Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Epistemology and Science of Justified Reason

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A theory of reasoned knowledge is presented by developing and demonstrating the methodology of a novel skeptical critique designed to extend the epistemological practice of belief justification to an epistemological practice of reason justification. Analyses of the reasoning found in the theorizations of certain seminal philosophers and leading scientists will reveal how the absence of the epistemic justification of reason defaults to the use of an unjustified form of reason that runs the play of an unrecognized and unchecked dialectic between epistemology and science. An alternative form of reason will be logically outlined and tested against the formalized skeptical critique in order for the newly recognized dialectic to be checked over reason with provisional epistemic justification. Zeno’s paradox and Green’s and Sellars’ critique of givenness are employed as argument functionaries of the reasoned knowledge theory.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Understood as a theoretical account of scientific method.

  2. See Davidson (1986), McGinn (1983), Rorty (1987), Stroud (1984), for examples of arguments why Quine’s naturalized empiricism cannot work.

  3. For an insightful distinction between the terms reason and rationality, see Guzzoni (1997) who advocates that reason should be reserved for more capacious usage where it perceives the unitary and the united, while rationality designates a more restricted use as the articulation and analysis of its objects into their constituent parts and elements.

  4. For epistemological examples of the more radical remedial address see the arguments found in Armstrong (1973) and Goldman (1967) regarding a causal connection theory; Nozick’s (1981) notion of beliefs tracking the truth in counterfactual situations; and Plantinga’s (1993) requirement for belief being produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties.

  5. See basic discussion in Bonjour (2005).

  6. In recent history the most prominent externalist theories have been versions of reliabilism. See Goldman (1986) for a discussion of the various version of a reliabilist account.

  7. For a hybrid view of internalism and externalism see Alston (1989) and Swain (1981).

  8. For related discussion see Miller (1994) and Musgrave (1999).

  9. For extended discussions on the limitations of reason see Barrow (1999), Dewdney (2004) and Poundstone (1989).

  10. See Cohen (2010) for a delineation of the nine legitimate reasoning types.

  11. From the Germanic word ‘Ermen’ meaning whole.

  12. For another example of an ontologically miss-determined skepticism see  Dreyer’s (2015) analysis of Nietzsche rejecting the existence of any kind of Kantian noumenon, yet implicitly subscribing to the logic noumenon in his philosophy of radical perspectivism.

  13. Note that Kant’s constitutive reason and regulative reason both count under the form of elemental-reason. Neither escape the projections of the logic noumenon; both run its logical structure.

  14. Epistemic justification requirements for the use of reason must be distinguished from legitimacy criteria that are standardly considered appropriate for different rationality types (see Cohen, 2010). The former concerns the epistemically justified use of a reason form, whereas the latter concerns the procedural legitimacy of various types of reasoning.

  15. A similar Zeno-type paradox emerges in the field theory reasoning and calculations of quantum electrodynamics. The same elemental form of reason, in the manner of ‘locality logic’, has been demonstrated to also provide the provenance of the infinity problematic there  (see Dreyer, 2015).

  16. In earlier research (see Dreyer, 2015) an epistemological methodology was developed for testing conceptual or logic scenarios, by which the logic noumenal projections of elemental-reason was found to be ‘epistemologically falsified’.

  17. A quantum system is understood to be an observed system interacting with an observing/measuring system.

  18. For investigative ontological purposes the scientific-epistemological dialectic of concept and object can be expanded, for example, around the (qualified) object characteristic of non-locality so to comport with Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability as may hence allow for the characterization of an experimental arrangement or physical system by a totality of conditions (see Popper, 1995).

  19. Identified fields of investigation include experimental psychology, evolution theory, probability theory, particle physics and cosmology.

  20. Derived from the constructed Greek verb Perstánai ‘to know through or throughout’, composed of the prefix per- ‘through or throughout’ and stánai ‘to stand’. Compare Epistánai ‘to know how (to do), or to know as a fact’; composed with the prefix epi- ‘on, over’. Various languages use different prefixes plus the verb ‘to stand’ to express intellectual comprehension: in Greek one ‘stands over’; in German verstehen means literally ‘stand before’; and in English one ‘stands under’. In the perstemic one ‘stands through’.

  21. See Nagel, 1970.

  22. See Mintoff, 1998, p. 519.

  23. Compare the whole-reasoned becoming of rational and empirical content categories to the earlier described behaviour of Plato’s qualities and of Green’s sensations vis-à-vis thoughts.

References

  • Alston, W. P. (1989). Epistemic justification. Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Aspect, A., Dalibard, J., & Roger, G. (1982). Experimental test of Bell’s inequalities using time-varying analysers. Physical Review Letters, 49, 1804–1807.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Audi, R. (1993). The structure of justification. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrow, J. (1999). Impossibility: The limits of science and the science of limits. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bohr, N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review, 48(8), 696.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonjour, L. (2005). Externalism/internalism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A companion to epistemology (pp. 132–136). Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caygill, H. (1995). A Kant dictionary. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. (1977). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, L. J. (2010). Rationality. In J. Dancy, E. Sosa, & M. Steup (Eds.), A companion to epistemology, second edition, (pp. 663–668). Wiley-Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1986). A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In E. lePore (Ed.), Truth and interpretation: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, (pp. 307–319). Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewdney, A. K. (2004). Beyond reason: 8 great problems that reveal the limits of science. Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyer, V. M. (2015). The premise of non-locality (3rd ed.). Stellenbosch, SA: Verdian Solari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, A. (1949). Autobiographical Notes. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (pp. 1–94). Library of the Living Philosophers.

  • Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N. (1935). Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? Physical Review, 47, 777–780.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farrell, F. B. (1995). Rorty and antirealism. In H. J. Saatkamp (Ed.), Rorty & pragmatism: The philosopher responds to his critics (pp. 154–188). Vanderbilt University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foley, R. (2011). Epistemic rationality. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 37–46). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and method. (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1975).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 335–372.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, T. H. (1874). General Introduction’ to David Hume. In T. Green & T. Grose (Eds.), A Treatise of Human Nature, (vol. 1). Longmans, Green and Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grim, P. (1991). The incomplete universe. Totality, knowledge and truth. The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grote, J. (1865). Exploratio philosophica, part I. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guzzoni, U. (1997). Reason – a different reason – something different than reason? Wondering about the concept of a different reason in Adorno, Lyotard, and Sloterdijk. In M. Pensky (Ed.), The actuality of Adorno: critical essays on Adorno and the postmodern. SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampton, J. (1996). On instrumental rationality. In J. Schneewind (Ed.), Essays in Honour of Kurt Baier (pp. 91ff). Ill: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, H. (2010). Being and time. (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). SUNY Press. (Original work published 1927).

    Google Scholar 

  • Horkheimer, M. (1947). Eclipse of reason. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1960). A treatise of human nature. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1738).

  • Irzik, G. (2008). Critical rationalism. In C. Martin & P. Stathis (Eds.), The Routledge companion to philosophy of science (pp. 58–66). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology, two volumes. Henry Holt.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1975). The meaning of truth: A sequel to pragmatism. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jeffrey, R. C. (1965). The logic of decision. Mcgraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. (2007/1781). Critique of pure reason. (M. Müller & M. Weigelt, Trans.). Penguin Books. (Original work published in 1781 and 1789).

  • Klein, P. (1981). Certainty: A refutation of scepticism. University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1974). Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1999). Rationality. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 206–219). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1983). Review of theories and things. The Journal of Philosophy, 80, 239–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. (1994). Critical rationalism. Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mintoff, J. (1998). Hume and instrumental reason. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 32, 519–538.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moser, P. K. (1991). Knowledge and evidence. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moser, P. K. (1999). Realism, objectivity, and skepticism. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 70–91). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave, A. (1999). Essays on realism and rationalism. Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1970). The possibility of altruism. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The current debate. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Plato. (2003). Phaedo. (H. Tredennick & H. Tarrant, Trans.). Plato: The last days of Socrates. Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, J. L. (1999). Procedural epistemology—at the interface of philosophy and AI. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 383–414). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  • Pooley, O. (2008). Space and time. In C. Martin & P. Stathis (Eds.), The Routledge companion to philosophy of science (pp. 452–467). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1971). The open society and its enemies (Vol. 2). Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1995). Quantum theory and the schism in physics. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poundstone, W. (1989). Labyrinths of reason: Paradox, puzzles, and the frailty of knowledge. Anchor Press, Doubleday.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. (1953). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1994). The world well lost. In R. Rorty (Ed.), Consequences of pragmatism: Essays (pp. 1972–1980). University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1987). Pragmatism and philosophy. In K. Baynes, J. Bohman, & T. McCarthy (Eds.), After philosophy: End or transformation? (pp. 26–66). MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1995). Response to Frank Farrel. In H. J. Saatkamp (Ed.), Rorty & pragmatism: The philosopher responds to his critics (pp. 189–195). Vanderbilt University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (2009). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, P. A. (2008). The epistemology of science after Quine. In C. Martin & P. Stathis (Eds.), The Routledge companion to philosophy of science (pp. 3–14). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1918). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, 1910–11, (pp. 108–28) Reprinted as chapter 10 in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays. Longmans, Green.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1929). Our Knowledge of the External World (revised). Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind (Vol. 1). Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. (1979). Epistemic Presupposition. In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 79–92). Reidel.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, B. (1984). The significance of philosophical skepticism. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and knowledge. Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tartaglia, J. (2007). Routledge philosophy guidebook to Rorty and the mirror of nature. Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Van Gogh, V. (1885). Vincent van Gogh, The letters. Retrieved from http://www.vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let537/letter.html

  • Werkmeister, W. H. (1992). The complementarity of phenomena and things-in-themselves. In R. F. Chadwick & C. Cazeaux (Eds.), Immanuel Kant. Critical assessments (pp. 276–285). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Westphal, M. (1999). Hermeneutics as epistemology. In J. Greco & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to epistemology (pp. 415–435). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yanofsky, N. S. (2016). The outer limits of reason. What science, mathematics, and logic cannot tell us. The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhao, J. Q., Cao, L. Z., Yang, Y., & Lu, H. X. (2018). Experimental verification of a new Bell- type inequality. Physics Letters A, 382(18), 1214–1217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Dedicated to Patrick, Dylan, Johann, Andrew and Paula. 

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Rue Cesar Frank 32, Brussels, Ixelles, Belgium

    Verdie Michael Dreyer

Authors
  1. Verdie Michael Dreyer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Verdie Michael Dreyer.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dreyer, V.M. The Epistemology and Science of Justified Reason. Philosophia 50, 503–532 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00399-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00399-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation