Abstract
The central question in this paper is whether anthropogenic mass extinction is ethically problematic above and beyond the sum of extinctions involved. The point of asking this question is not to determine the ethical status of anthropogenic massive extinction, which is clearly ethical horrendous. It is to see if - as is the case with interrogating the wrongness and badness of extinction - answering it illuminates something about the value of what is being lost and sharpens the considerations that substantiate the view; and, if so, whether that might be useful in the context of evaluating mooted approaches to mitigating or adapting to it. The view defended is that massive extinction driven by undermining the conditions that make life forms possible for diverse and higher taxonomic groups constitutes a planetary shift, a phase change, different in kind from merely accelerated anthropogenic change. Justified partiality to the current assemblages of species and biomes is grounded in human relationships, dependencies, histories, and connections with this particular planetary state. This partiality warrants recognizing the loss of this state of the planet - these biospheric conditions, species assemblages, and biomes - as bad, above and beyond the individual harms and species losses involved. This account explains and substantiates why a mass extinction is worse than an equal number of extinctions spread over multiple systems or planets, all other things being equal. This account also provides reason not to embrace the anthropocene or embark on a synthetic age.
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Notes
A brief note on methodology and terminology. Thought experiments and common beliefs are not here treated as arguments or justification, though they are in a sense (debunkable) data points. They are used to motivate and sometimes clarify a view or idea. In this case, it is the view that species matter above and beyond the individual organisms that comprise them (which, in this section, is the explanandum). The question then is whether this view can be accommodated (i.e. is consistent with) or explained (i.e. can be accounted for) by theoretical accounts that operate over that space and, in turn, whether those accounts can be substantiated (i.e. arguments and other considerations provided in support of them). If it cannot be accommodated, then either the view or the theoretical account needs revision. So, the question being posed here is whether it is possible to provide an account (in this case, one that encompasses the value of species) that can not only accommodate the view that they matter above and beyond the individuals involved, and explain why that is, but that can also be substantiated. For example, in what follows I argue that the view that species have interests or a welfare above and beyond that of the individuals that comprise them can accommodate and explain the intuition/common belief, but it cannot itself be substantiated. In contrast, the view that species have value in virtue of their being unique forms of life can do all three, so it is a more justified account (all other things being equal). If there was no alternative account, or if there were strong ancillary considerations (e.g. good welfarist arguments) then there would be a choice to make about whether to accept the unsubstantiated theory or give up the common belief, for example. So the criteria for evaluating theoretical accounts that are operating in the background here are accuracy (i.e. does the account improve understanding by mapping well the features in the space over which it is theorizing as evidenced by substantiated explanations) and practical usefulness (i.e. does the theory help enable activities it is meant to support, such as making accurate additional inferences, working through problems of particular kinds, or making reliable predictions). For discussion and defense of this general methodology see Bengson et al. (in press).
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Sandler, R. On the Massness of Mass Extinction. Philosophia 50, 2205–2220 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00436-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00436-1