texts which, I think, provide perspectives of aspects of what I think a protest theodicy would look like.

  5. The history of developments at something like a protest theology is vast and I do not have time or space to explore it here. More recently, important resources can be found in Jewish and Post-Holocaust Theological Literature (eg. Blumenthal 2003) and interpretations of ‘lament’ or ‘protest’ themes in theological and philosophical literature (eg. including interpretations of (Kant 1996).

  6. See also resources such as (Gillingham 2015) and (Harper and Barker 2017).

  7. Besides sceptical theism, various other theodicies may be constructed that might fit this bill (Søvik 2008, 479-480). But it is also worth considering whether there may be resources in other existing theoretical theodicies that may achieve this goal. For instance, while some theodicies may argue that suffering itself is necessary to produce a greater good (and therefore endorse a praxis of embrace), there are other theodicies that hold that suffering is not necessary. For instance, some version of the free will defence may argue that, in order for God to create humans with ‘free will’, he must allow for the possibility (though not necessity) that humans will make decisions that may result in suffering. For such theodicies, suffering is an unnecessary and unwanted by-product of creation, and therefore, ought to be protested against. In this way, some theoretical theodicies may mediate a praxis of protest (against actual evils), insofar as, in their narrative, suffering can be understood as an unnecessary and unwanted by-product of creation.

  8. For a helpful introduction to some recent developments, see for instance (McBrayer 2010, Dougherty and McBrayer 2014, McBrayer 2017, Hendricks 2020a, Hendricks 2020b, Oliveira 2020, Hendricks 2021)

  9. See also responses such as (Bergmann 2001, McBrayer 2012, Hendricks 2020a and Hendricks 2021).

  10. While many sufferers may be asking practical questions, some may also be asking theoretical ones – be it about the existence of God, rationality of their belief, or an explanation. Søvik explains this well, “When people suffer and say things like: 'Why did this happen?', or 'Where was God?', it can be difficult to know whether they are asking a theoretical question in need of a theoretical answer, or are expressing sorrow and complaint in need of comfort... But maybe the person in sorrow did ask a theoretical question, because she had some existential problems concerning whether she could still believe in God. In some cases of sorrow a theoretical answer is what is needed, and it may have the good consequences of bringing comfort and hope. It is a matter of practical wisdom to find out what is asked for and what is needed” (Søvik 2011, 481-482).

  11. Here, I follow Hendrick’s formulation (Hendricks 2020a, 44).

  12. Ooi (forthcoming) has argued that sceptical theism provides the theist a defeater belief against apparent counter-evidence, and thus allows her to remain rationally justified in being a theistic evidentialist.

  13. See a helpful discussion in (Van Inwagen 2003, 4-5).

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Loy Hui-Chieh and Leow Theng Huat for conversations and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the editor and anonymous referees at this journal for their comments on an earlier draft.

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    Daryl Ooi

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Ooi, D. Theodicy on Trial. Philosophia 50, 2015–2034 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00493-0

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