In this essay, I present a straightforward counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence.
KeywordsUniqueness Epistemic permissiveness Disagreement Subjective bayesianism Epistemic instrumentalism
I would like to thank John Basl, Michael Goldsby, and Michael Titelbaum for helpful discussion, as well as three anonymous referees for their suggestions and criticisms. This research was supported, in part, by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation through their Sawyer Seminar entitled Theoretical Issues in Social Epistemology.
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