Abstract
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is sometimes claimed to hold a redundancy (or deflationary) theory of truth. The main evidence to support this view, however, comes from a single passage, number 136, which has been misinterpreted. In this essay I argue for an alternative interpretation of the critical passage in question. The purpose behind Wittgenstein’s remarks is not to provide a general theory of truth, per se. Rather, Wittgenstein uses the section as a way to introduce his notion of fit, a notion that will play a more substantial role in his later arguments on following rules. Furthermore, if Wittgenstein did hold something close to a redundancy theory of truth, such a view would illuminate remarks from the earlier notebooks about a crucial Tractarian view rather than his later view from the Investigations: the so-called “Picture Theory”.
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Notes
Among those who attribute this view to Wittgenstein are Simon Blackburn (2002), Paul Horwich (2016), Saul Kripke (1982), and Christopher Peacocke (1981). By contrast, Sara Ellenbogen (2003) rejects the deflationary view by taking issue with the deflationist’s assumption that “…because ‘is true’ is not used to attribute to linguistic entities an ordinary sort of property, we cannot specify the general conditions of our application of the predicate. It is this assumption that leads him to say that truth cannot be explicated by means of other concepts. And the assumption is false…” (xiii).
In fairness, Horwich (2016) does remark that his aims are not intended to be scholarly in the sense of arguing that Wittgenstein did in fact hold RT.
Blackburn (2002) agrees with Kripke’s organizational partition, though claims that the positive argument, that of replacing the old picture theory, ultimately fails.
To be fair, Kripke acknowledges the desultory nature of the Investigations, quoting the preface’s remark about going “criss cross in every direction”. Even so, we’re not given much of an argument for why those sections he lists should count as the main sections.
Blackburn (2002) also simply assumes that Wittgenstein is an RT theorist, though he criticizes Kripke as placing too much “soothing” power on the theory in response to the hypothetical objector’s criticisms.
I don’t read §293 the same as Peacocke in that I don’t think the passage supports the non-designative claim with respect to “pain”. Rather, if one looks at the passage itself, the statement is a conditional: “if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant “(my emphasis). So Wittgenstein’s point isn’t that we shouldn’t regard the grammar of “pain” on the model of object and designation, but if we do, whatever the term designates is irrelevant when it comes to how a term is used. What’s more, it doesn’t follow that since we can’t look into the box of anyone else that “beetle” has no designatum. As Wittgenstein states, the designatum becomes irrelevant for the way we use the term. Rejecting the non-designative model for terms like “pain” will only follow once we’re given other premises concerned with the use-theory of meaning, premises we’re not given in §293.
See Note 6 for remarks on this argument.
For instance, at §244 Wittgenstein asks “How do words refer to sensations?” and at §270 he asks “And what reason do we have here for calling ‘S’ the name of a sensation?”
Since I’m not concerned in this paper with a redundancy theory of reference, I’m going to skip over discussion of this subject for brevity.
Parenthetically, Peacocke acknowledges two purposes behind this passage: first as a way of endorsing a “homophonic theory of truth” and second, a way of rejecting the idea that one can use truth-predicates to determine whether something is a proposition. It is this latter purpose that I think is important when interpreting this passage, but for some reason it has received little attention from Wittgenstein commentators.
Again in fairness, Peacocke does say that it only “appears” that Wittgenstein held RT. On the other hand, Kripke appears to simply state, matter-of-factly, that Wittgenstein held RT. Even so, this criticism should be tempered by Kripke’s own admission that his paper “…should be thought of as expounding…Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him” (Kripke, p. 5).
Even if Wittgenstein wasn’t an RT theorist, Kripke and Peacocke could simply make the move to say that a possible Wittgenstein, call him “Wittgenstein*”, was an avid RT proponent.
In these passages I do not read Wittgenstein as using the German term “Satz” to refer to what sometimes philosophers describe as that which is expressed by sentences, i.e. propositions. Rather, he is criticizing those who attempt to predicate something of sentences. Cf. Hacker (1986, 326, n.17), who makes are similar assessment with respect to Wittgenstein (1974) and the Philosophical Grammar. To avoid confusion I have replaced occurrences of “p” with occurrences of the “S” to indicate that what Wittgenstein has in mind are linguistic entities, that is, sentences. The bolded and italicized occurrences take the place of the use of corners.
A reviewer has remarked that some Wittgenstein commentators (e.g. Hacker 1972, p. 302) read 136 as making an epistemological point about truth. For instance, it can be read as saying that “one can’t conceive of the truth of a statement independently of our practice of calling it true”. Hacker’s comments on this topic arise out of his attempt to assess the notion of a criteria, and in doing so, he is led to interpreting the Tractatus in a “realist” light, while construing the Investigations as “anti-realist”. However, Hacker (1986) very clearly recants in the later revision of his book, writing that interpreting Wittgenstein in this way, “…involves a serious misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception of a criterion” (323). Later, he admits that this seems to have been motivated by his own “…disposition to try to squeeze Wittgenstein’s thought into preprepared pigeon-holes that represent only our own misconceptions” (324).
See for instance Dolby (2017).
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Acknowledgments
The initial draft of this paper began in 2010 when I enrolled in a graduate seminar at the University of Kansas taught by Professor Anthony "Tony" Genova, on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. To the surprise and great sadness of the entire department, Tony died before the semester could end, and although the class resumed thanks to Professor Scott Jenkins, Tony's presence in the department was sorely missed. Tony's incisive humor, his philosophical acumen, and his compelling teaching methods were indispensable influences on my thinking for the earlier versions of this paper, and I would like to dedicate it to his memory.
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McFarland, A.L. Wittgenstein and Redundant Truth. Philosophia 48, 1515–1525 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00175-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00175-9