Advertisement

Philosophia

, Volume 43, Issue 2, pp 403–409 | Cite as

A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis

  • Matthew KopecEmail author
Article

Abstract

In this essay, I present a straightforward counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence.

Keywords

Uniqueness Epistemic permissiveness Disagreement Subjective bayesianism Epistemic instrumentalism 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank John Basl, Michael Goldsby, and Michael Titelbaum for helpful discussion, as well as three anonymous referees for their suggestions and criticisms. This research was supported, in part, by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation through their Sawyer Seminar entitled Theoretical Issues in Social Epistemology.

References

  1. Ballantyne, N., & Coffman, E. J. (2012). Conciliationism and uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90, 657–670.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Brueckner, A., & Bundy, A. (2012). On ‘epistemic permissiveness.’. Synthese, 188, 165–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Christensen, D. (2009). Disagreement as evidence: the epistemology of controversy. Philosophy Compass, 4, 756–767.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Christensen, D. forthcoming. Conciliation, uniqueness and rational toxicity. Noûs Google Scholar
  5. Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology Futures (pp. 216–236). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In L. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without Gods (pp. 194–214). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Greaves, H. (2013). Epistemic decision theory. Mind, 122, 915–952.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Kelly, T. (2005). The epistemic significance of disagreement. In J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (pp. 167–196). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement (pp. 111–174). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Kelly, T. (2013). Evidence can be permissive. In M. Steup, J. Turri, E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (pp. 298–312). Wiley.Google Scholar
  11. Kukla, A. (1994). Some limits to empirical inquiry. Analysis, 54, 153–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Lockard, M. (2013). Epistemic instrumentalism. Synthese, 190, 1701–1718.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. White, R. (2005). Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 445–459.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. White, R. (2013). Evidence Cannot Be Permissive. In M. Steup, J. Turri, E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (pp. 312–323). Wiley.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

Personalised recommendations