, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 1027–1037 | Cite as

Fundamental Uncertainty and Values

  • Daniele ChiffiEmail author
  • Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen


This paper explores the intertwining of uncertainty and values. We consider an important but underexplored field of fundamental uncertainty and values in decision-making. Some proposed methodologies to deal with fundamental uncertainty have included potential surprise theory, scenario planning and hypothetical retrospection. We focus on the principle of uncertainty transduction in hypothetical retrospection as an illustrative case of how values interact with fundamental uncertainty. We show that while uncertainty transduction appears intuitive in decision contexts it nevertheless fails in important ranges of strategic game-theoretic cases. The methodological reasons behind the failure are then examined.


Fundamental uncertainty Values Hypothetical retrospection Uncertainty transduction Game theory 



Research supported by the Estonian Research Council (PUT1305, “Abduction in the Age of Fundamental Uncertainty”, PI A.-V. Pietarinen). We thank the reviewers for their insightful remarks.

Compliance with Ethical Standards


Estonian Research Council, Research Grant, Abduction in the age of fundamental uncertainty (PUT 1305).


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tallinn University of TechnologyTallinnEstonia

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