Abstract
I raise a puzzle concerning Destinism -- the view that that the only things we can do are those things we in fact do.
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Notes
My puzzle resembles an argument independently offered in Huemer (unpublished). Where Huemer presents an alleged proof of free will, I present theses that are jointly puzzling. Huemer’s argument concerns determinism; mine uses a more circumscribed Destinism. My development of the puzzle in terms of what is bad, finally, is novel.
Note that this puzzle makes use neither of the claim that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise nor the claim that if something is wrong, something else ought to be done instead. It thus differs importantly from another puzzle in the neighborhood as discussed in, e.g., Fischer (2003) and Yaffe (1999). Thanks to Soufiane Hamri, Philip Swenson, and Patrick Todd for comments and conversation.
References
Fischer, J. M. (2003). Ought-implies-can', causal determinism, and moral responsibility. Analysis, 63, 244–250.
Huemer, M. (unpublished). A proof of free will. URL: https://spot.colorado.edu/~huemer/papers/fwill.htm
Yaffe, G. (1999). Ought implies can' and the principle of alternate possibilities. Analysis, 59, 218–222.
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Bailey, A.M. Destinism. Philosophia 50, 983–985 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00435-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00435-2