Abstract
Several philosophers have recently suggested that truths about unactualized metaphysical possibilities are true in virtue of the existence of actual objects and their dispositional properties. For example, on this view, it is true that unicorns are metaphysically possible only if some actual object has (or had) the disposition to bring it about that there are unicorns. This view, a dispositionalist version of what has recently been dubbed “The New Actualism,” is a proposal about the nature of modal truthmakers. But, I will argue, this proposal entails much more than that. Here, I will demonstrate that, if the modal truthmakers are the dispositional properties of actual objects, then either (i) there exists one or more causally potent necessary beings, or (ii) necessarily, there exists an actually infinite number of contingent beings.
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Notes
There are other varieties of The New Actualism. One could, for instance, ground modal claims in essences. It is plausible that I have the property of originating from a particular mother and father essentially. If that is correct, then it is metaphysically impossible for, say, Harry Truman to have been my father. This is ‘object essentialism.’ Others might argue that properties have essences. For instance, it is plausible that ‘being a horse’ and ‘being a human’ are essentially incompatible. If so, then it is metaphysically impossible for, say, something to be both a horse and a human at the same time. This is ‘property essentialism.’ Here, I will deal only with the dispositionalist version of The New Actualism. For more details about these other versions, see Vetter (2011).
At least, this is true of deterministic dispositions. For probabilistic dispositions, X would only probabilify M.
NAD theorists in general reject possible worlds, but only because (they argue) worlds cannot be the things in virtue of which the modal truths are true. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly remain metaphysical possibilities—i.e., ways things could be. The claim of NAD is only that such things, whatever their ontological status, cannot be the truthmakers for modal truths. In this paper, I will sometimes use the term ‘possible world’ as a synonym for the various complete, or maximal, “ways things could be.” This should not, however, be understood as attributing any particular ontological commitment regarding worlds to NAD.
Again, by ‘possible world’ I simply mean ‘complete way things could be,’ and attribute no particular ontological status of worlds to NAD.
Note that the truth of most propositions of the form < Possibly, S > will be over-determined. That is, just as most non-modal propositions are made true by a wide range of individuals—e.g., <A dog exists > is made true by any of the particular dogs, Sparky, Fido, Rex, and so on—so too with most modal propositions. For instance, <Possibly, a novel exists > is made true by any actual novel as well as any person with the relevant dispositions to bring it about that a novel exists (e.g., by writing one); and perhaps even stranger things (we are told, for instance, that a troupe of monkeys sitting at typewriters could produce a novel if given enough time).
Why not uninstantiated dispositions? Two reasons: (1) First, NAD is a version of Naturalism about modal truthmakers. As such, these truthmakers will not be abstract entities such as uninstantiated universals. (2) NAD proposes that the modal truthmakers must be causally efficacious. That being the case, uninstantiated universals cannot be the modal truthmakers (since they are not capable of causing anything).
However, this is not to say that NAD theorists must deny that there are some dispositional properties that possibly exist, but do not actually exist—it is just that, if they exist, they do not make modal truths true. For instance, <Possibly, a human being jumps 10 feet high > is likely to be true, even if no human being presently possesses the relevant disposition. But, a human being could possess the relevant disposition. So, there are probably some uninstantiated, possible dispositional properties. However, the truthmaker for the proposition, <Possibly, a human being jumps 10 feet high > is not some uninstantiated disposition, but rather some actual one; namely, it is some actual dispositional property of some actual object which could manifest in such a way that it sets in motion a causal chain which ultimately results in some object instantiating the relevant disposition.
Why must the disposition ‘probabilify’ these outcomes? Why can it not instead guarantee them? Answer: If object X possesses a disposition, D, which guarantees that, when in circumstance C, X will produce manifestation M, then there would be no divergences. Rather, if X has a disposition only to produce M when in circumstance C, then any scenario where X manifests as anything other than M when placed in C is a metaphysical impossibility.
In short, in order for any states of affairs other than the actual ones to be brought about, the causal nodes must be indeterministic. If each node determined its outcome (with a probability of one), then possibility would not take a branching structure—rather, there would be only one “branch” off of each dispositional node, such that all of the metaphysical possibilities would trace only a single straight line (namely, the actual world).
Note also that, on NAD, even if the counterfactual < if X were in C, then X would M > is true, this does not guarantee that the state of affairs M is a metaphysical possibility. For M to be possible, the state of affairs of X’s being in C must itself be a metaphysical possibility (and this will be the case only if there exists some actual causal node, where one of its possible manifestations is the bringing about of X’s being in C). For instance, Pruss writes, “Suppose Churchill has a deterministic disposition to reject the bribe. Then, this disposition necessitates his rejection should he be offered the bribe under the circumstances involved in the disposition’s antecedent. … If his disposition is indeterministic, then we cannot say it necessitates the rejection, but at least it seems we can say that it possibilifies it, though still only if the conditions are somehow already possibilified.” (italics in original, bold mine; note, however, that Pruss prefers to use the terms ‘powers’ and ‘capabilities’ for non-necessitating, indeterministic possibilifiers).
Note that ‘becomes available for actualization’ does not mean ‘becomes possible’, but something rather more colloquial. On NAD, all of the branches are always metaphysically possible. But, which possible branch (i.e., manifestation of a disposition) gets actualized will depend upon which manifestation condition gets actualized. For instance, if I had chosen bleach as my morning beverage, then branches including choking and death would have ‘become available’—but not if I had chosen tea (assuming it was not poisoned tea).
Strictly speaking, the future would also be in some sense “open” if 'there is at least one metaphysically possible world which diverges from the actual world at t, but then re-converges with it at some later time after t. But, for simplicity, I will only consider those worlds which differ from the actual world at all times after t. Surely, if one endorses The Assumption of Open Futures, then one will endorse this latter claim as well (i.e., Divergence is Possible). It would be incredibly counter-intuitive if it turned out that, while there are possible worlds where some future times are divergences from the actual world, all of them are such that they inevitably re-converge with the actual world at some time after their divergence.
This same point is noted by Mackie (2006), in her discussion of The Overlap Requirement.
My conclusion is this: Once one accepts GOR and Divergence (as any New Actualist Dispositionalist should), there are only four choices regarding axiom (4) and the possibility of converging worlds. Namely:
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1.
Accept both (4) and converging worlds.
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2.
Accept (4), but reject converging worlds.
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3.
Reject (4), but accept converging worlds.
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4.
Reject both (4) and converging worlds.
The first option, I have shown, is impossible. Of the remaining three options, both the second and the fourth will deliver the conclusion of this paper. It is only by embracing the third option—rejecting transitivity, but accepting converging worlds—that the NAD theorist will successfully escape my conclusion. If the NAD theorist wishes to endorse this third option, so be it; though I find it to be the least plausible of the three available, for reasons cited above (as will, I expect, most NAD theorists)
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By ‘necessary being,’ I simply mean something that exists in every possible world (i.e., is included in every “way things could be”). I do not use the term synonymously with ‘God,’ as some theists do (though a God would be a fitting example of a causally potent necessary being).
For instance, Alexander Pruss (2011) explicitly endorses the view that God, a necessary being, is the first causal node which grounds all of the metaphysical possibilities (though, his conclusion of theism is derived from reasons independent of New Actualist Dispositionalism; see part IV, Sections 1–2 of his book).
References
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Borghini, A., & Williams, N. E. (2008). A Dispositional Theory of Possibility. Dialectica, 62(1), 21–41.
Contessa, G. (2010). Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism. Synthese, 174(3), 341–353.
Jacobs, J. D. (2010). A Powers Theory of Modality: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 227–248.
Mackie, P. (2006). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pruss, A. R. (2011). Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds. New York: Continuum.
Vetter, B. (2011). Recent work: Modality Without Possible Worlds. Analysis, 71(4), 742–754.
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Vance, C. Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Necessary Origin. Philosophia 42, 1111–1127 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9520-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9520-3