Abstract
Tiddy Smith argues that common consent amongst geographically and historically isolated communities provides strong evidence for animism―the view that there are nature spirits. In this article, I argue that the problem of animistic hiddenness―the lack of widespread belief in nature spirits―is at least as strong evidence against animism that common consent is evidence for it, meaning that the evidence for animism that Smith provides is (at least) neutralized.
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Notes
There is some dispute about whether there are any non-resistant non-believers. I will not enter that dispute here.
I focus on the current lack of belief in animism. However, the problem can just as easily be formulated in terms of the uneven distribution of belief in nature spirits: if nature spirits exist, then we would expect them to reveal themselves to distinct populations roughly equally, since such populations are roughly equally exposed to nature.
Of course, as Smith makes clear, animism does not entail that all trees, mountains, etc. have spirits.
Another way to put this: suppose that Smith’s evidence makes animism 3 times more likely. My claim is that the problem of animistic hiddenness makes animism at least 3 times less likely.
Similar things can be said about omnipotence and omniscience (God has these properties, whereas nature spirits aren’t thought to have them).
Perhaps there is a good reason for thinking this. I leave it to animists to produce the reason.
A reviewer points out that the fact that nature spirits (if they exist) are like us doesn’t entail that their intelligence doesn’t vastly outstrip ours. For example, a three year old is like an adult, but an adult is vastly more intelligent than a three year old (at least typically). But if their intelligence is vastly greater than ours, then considerations pertaining to skeptical theism might apply. However, for this response to cut ice, we need to be given good reason to think that nature spirits―if they exist―would have intelligence that vastly outstrips our own. Again, I leave it to animists and their sympathizers to show this.
For example, one reviewer suggests that it’s possible that we’re not able to connect with nature spirits because we lack the right technique, whereas our ancestors didn’t lack this technique. This is, of course, a possible explanation. But for this to challenge my argument, it needs to be likely, and we have no reason to think it is.
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Acknowledgements
I would like it to say: Thanks to Paul Draper and several referees for comments on this article. And thanks especially to G.L.G. - Colin Patrick Mitchell - for particularly insightful comments.
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Hendricks, P. How to Debunk Animism. Philosophia 50, 543–550 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00401-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00401-y