Abstract
Vihvelin argues that Frankfurt-style cases should be divided into two kinds, according to when the trigger for the intention takes place: either prior to the agent's choice or after it. Most agree that only the former, which I call pre-decisional intervention, stands a chance of removing all of an agent's alternatives. Vihvelin notes that both sides in the dispute over whether there is a successful case of pre-decisional intervention assume that if there is a successful case, then it will be a case where the agent has no alternative. Vihvelin thinks this is a mistake: agents subject to pre-decisional intervention still have alternatives, and the intricate discussion and development of ever more complex Frankfurt-style cases is beside the point. She argues for this by presenting a case, purportedly analogous to Frankfurt-style cases, where it is clear that there are alternatives available. Fischer has replied by disputing the analogy. In this paper I argue that Vihvelin is right to think the cases are analogous, but that both Fischer and Vihvelin are wrong to think that Vihvelin's parallel case is one where there are alternatives. Despite appearances, this is not the case, and I construct a Fischer-inspired argument to show this.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
It is interesting to note that if Lowe’s semantics of counterfactuals are correct then an ambiguity is exactly what we have here Lowe 1990, p. 81.
References
Clarke, R. (2011). Responsibility, mechanisms, and capacities. The Modern Schoolman, 88(1), 161–169.
Fischer, J. M. (1994). The metaphysics of free will: An essay on control. Wiley-Blackwell.
Fischer, J. M. (2008). Freedom, foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: a reply to Vihvelin. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38(3), 327.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66(3), 829–839.
Ginet, C. (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: why I don’t find Frankfurt’s argument convincing. Noûs, 30, 403–417.
Hunt, D. P. (2005). Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives. In Free will and moral responsibility (p. 126).
Levy, N. (2008). Counterfactual intervention and agents’ capacities. The Journal of Philosophy, 105(5), 223–239. Available online at http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=20899757.
Lowe, E. J. (1990). Conditionals, context, and transitivity. Analysis, 50(2), 80–87.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.
Vihvelin, K. (2000). Freedom, foreknowledge, and the principle of alternate possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30(1), 1–23.
Vihvelin, K. (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: a reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38(3), 343.
Vihvelin, K. (2013). Causes, laws, and free will. Why determinism doesn’t matter. New York: Oxford University Press.
Widerker, D. (2003). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. In G. Watson (Ed.), Free will (2nd ed.). Oxford: OUP.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kittle, S. Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-decisional’ Intervention. Philosophia 42, 987–997 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9551-9
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9551-9