Abstract
In recent papers, Eric Schwitzgebel (Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721, 2015, Philosophia, 44, 877-883, 2016) argues that if physicalism is true, then the United States is probably conscious. My primary aim here is to demonstrate that the source of Schwitzgebel’s conditional argument is the “Problem of Other Minds,” which is a general problem; wherefore, Schwitzgebel’s conclusion should be revised and applied not only to physicalism, but to most contemporary theories of the mind. I analyze the difference between Schwitzgebel’s argument and other arguments against functionalism, arguing that the difference between them is rooted in referring to the causal role of the whole system, rather than referring to the casual role of the system’s parts. This key difference between functionalism and behaviorism explains why the source of Schwitzgebel’s argument stems from the problem of other minds. I conclude that however counterintuitive from a metaphysical point of view, the United States may have its own stream of consciousness, but it has nothing to do with physicalism in particular.
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Notes
Schwitzgebel’s examples of imaginary group entities include the ‘Sirian Supersquids’ and the ‘Antarean Antheads’. I do not discuss those thought experiments here, but only state that according to some views, physicalism is an empirical hypothesis regarding the actual world (see Papineau 2001). Therefore, those creatures may be metaphysically possible, but I cannot determine whether they are physically possible, or even if it is physically possible that those creatures can have a conscious experience. I see this as an empirical question. For this reason I choose to address only the group of the United States.
It can be said that the problem of other minds stems directly from the hard problem of consciousness (although chronologically it is the other way around).
Although it might be interesting to consider heterophenomenology in the context of the scientific measurement of consciousness. Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Dennett (1982, 2003) for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. Piccinini (2010) even suggests some changes in the method, so that heterophenomenology turns into the self-measurement methodology of first-person data. However, since we don’t have “first-person reports” from the United States – I’m not sure whether this method could help us in the case of group minds, or in cases of radically different minds from ours (without falling back to behaviorism or even anthropomorphism). But it is worth mentioning that Radner (1994) had suggested that heterophenomenology could be used also in the scientific study of animal minds. That approach, if defended, might be helpful in addressing the problem of other group minds such as the United States’ own mind. But that is not the road Schwitzgebel chose, and so it goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Descartes, for example, refused to rely on this observation, arguing that animals have no mind, although they behave under the right circumstances as if they do (1641/1996). Nevertheless, I carefully assume that even modern substance dualists would not take this course.
We can ask, how should we get to decide how many characteristics are sufficient for acknowledging an object as a subject (i.e. a conscious thing)? This discussion can lead to the sorites paradox, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
But there are few substance dualists, such as Lowe (2006).
This view is called neuro-chauvinism, and is discussed below.
According to Schwitzgebel, neuro-chauvinism is the assumption that consciousness requires neurons organized properly, for all the actual entities that we normally regard as conscious do have neurons. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that consciousness requires human biology or something similar. This is precisely the reason why the United States does not have its own stream of consciousness, although it might look like it does. The United States is not conscious simply because it is not made of the proper stuff (i.e. neurons).
We can say, from a physicalist point of view (or perhaps a “micro-physicalist” point of view), that in a sense, all the differences between different material stuff in the world are rooted only in the organization of the basic material stuff that construct them (i.e. quarks and electrons if we use the standard model, or strings if we use superstrings theory). In other words, even the difference between different chemical elements is an organizational one. And so, as an argument against “neuro-chauvinism”, it can be said that also a “neuron” can be defined functionally, just at a lower level of organization. I guess this is why neuro-chauvinism is not a strictly functionalist view. However, it seems that the distinction between “organization” and “kind of stuff” cannot be so easily defended.
Schwitzgebel explains extreme sparseness in this way: “argue that consciousness is rare, so only very specific types of systems possess it, and then argue that the United States doesn’t meet the restrictive criteria. If the criteria are specifically neural, this position is neuro-chauvinism… the most commonly endorsed extreme sparseness view is one which language is required for consciousness. Thus, dogs, wild apes, and human infants aren’t conscious.”
This group may include nearly all types of emergentists (weak and strong).
Note that although the macro motivation of the three is similar, to emphasize the counterintuitive consequences of the functionalist hypothesis, there is a difference in the solution offered. While Cuda opposes neuro-chauvinism as a solution, Block purports that not all substances can fulfill the casual role of a neuron (for instance, not a person and not a beer can).
According to Schwitzgebel (2016), his main point is that if functionalism is true, some actual (or easily arranged) groups of people are probably literally phenomenally conscious. The United States was chosen as a test case simply because it seems the most plausible case to make (p. 879). I wonder what Schwitzgebel intends by “easily arranged.” For if we arrange a group of people to imitate a simple brain state, Schwitzgebel’s argument collapses into Block’s argument instantly. But this must not be Schwitzgebel’s intention.
Of course, Schwitzgebel is not specifically (or explicitly) arguing that X is sufficient for mental states according to functionalism nor that the United States has X. However, I have showed that Schwitzgebel is actually (and indirectly) does assume something of that kind. I use the word ‘assume’, because Schwitzgebel’s conclusion is that the United States is probably conscious.
For more detail regarding the disadvantages of behaviorism see, for example, Shagrir 2005.
There are metaphysical considerations regarding the subject of the relation between a system’s whole and its parts. Since some theses of emergence address this issue, and there is a strong connection between functionalism and emergence, perhaps the thesis of emergence is the right candidate to deal with such metaphysical and empirical considerations. However, this goes beyond the scope of this paper.
This assumes, as I noted above, that we agree with Schwitzgebel’s criticism of the three means of resolution, eliminativism, neuro-chauvinism and extreme sparseness.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of this journal for his insightful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Eli Pitkovsky and the attendees of the Tel-Hai philosophy colloquium for a helpful discussion about an earlier draft of this paper.
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Dahan, O. The Problem of Other (Group) Minds (Response to Schwitzgebel). Philosophia 45, 1099–1112 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9876-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9876-2